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PREFACE 
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is 
now a past history, along with the seventeen previous Com-
mittees and commissions which had reported on the Palestine 
problem. 
But this Committee had several unusual features. It 
was a United Nations Committee and the Big Powers had no 
part in it. It was instructed to complete its work in one 
hundred and twenty days. The Committee visited four con-
tinents, heard many advocates and collected nearly two 
hundred pounds of typed or printed evidence. Lastly it was 
the first international Committee to study the problem of 
Jewry inside and outside Palestine. 
I was in Palestine during the Committee's hearing in 
Jerusalem in 1947 and I was in the United States when the 
United Nations, under Pressure of Politics, voted for the 
Committee's decision- the partition of Palestine. Since 
then, it was my privilege to give a first hand account of 
the Arab-Jewish conflict by all that I saw, read and heard. 
I thought it might be useful to share with others the polit-
ical education which it was my privilege to obtain in my own 
country. 
I was surprised and irritated, in New York as well as 
in California, by the almost complete disregard and ignorance 
.... 
of the Palestine problem and particularly the Arab case. 
Only those few .Americans vrho had actual experience of the 
Ifiddle East sho'llred any real understanding of the problem. 
It is this ignorance, indeed• on th_e part of the .American 
intelligentsia. that .. I.ed me· to·'Write' this narrative. If it 
does nothing else, I hope that it indicates the irrespon-
sibility of those who find it easy to make up their minds 
ii 
far away from the scene of action; and secondly, the need, 
on the part of British and .Ame·rican statesmen, for imagin-
ation and understanding strong enough to see through official 
papers the human problems which they too often conceal. 
Through my research I have found that there is in exist-
ance already a considerable body of literature in English 
and other European languages on the history of the British 
mandate and the work of the United Ne.tions' Special Commit-
tee on Palestine. But it has to be used with care, partly 
because of the high percentage of open or veiled propaganda, 
and partly because the remoteness of the indispensable Arabic 
sources has militated against real fairness, even in the 
works of neutral and fair minded historians. Zionist propa-
ganda is active, highly organized and wide-spread; the '"orld 
press, at any rate in the democracies of the West, is largely 
amenable to it; it connnands many of the available channels 
for the dissemination of news, and more particularly those 
of the English speaking world. Arab propaganda is in compar-
ison primitive and infinitely less successful; the Arabs 
have little of the skill and financial resources which 
make Jewish propaganda so effective. 
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Another vast body of information comes from official 
British sources, but here, too, the requirements of true 
impartiality are not met. Nor can they be, until the time 
comes when the British Government can rel~ase more documents. 
for publication. 
The members of the United Nqtions' Special Committee 
on Ealeatine enjoy the benefits of a well-equipped Zionist 
office in Geneva, which supplies them with information in 
a for.m and a language suited to their comprehension. There 
is no similar channel on the Arab side. Even such sources 
as the Arabic Preas of Paleatine,which provides a valuable 
body of comment on the operation of the mandate as it affects 
the Arab population, are not used. Petitions and memoranda 
drawn up in Arabic have to be submitted at Geneva in trans-
lation. It requires more than mere transposition to turn 
good Arabic into readable English or French, and the Arabs 
of Palestine are unskilled in the art of presenting their 
case in a foreign language. The result is that the knowledge 
possessed by the members of the Committee is visibly one-sided 
and their examination of the working of the mandate reads 
as though it was conducted for the most part by advocates of 
the Zionist case. 
The writer, as a native of that troubled part of the 
wprld and as a student of international relations, believes 
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that the study of the Palestine partition is beset with 
peculiar difficulties. In the first place, the material 
is enormous and widely scattered. In the second place, it 
is to an unusual degree conflicting and inconsistent. Third~ 
ly, a large proportion of it which on inspection appears 
relevant and promising turns out, when sifted, to rest upon 
false assumptions or questionable data. Lastly, the passions 
aroused by Palestine have done so much to obscure the truth 
that the facts have become enveloped in a mist of sentiment, 
legand and propaganda, which acts as a smoke-screen of al-
most inpenetrable density. 
I do not claim that the present study has necessarily 
mastered all those difficulties. But I have been made 
acutely aware of their existence by my research, and they 
have led me to the conclusion that the most formidable ob-
stacle to an understanding, and therefore to a solution, 
of the Palestine problem lies not so much in its inherent 
complexity as in the solid jungle of legend and propaganda 
which has grown up around it. To the ordinary tasks of a 
student dealing with the facts is thus added an obligation 
to deal with the pseudo-facts and dethrone them from their 
illegitimate eminence. It is as much his duty to expose 
the fallacies as to assert the truth, and the duty is all 
the more imperative as he is dealing with a tragedy, in 
i·rhich innocent lives are being sacrificed every day and 
human beings kept in anguish and suffering. 
T 
To discharge my responsibility properly and faithful-
ly, I have presented this paper to the reader in a well 
rounded and balanced shape, starting with a short intro-
duction as an essential background to my theme. The purpose 
of this introduction is to orient the reader as to the 
nature, origin and the development of the Palestine question. 
This part shall be called Palestine and Power of Politics. 
Part two is the main theme of this paper. The United 
Nations and the Partition of Palestine -- mainly the work 
of the United Nations' Special Corr~ittee on Palestine which 
offers the students of international relations a good lesson 
in pressure of politics. 
The first three chapters of this part deal with the 
origin, composition, term of references, chairmanship, work-
ing committees and the decision of the jury (United Nations' 
Special Committee on Palestine). 
Chapter four is viev~oints, comments and attitudes of 
the members of the committees and the parties involved. It 
is a critical evaluation of the United !rations' Special Com-
mittee on Palestine's decision. 
Chapter five is the considerations and observ-ations. 
It is another critical evaluation of the Committee's parti-
tion-plan in the light of -- Israel-- in the pattern of the 
Hi ddl e East • 
Chapter six is the conclusion in which I will elaborate 
vi 
the rebirth of Israel and the shifting of balance of power 
in the 11iddle East as a result of the attitude of the big 
powers who supported the Committee's partition-plan in the 
United Nations' final decision. 
Whatever the Committee's merits and shortcomings, the 
present Israel Stateris a growing concern. The relations 
between Israel and the Arab countries appear to be char-
acterized b~ a "bad neighbor policy." 'Whether the Arabs 
will admit the de facto existence of Israel and come to 
settlement remains to be seen. But time favors Israel, and 
the longer it maintains itself the more difficult it will 
become for the Arabs to ignore its existence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PART I 
PALESTINE AND POWER POLITICS 
{THE ORIGIN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM} 
CH.APTER I 
Eal.estine and the Great Powers 
Geographically Palestine is the heart of one of the 
mQ.st important zones of political conflict in the world--
the Near East. The Ara.b-.Jewish question in Palestine can-
not be considered in a. vacuum. It is surrounded by many 
political forces that must be taken into account in attempt-
ing any solution of the problem. These forces are the old 
:famil.ia.r ones -- imperialism,. world politics and nationalism. 
In the Near Eastern area British, Russian, American, .Jewish 
and Arab-MOslem interests meet. As the most troublesome spot 
111;f the area, Palestine is ip.evitably involved in any settle-
ment affecting the Near East. 
Great Britain and Palesinte 
As a world power and empire, Great Britain has been 
vitally concerned in the Near and Middle East. The opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 was one of the prominent links of 
the chain binding England to the Near East. All along the 
Mediterranean-Suez -- Red Sea route to India and the Far East, 
England has built and maintained security outposts -- Malta, 
. Cy:prus, Egypt, and Aden are prominent examples. That vital 
Kear Eastern zone she is endeavoring to protect from the 
many forces that are today challenging her predominant 
position there. 
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The Near East is strategically located on other commun-
ications systems besides the Suez Oana1 route. Dry land 
routes connecting Europe, Asia and Africa traverse this 
area. Russia has historically tried to open windows to the 
Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean through the Near Eastern 
wall. Whether she will be successful in the future remains 
to be seen. During and since the recent war, air bases in 
the Rear East have become of increasing importance to both 
Great Britain and the United States. Furthermore, the Near 
East is rich in natural resources -- Egyptian cotton, Pales-
tinian minerals from the Dead Sea, and petroleum. Finally, 
this area may become in the future an important market. 
Great Britain, although facing many demands from a 
rising Arab nationalism in recent years, still retains in-
fluence in practically every state in the Near East. Be-
sides being the mandatory power in Palestine, She maintains 
a very special position in independent Egypt where, under 
treaty, she has;maintained troops since the nineteenth cen-
tury. She is negotiating at present time to withdraw from 
Egypt and ·f'9r ·that· reason she is all the more reluctant to 
surrender her other positions in the Near East. Iraq and 
the recently created independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan 
are in special. treaty relations with Great Britain which 
per.mit the latter to maintain armed forces in these two 
countries. Klng Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia receives a sub-
sidy from the British government. British oil interests 
dominate southern Iran, Iraw, and KUwait. 
France and Falestine 
3 
France has been largely squeezed out of Syria and Leb-
anon by the course of the recent war. She (France) support-
ed the Zionist cause hoping to get a strategic hold in the 
new state. 
The U. s. s. R. and Palestine 
One of the greatest pressures in the Near East is that 
exerted by the Soviet Union. Some have said that Great Brit-
ain might pull out of the Suez canal and come to terms with 
Egypt if it were not for the shadow of the U • S. s. R. fall-
ing over the Near Eastern lands. The historic drive of Russia. 
towards warm water ports is too familiar to describe here. 
There has been a decided change in the Soviet attitude 
towards Palestine. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 
Zionism in Russia was persecuted more than any other nati. onal 
movement. Hebrew was the only language considered counter-
revolutionary in itself, and it was officially outlawed. Anti-
Semitism, however, was forbidden. The reason for this is that 
Zionism was looked upon as the ally and spearhead of British 
imperialism. This ally of Great Britain could not be tolerated 
--
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in the u. s. s. R.tl) 
Then came the 1939 White Paper and the war. Zionism 
was no longer so closely wedded to the British Empire. Very 
significantly in October 1943,. Ivan Maisky, Vice-Commissar 
of Foreign .Af'fairs, paid the first Soviet visit to Palestine. 
During the Nazi invasion, for the first time Russian Jewry 
was allowed to make contact with and appeal to world JeW!Y• 
In january, 1944, an exhibition showing the progress of the 
Jews in Palestine was admitted in M0scow.(2) In February, 
1945, at a Trade Union Conference in London the Soviet del-
egate voted for a resolution supporting Palestine as a home-
• • • ' II 
land for the ~ews.(3) And so the examples multiply of the 
Soviet wooing of Palestine. That there may be grounds for 
cooperation on the Jewish side is seAn in the partly social-
ized character of the Jewish agricultural economy in Pales-
tine -- the collective and cooperative farms, and in the 
fact that so many of the Palestinian jews are from Russia or 
other lands at present under Russian control.(4) 
(1) Elia.hu Ben-HOrin, "The Soviet· Wooing of Palestine", 
Harper's Magaz~ne,_ April 1944, p. 414. 
(2} Ibid., :Pil• 415-416. 
(3) Grant s. MCClellan, "Palestine and America's Role· in 
the :Middle East," Foreign Policy Reports, july 1, 1945,p.l01. 
(4) Ben-HOrin, op. cit.~ p. 418. 
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Ear have the Soviets overlooked the Mnslems. The BOl-
sheviks have increased their interest in the MOslem culture, 
languages and religion and have stressed the unity of MOs-
lems in Russia. wi th_those abroad. Russia has recently es-
tablished diplomatic relations with several of the Arab 
states. In 1944 pilgrims for the first time traveled from 
the Soviet Union to Meoca.(5) Verbally, the u.s. s. R. 
supports Arab demands of independence but distrusts the Arab 
League a.s a British creation. 
Russia was very concerned with the conflict; For one 
thing she could hope to establish a military foothold. Other 
important reasons for their support to the Jews are: 
1. They hoped to win new friends among the 
Zionist in the Western World, as well as 
in Palestine. 
2. Russia wanted to see British influence and 
above all, British Military power weakened 
in the Middle East. 
3. Russia wanted to damage American influence 
in the Middle East by encouraging the United 
States and backing her in the Jewish support. 
Russia is looking for the oil of Saudia Arabia. 
4. Soviet experts believed that partition was 
certain to bring chaos and violence to the 
Mlddle East, which it did, and Russia will 
benefit from that chaos. 
The Arab leaders had declared more than once that if 
the United States will continue supporting the Jews, sooner 
(5) MeClellan, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
or ~ater they will be on the Soviet side. Zionists are 
using the same argument, that unless the United States will 
give them fUll support in the form of le,ansl :$500,ooo,ooo, 
arms and political backing, Israel will turn pro-Russian. 
Depending on the course of events, either the Arabs or the 
Zionists may prove right. What the Russians are hoping, of 
course, is that they will both prove right.(6) 
The United States and Palestine 
6 
Because of the large and influential Jewish population 
in the United States it was natural for the Zionists to turn 
their attention to this country almost from the inception of 
their movement. The role which the United States has played 
in world affairs since 1914 made it necessary for them to ob-
tain America's endorsement of their program, and if possible, 
its active support. They have succeeded in both.(?) 
Politically, the Zionists have secured the American en-
dorsement of their program as expressed in campaign state-
ments which were merely to secure the Jewish votes, and pre-
vailed to throw the weight of its influence on their side 
and sponsor their demands. On August 31, 1918, President 
Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration as contained 
{6) Kermit Roosevelt Arab's Oil and History (New York: 
Harper Brothers, 1949~, p. 247. 
(7) Ibid., pp. 84, 99, 178, 198. 
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in the following letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen s. Wise, 
ed: 
•I have watched with deep and sincere interest the 
~regress of the Zionist movement in the United States 
and in the Allied countries since the declaration by Mr. 
::Be.lfour, on behalf o1!. the English Government of Great 
Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of 
a National Home for the Jewish people." (8) 
President Warren G. Earding said on June 1, 1921; 
"It is impossible for one who ha• studied at all 
the services of the Hebrew people to avoid the faith 
that they will one day be restored to their historic 
national home and there enter on a new and yet greater 
phase of their contribution to the advance of human-
ity. (9) 
President Calvin Coolidge on June 13, 1924, declared: 
"I have so many times reiterated my interest in 
this great movement that anything which I might add 
would be a repetition of former statements, but I afu 
nevertheless glad to have this opportunity to express 
again my sympathy with the deep and intense longing 
which finds such fine expression in the Jewish Nation-
al Homeland in Palestine," (10) 
President Herbert Hoover on September 21, 1928, assert-
"I have watched with genuine admiration the steady 
and unmistakable progress made in the rehabilitation of 
Palestine •••• It is very gratifying to note that many 
American Jews, Zionists as well as non-Zionists, have 
rendered such splendid service to this cause which mer-
its the sympathy and moral encouragement of everyone."(ll) 
{8) ·Ray s. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Lett ere, Vol. VIII, (New Yo~:k,. 1939) ,pp. !372 ff. 
(9) Charles R. Gellent, 'The Palestine Problem, (Washington, 
D.C.: The Library of Congress, ~~rch 1; 1947}, p. 111. 
(10) Ibid,, p. 112, 
(11) Ibid., p. 112. 
B 
..... 
At the time Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York 
was campaigning for the presidency in 1932 he wrote to Pres-
ident ~rris Rothenberg of the Zionist Organization of Amer-
ica clarifying his position aw to the Balfour Declaration and 
endorsing it,(l2) 
In 1938 President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Mayor 
Thomas .T. Spella;cy of Hartford on October 19 in which he ex-
pressed his sympathy with the establishment of a Jewish nat-
ional home in Palestine.(l3) 
During the election of 1944, to get the Jewish votes as 
usual, the Democratic National Convention announced, 
We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted 
Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy 
as to result in the establishment there of a free and 
democratic Jewish Common Wealth. (14) 
On October, 1944, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Repub-
lican candidate for president, issued a statement endorsing 
the Zionist plans of his party and declaring that he was for 
the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and Democratic Jew-
ish Common Wealth, 
(12) 
!Hl 
On October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt announced: 
With the Traditional American Policy, I am con-
vinced that the American people should give their 
support to this aim, and if reelected I shall help to 
bring about its realization. (15) 
Ibid,, p. 112. 
Ibid,, p. 112. 
Ibid., p. 113. 
Ibid., p. 113. 
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Immediately following President Roosevelt's death, 
the Zionists trained their guns on his successor, Harry s. 
Truman and a week later newspaper readers were told that 
the problem of Palestine was upper-most in the president's 
mind, and was claiming more of his attention than any other. 
He declared: 
"I am communicating directly with the British 
Government in an effort to have the doors of Pales-
tine opened to those displaced persons who wish to 
go there. (16) 
Yet 1946 was an election year, and some stand would have to 
be taken. On October 4, President Truman again issued a 
statement calling for the immediate admission of 100,000 
~ews to Palestine. He also supported the Jewish Agency pro-
posal for the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of 
its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area 
of Palestine.(l7) 
The story behind this statement is simple and was par-
tially reported at that time.(l8) Messrs. Mead and Lehman, 
good Democrats, were waging a losing campaign for Governor 
and Senator respectively in New York State. Political leaders 
believe, though this has never been tested, the Zionist in 
(16) R. W. Thompson, The Palestine Problem.(London: Andrew 
Melrose, 1947), p. 91. 
(17) New York Times, Oct. 5, 1946, p. 2. 
c 
(18) See the article by James Reston in New York times of 
Oct. 7, 1946, :p. 4. -- --·. 
New York would vote as a bloc and might win or lose an 
election. In the heat of the campaign, Mead and Lehman 
informed the White House that a statement favoring Zion-
ism must be made immediately, for Dewey, Mead's opponent, 
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was reported to be on the point of issuing one himself.(l9) 
The White HOuse referred the matter for drafting to the 
State Department, but was not satisfied with the State De-
partment's first effort. Meanwhile New York called again: 
if President Truman did not issue a statement, Mead and Le-
hman would do so, publicly calling upon Mr. Truman to support 
it. Working under great pressure - domestic polititical 
pressure logically unrelated to Palestine - the October 4 
statement was produced. 
It was diwturbing because it emphasized, more dramat-
ically than ever before, but not for the first time, the 
blatent way in which local political concerns may determine 
American foreign policy. Even the timing was obvious - not 
only close to election day, but on the eve of an important 
Jewish religious festival. Many Jews deplored this appeal 
to deep religious sentiment for obviously political purposes. 
The final act in the partition of Palestine was played 
out at the General Assembly in the fall of 1947. On October 
11, the United States delegation declared itself, with a few 
(19) New York Times, Oct. 7, 1946, p. 5. 
,. 
reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as sub-
mitted b,y the United Nation's Special Committee. 
The present course of world crisis will increasingly 
force upon Americans the realization that their national 
interests and those of the JeWish State in Palestine are 
going to conflict. It is to be hoped that American Zion-
ists and non-Zionists alike will come to grips with the 
realization of the problem.(20) Mr. Kermit Roosevelt has 
expressed his concern in these words: 
11 
"If the future of our position in the Middle East is 
dark, at least the lesson to be learned from the Palestine 
case is clear. The process by which Zionist Jews have been 
able to promote American support for the partition of Pal-
estine demonstrates the vital need of a foreign policy based 
on national rather than partisan interests. A Palestine 
Zionist, indeed may dismiss the Russian threat to the United 
States from his considerations, but an American may not, even 
if he is a Zionist, and as every American Zionist should think 
of himself as an American first, so should every Democrat and 
Republican. Only when the National interests of the United 
States, in their highest terms, take precedence over all other 
considerations, can a logical, forseeing foreign policy be 
(20) Kermit Roosevelt, "The Palestine Partition of Pales-
tine", The Fuddle East Journal, Jan., 1948, p. 6. 
12 
evo1ved. Be American political leader has the right to eo~~ 
promiee American interest to gain partisan votes. The role 
the United States assumed in the Palestine question is not 
the responsibility of Zionists alone, but of each American 
citizen."(21) 
As to the attitude of the State Department, Crum, a United 
States member of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, 
courageously stated that during his mission he was given a 
secret file from the State Department, the existence of which 
apparently not even president Truman had known. According to 
this file, since 1938, each time a promise was made to Amer-
ican Jewry regarding Palestine, the State Department prompt-
ly sent a message to the Arab rulers discounting it and re~ 
assuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was prom-
ised publicly to the Jews, "nothing would be done to change 
the situation in Palestine". This File, according to Crum, 
confirmed the charge of double-dealing that had been hurled 
at both the United States and Great Britain.(22) 
President T~uman's interference is understandable; he 
had nothing to lose. lie receives the gratitude of all the 
Jews of America, but none of the Arabs' hatred, for there 
are few in the United States. It is as if Britain, to please 
her African Colonies interfered with the Ame~ican color ques-
tion. 
(21) Ibid., p. 16. 
(22) Bartely c. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain,(Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1947,)p. 36. 
Palestine in Near Eastern Politics 
Although small in size, Palestine has been a much 
coveted land, together with Syria, of which was a part 
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until 191.4, Palewtine has been the meeting places of Asia, 
Africa and Europe, the East and the West. It has been the 
bridge of empire, the highway of commerce, the crossroads of 
the world. 
Palestine is too small a country. It is closer in size 
to a county than a country. Its total area was ten thousand 
four hundred thirty square miles, about the size of the State 
of Vermont. You can circle it in an automobile between break-
fast and dinner. From 10,000 feet in the air you can see:· all 
of it with the naked eye. It is only 160 miles long, with 
?0 miles wide at the broadest point. 
Three Faiths 
The Pope announced in 194? that Palestine does not be-
long either to the Jews or to the Arabs, but that it belongs 
to every Christian, and every Christian nation, and on behalf 
of the Catholics all over the world he demanded that Pales-
tine should be an international state under the United Nations 
rule. 
But to the Jews of Palestine, it is the land of Israel 
and they believe that Jehovah gave it to Abraham;for God 
said, "Unto thy seed will I give this Land." In Jerusalem 
arose the Temple of Solomon. Here was the native soil of 
the prophets. Here are the sanctified places associated with 
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their lives. 
For the MOslems, Palestine is the second sacred place 
after Mecca and Medina. They believe that their great pro ... 
phet, MOhammed, once made a miraculous night-ride on an en-
chanted steed, from Mecca to the Haram esh-shariff (a holy 
place in Jerusalem) and then through the heavens with the 
angel Gabriel, back to the Haram, and once more through the 
skies to Mecca. 
The General Assembly has requested the Special Committee 
"to give most careful consideration to the religious inter-
ests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity." 
The wor4ing of the above request clearly indicates that 
the General Assembly had in mind not only the religious in-
terests of three faiths whose millions of believers are 
spread over the world. For those believers Palestine is 
Holy Land, because it is associate~ with the origin and his-
tory of their respective religions, because it contains sites 
and shrines which they hold in particular veneration, and be-
cause close to and associated with many of those sites and 
shrines there are religious, eduqational and eleemoysna~ 
establishments which the communities concerned wish to pre-
serve. 
Strategically, Palestine is a vital outpost against any 
threat to the Suez Canal. It is in the heart of the oil-rich 
Middle East, the mastery of which may well be a decisive fact-
or in the struggle between the Western Democracies and the 
Communistic Slavic Countries. 
There is no other section in the world that has the 
same amount of minerals as does the Dead Sea. (PCL : Po-
tassium Chloride.) If all the nations of the world would 
use PCL from the Dead Sea, they would need one thousand 
years to exhaust it. 
The chief attraction of the Middle East of which Pal-
estine is a part lies, however, not so much in its wealth, 
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as in its geographic position. The Eastern Mediterranean, 
the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf -- the most vital sea routes 
in world trade and communications depend on the Ydddle East. 
It is the "Grand Central" of the world. 
The Middle East has been a much coveted land.(~3) Rus-
sian, German, British, French, and Italian, imperialists of 
every brand all turned to the Middle East in their search 
for conquest and aggrandizement. The Middle East is a mighty 
crossroad. He who holds that crossroad, can forbid the pas-
sage of commerce and of military supplies from Europe to Asia 
or Africa. The Middle East invented the wheel on which mod-
ern civilization is built, and it is now supplying oil to keep 
that wheel turning.(24) 
(23) E. Ben-Horin, The }liddle East, (New York: w.w. Norton & 
Co., Inc., 1943),p. 11. 
(24} F1fty percent of the world's oil is in the Middle East 
and thirty-two percent in the United States. The production 
of one barrel is $.06 in the Middle East, while it is from 
$1.50 to %3.00 in the United States. One well in Iran pro-
duces as much as 800 wells in the United States; one well in 
Saudi Arabia produces as much as 1,000 wells in the United States. 
No European aggressor, whether Germany or Russia nowt 
can march its armies into the oil lands, and the Dead Sea, 
or the treasure house of Africa, except through the Itiddle 
East. 
The sea route from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean 
passes through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the 
Red Sea.. 
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Two of the three major Asiatic routes run through the 
Arab East.(25) They are the shortest, cheapest, and safest 
routes -- Suez and the Palestine-Syrian Seaboard. The third 
is through Turkey. Hence, the Arab East provides one of the 
world's most important routes. 
The air routes which link Europe with India, Ceylon, 
Burma, Malaya, South China, and Australia are dependent on 
refueling bases in Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. 
To paraphrase a geopolitician of the past generation, 
lfWho controls the Middle East, controls the World Islands; and 
who controls the World Islands, controls the world." 
(25) The Arab East consists of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
countries of the fertile crescent and Egypt; see, Problems 
of the Middle East,-American Christian Palestine Committee, 
New York University, 194?, p. 1. 
CHAPTER II 
WAR PROMISES 
Conflicting Promises -- The Creation of the Problem 
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When World War I began, the British Government immed-
iately realized that the Turks and their German Allies could 
attack its life line with a double-barreled weapon. They 
could make Palestine the base for a military campaign against 
the Suez Canal. They could get the Turkish Sultan who was 
also Caleph, or religious leader, of all Mohammedans to pro-
claim a holy war against the Allies. Thus all MDslems from 
11orocco to India might be induced to take up arms against 
Great Britain in the hope that, dying, they would win etern-
al salvation. For was it not written that, 
Whosoever falls in b~ttle, his sins will be for-
given; at the day of judgment his wounds shall be re-
splendent as vermilion and ordoriferous as musk and 
the loss of his limbs shall be supplied by the wings 
of angels and cherubims.(l) 
The Turks fired both barrels, and the call was issued 
in the first month of Turkey's entry into vrar. First came 
the Fetva ( a Fetva, in Arabic is FatiwaJ it is a formal 
pronouncement made by the appropriate theological authority 
on matters involving the interpretation of the Canon Law)(2) 
(l) Caught from memory. 
(2) Dr. Shiek Abo-Elusser Abideen, Issool Ashariha,(Islamic 
Law), (Damascus: Syrian University Press, 1939), p. 3. 
18 
rendered by the Sha.ikhal-Islam on the seventh of November, 
in which that dignitary, the highest theological official 
in the Ottoman Empire, declared it a sacred personal duty 
on all MOslems in the world, including tho~e living under 
the rule of Great Britain, France, or Ru~sia, to unite a• 
gainst those three enemies of Islam; to take up arms against 
them and their allies; and to refuse in all circumstances, 
even with the death penalty, to assist the governments of 
the Entente in their attacks on the Ottoman Empire and its 
German and Austro-Hungarian defenders. Then came the Sul-
tan proclamation to the army and the fleet, issued on the 
eleventh, in which he e.xhorted them to fight for the liber-
ation of enslaved Islam as well as in the defence of a 
threatened Empire; lastly, there was the manifesto to the 
MOslem world, issued on the twenty-third over the signatures 
of the Shaikhal-Islam and of the twenty-eight other religiouw 
dignitaries. The Sultan stated in the manifesto, "I command 
that his manifesto be distributed in all the Moslem coun-
tries." It called upon all the Moslems of the world, whether 
subjects of the Entente Powers or not to obey the injunctions 
of the Holy Book as interpreted by the sacred Fetva, and par-
. 
ticipate in the defence of Islam and the Holy Places. But 
the attack on the Suez Canal fell flat and the holy war,when 
it was proclaimed, proved to be a dud. 
One reason for this failure was that the Arabic-speaking 
inhabitants of Syria and Arabia were discontented under the 
Turkish yoke and were therefore not at all eager to fight 
for their masters. Thus when the Sultan-Caleph proclaimed 
the Holy War, the Arabian King Hussein refused to allow it 
to be preached in the mosques of the Holy Cities. He took 
no further action and the next move came from the British 
side. 
The British.hoped they might persuade the Arabs and 
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their King Hussein to start a rebellion against the Turkish 
Government. For that reason Britain opened negotiations with 
King Hussein. She promised that the independence of the Ar· 
abian Peninsula and Syria would be assured when peace was made. 
Sir Henry McMahon, then High Commissibner in Egypt, on 
behalf of the British Government, wrote to Sharif Hussein and 
assured him in return for his help and pledge, that England 
had promised to recognize an independent and united Arab 
State east of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The Arabs 
entered the war in 1916. They worked from Arabia under Fei-
sal (Hussein's son) and Lawerance. That the Arabs rendered 
the Allied cause valuable assistance and completely fulfill-
ed their side of the bargain has never been questioned. The 
only point under dispute is whether the British pledge in-
cluded Palestine or not. The correspondence between Hussien 
and Mc1~on which began in July,l915 and ended in January, 
1916, is too long and complicated to examine here. For over 
twenty years the British Government refused to publish the 
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correspondence. The correspondence was finally released to 
the world in 1939.(3) 
Part of the publication is as follows: King Hussein 
wrote Sir Henry on ~uly 18, 1915, outlining the terms on 
which he was willing to lead an Arab revolt against Turkey. 
His first condition was the following: 
England was to acknowledge the independence of 
the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Messina 
and Adana up to the 370 of latitude, up to the bor-
ders of Persia, on the sofith by the Indian Ocean, 
with the exception of Aden to remain as it is, and 
the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. 
England is to approve of the proclamation of an Arab 
Khalifate of Islam.(4) 
::art O·f the McMahon letter of October 24, 1915 to King 
Hussein is as follows: 
I am empowered in the name of the Government of 
Great Britain to give you the following awsurance and 
make the following reply to your letter. Subject to 
the above modification Great Britain is prepared to 
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs 
within the territories included in the limits and 
boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of 1-!ecca. (5) 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement 
NO sooner had Sir McMahon clinched his bargain with 
Sheriff Hussein than conversations were opened by Great Brit-
ain with France and Russia. The French delegate was F. George 
Picot, who had served in Syria as consul prior to the War, and 
(3) Maugham Robin, op. cit., p. 29. 
(4) Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39, The Hussein-McMahen 
Correspondence, "Antonius," pp. 164-183. See Appendix I. 
(5) See Appendix. Ne: I. 
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and Sir V~rk Sykes. The two delegates together with Russia 
drew up a scheme dividing what they had promised to be an 
independent country under Hussein. It was thus divided up 
into what we call today Syria, Lebanon (which was given to 
France); Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan (which was given 
to Great Britain). White Russia obtained Eryerum, Trebizond, 
Van Bi ttis and tae Southern Part of Kurdi stan. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement has two aims: 
(1) 
(2) 
It was t.o cut up the Arab land in such a 
manner as to place artificial obstacles 
in the way of unity. 
Another aim was self interest in a land 
full of riches and oil. (6) 
So everyone of the three powers had helped himself to 
generous slices of the Sultan's dominions.(?) Teachers al-
ways make it a point when they teach history in the Middle 
East to say that "England has betrayed the Arabs". I was 
told tlus in the fourth grade. 
The Balfour Declaration 
England had made a third agreement as a promise. In 
1917 the AJ.lied cause was desperate. Russia ,.;as dropping out 
(6) Library of Congress, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 50, 
The Palestine Problem (Washington, D.C., March 1, 1947), p. 20. 
D. George, The Truth_Abo~t the Peace Treaties, Vol. II, 
London, 1938, J;>,.. 1038. 
See: H. W''~Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference 
of Paris, Vol.~ (London, 1926), pp. 13-17. 
(7) Russia's part in the agreement was terminated by the Bol-
shevik Revolution. See Library of Congress, Palestine Problem, 
p. 20. 
of the War, and the United States had not yet entered the 
war, and Britain and France needed every ounce of avail-
able aid. As a result Britain wanted to secure the propa-
ganda support of the Zionists and the wholehearted support 
in Europe and the United States. More than this, Britain 
was trying to get in on the ground floor by fore-stalling 
the enemy, for Germany too was holding out tempting bait to 
the Zionists. It was proposed that the Jews should have Pal-
estine. But it was too late for Germany and Britain had al-
ready captured Palestine. Britain made another bargain with 
the Zionists. Arthur James Balfour, as a foreign secretary 
on behalf of Britain and Dr. Chaim Weizmann as the Zionist 
spokesman made an agreement as follows (from Balfour to Lord 
Rothschild), Nov. 8, 1917: 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf 
of his Majesty's Government the following declaration of 
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been 
submitted to and approved by the cabinet. His Majesty's 
Government view with favor the establishment in Pales-
tine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will 
use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement 
of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
right of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, 
or rights and political status enjoy~ by Jews in any 
other country. I should be grateful if you would bring 
this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Feder-
ation. (8) 
(8) Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, p. 6. 
United Nations World, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May, 1947). 
See: Parliament Debate, House of Commons, p. 1248. 
See: W. Henry Cooke and Edith l?. Stickney, Readings in 
Euro ean International Relations Since 1879, (New York: Har-
p·er Brothers Publishers, 1931 , p. 538.-
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The United States Government for a while waw prevented 
from publicly endorsing the Balfour Declaration because it 
was not at ,.rar with Turkey. But after the necessary break 
vd th· Turkey was made, President Wilson endorsed the Balfour 
Declaration in a letter to Rabbi Stephen s. Wise on August 
31, 1918, in which he indicated his approval of the estab-
lishment of a Jewish National Home in Falestine.(9) 
Whether the President was correct or not in his assumpt-
ions regarding the agreement of the "Allied Nations", he at 
least made perfectly clear that the United States Government 
was interpreting the phrase "national home 11 in a sense much 
desired by the Zionists, that is, that Palestine should event-
ually contain a Jewish state. 
In this connection there is often quoted as- favoring the 
Arab side the twelfth of President Wilson's famous Fourteen 
Points, outlined on January 8, 1918, concerning the Ottoman 
Empire (which included Palestine). It ran as follows: 
The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Em-
pire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the 
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous devel-
opl;lent •••• (10) 
------------------'"--
(9) Ray s. Baker; Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 
Viii, (New York:. 1939), pp. 372-373. 
(10) W. ~acDonald, Documentary Source Book of American His-
1Q.n:, (New York, 1926), p. 672. · 
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The Arabs have claimed that Wilson's promise of "auto-
nomous development" applied to them and that this promise was 
in conflict with the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour 
Declaration. 
The plain fact is that contradictory promises, of equal 
importance, to the people concerned, were made by the Brit-
ish authorities and that in each case they were accepted in 
good faith by the recipient. The fears aroused, by both the 
Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement, caused a 
group of seven representative Arabs in Cairo to address a 
memorandum to the British Government. In reply, the British: 
Government quoted the proclamation made by the commander-in-
chief on the occasion of the capture of Jerusalem in Decem-
ber, 1917, only a month after the issuing of the Balfour Dec-
laration. In this proclamation it was officially stated: 
That the policy of the British Government towards 
Palestine was that the future government of that terr-
itory should be based upon the principle of the con-
sent of the governed. The Arab leade~s were assured 
that this would always be the policy of his Hajesty'e 
Government. (11) 
On JUly 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the follow-
ing principle as one of the four great ends for which the 
associated peoples of the world were fighting: 
The settlement of every question, whether of 
(11) The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central, 
Geneva, 1947, p. 106. 
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territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, 
or of political relationship upon the basis of the 
free acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the 
material interest, or advantage of any other nation 
of people which may desire a different settlement for 
the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.(l2) 
England hailed Wilson's Points but went ahead and divided 
the country with France and promised the Zionist t.he Nation-
al Home without consulting any of the inhabitants of that 
country. 
The Arabs protested against the allies' acts and the 
division of their land into so many separate governments. 
"Both measures were temporary expedients," General .Allenby 
told,and assured the Arabs, "In the final settlement your 
wishes shall be respected." 
The news of the Balfour Declaration reached the Arab 
world first in Egypt where it provoked a wave of protest. 
When it reached Hussein, who by this time had assumea the 
title of King of the Jejaz, he was greatly disturbed and ask-
ed for an explanation. The British sent Commander David G. 
Hogarth to confer with King Hussein in January, 1918, at 
Jeddah. Commander Hogarth's message was delivered orally, 
but King Hussein wrote it down. The Englishman assured the 
King that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be 
allowed in so far as would be consistent with political and 
(12) W. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 672. 
economic freedom of the Arab population.(l3) 
The Meaning of the Balfour Declaration 
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There is no denying the momentous importance of the 
Balfour Declaration. It has stood, up to the present time, 
as the basic document of the whole Palestine problem while 
the others were hidden. Jews, Arabs, the British and other 
governments concerned have battled endlessly over its exact 
meaning. It has been interpreted to the advantage first of 
one side.and then of the other, as the circumstances of the 
situation demanded. In the comments of the press at the time, 
it is clear that some newspapers interpreted Balfour's state-
ment as a promise that Palestine might possibly become, in 
time, a Jewish state.(l4) Such an interpretation has often 
been accepted, especially by the Jews. But as time advances, 
interpretation of the Balfour Declaration proved not to be so 
simple. The British Government in particular later saw fit 
to attach a more limited significance to its phraseology. 
Of one thing there seems to be little doubt -- the doc-
ument was carefully weighed by all parties concerned and 
eve17 phrase and comma deliberated. If there is vagueness 
(13) Charles R. Gallner, The Library of Congress, The Pales-
tine Problem, op. cit., p. 11. 
(14) See Sokolo'l...r, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 84097, for a se-
lection of newspaper comment favorable to the Balfour Declar-
ation. 
in its terms, it is not accidental • 
• • • • In his Zionism. !vir. Leonard Stein says, "The 
Balfour Declaration vras by no means a casual ges-
ture. It was issued after prolonged deliberations 
as a considered statement of policy." In Temper-
ley's History of the Peace Conference of Paris, it 
is stated that "before the British Government gave 
the Declaration to the world, it had been closely 
examined in all its bearings and implications, and 
subjected to repeated change and amendment." M. 
Nahum Sokolov, in his History of Zionism, in L.ondon 
was tested by the Zionist Organization in America, 
and every suggestion in America received the most 
careful attention in London. 11 ••• Mr. Lloyd George 
himself, speaking in Wales in 1930, assured his hear-
ers, in curious terms, that the Declaration "was pre-
pared after much consideration, not m·erely of its 
policy but of its actual wording." (15) 
Prince Faisal and the American Commission 
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In 191.9 Prince Faisal want to France to attend the 
peace conference. France did not recognize him and made it 
clear to him that he was not welcome. Faisal realized that 
imperialism was threatening all the Arab lands. Becoming 
conscious of his own weakness and the big influence of the 
Zionist; he told the delegates at the peace conference that 
the Arabs wanted complete and immediate independence. He 
suggested an International Commission to be sent to Syria. 
The American President supported Faisal according to his 
doctrrne. He named Dr. Henry c. King and ~tt. Charles R. 
Crane as United States representative to the proposed commis-
sion. But Clemeneau and Lloyd George did not agree and blocked 
(15) J .1'1.1{. J'effriiis1 ·~&;}est~_!! ~lte )~e~li ty. (LondoJil: 1939) 
P. 172 
\ 
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the move. President Wilson sent his representatives alone. 
They spent the summer of 191~ in Syria .. and Palestine and re-
turned \vi th a report which bears witness to their keen fore-
sight and coura.ge.(l6) 
In the report the Arabs wanted complete independencet 
but might accept the mandate for a limited time, on condition 
that the mandate will be entrusted to the United States. 
A national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent 
to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the reaction 
of such a. Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest 
trespassing upon the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish comr.mnities in Palestine. There would then be no 
reason why Palestine could not be included in a United Syrian 
State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places 
being cared for by an international and inter-religious com-
mission somewhat as at present, under approval of the manda-
tory and the League of Nations. The Jews of course, would 
have representatives upon this commission. 
On April 25, 1920 at the San Remo meeting of the Allied 
Supreme Council, consisting of Great Britain, France, and 
Italy, it was decided to give the mandate over Iraq, Trans-
Jordan, and Palestine to Britain, and those over Syria and 
(16) Memorandom by His }fujesty's Government, Political His-
tory of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 2. 
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Lebanon to France. This decision was announced on May 5, 
in the year of 1920. In July, 1922, the Council of the 
League of Nations, which Great Britain then dominated, rat-
ified the draft mandate for Palestine, and other parts of 
the Arab lands, that had been submitted to the League.(l7) 
Examining the Palestine mandate itself, we can see 
Great Britain has been commissioned by the League to rule 
in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration. The keynote pro-
vision reads: 
The mandatory shall be responsible for placing 
the country under such political, administrative and 
economic conditions as will secure the establishment 
of ~he Jevnsh National Home and the development of 
self-governing institution, and also for safeguarding 
the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants 
of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.(l8) 
It is not an easy job to get another people to live· in 
somebody else's land. Moreover, the mandatory power was to 
encourage local self-government (which she never did). It 
was to recognize an appropriate Jewish agency as a public 
body to advise and cooperate with the governing authorities 
of Palestine, and to assist the development of the National 
Home. Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, but the 
rights and positions of other sections of the population were 
(17) Library of Congress, Palestine Problem, 6p. cit., p. 27. 
See UN World, Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947. 
(18) Memorandom by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 1. 
not to be injured thereby. The Jews were to be encouraged 
to settle closely on the land, to develop and improve the 
soil so that many more people could earn their living on a 
given plot. 
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English, Arabie and Hebr~v were all declared to be the 
official languages. Three languages and three Sabbaths, Fri. 
day for the }fuslems, Saturday for the Jews, and Sunday for 
the Christians -- in a district the size of New Hampshire. 
The root of the trouble in Palestine was that England 
put its military government in.'force and not a Palestinian 
government. All powers were centered around the British High 
Commissioner and his deputies. There was no constttution ex-
cept the mandate. England from the beginning never tried to 
unite the Arabs and Jews, and to end the division between the 
rival races. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPERIALISM IN ACTION 
Blood Shed, Commissions and White Papers 
The Hilitary Committee 
Feeling that Great Britain had betrayed them, the Arabs 
for the first time in their history resorted to violence a-
gainst the Jews. In April, 1920, five Jews were killed and 
over 200 injured. in a clash between Tela vi v and Jaffe. A 
Ydlitary Committee of Inquiry (the Civil Administration was 
not then established) found that the causes of the outbreak 
were: 
(1) The disappointment of the Arabs at the non-
fulfillment of the promises mf independence 
which had been given to them during the first 
war. 
(2) The belief of the Arabs that the Balfour Dec-
laration implied a denial of the right of self-
determination. 
(3) A propaganda from outside with the growth of 
nationalism. 
In May 1921, a year later, more serious attacks made by 
the Arabs on the Jews of Jaffa and five rural settlements. 
On this occasion forty-seven Jews were killed and 146 wounded. 
A commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft, reached 
the conclusion that: 
(1) Great Britain, when she took over the administration, 
of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a 
policy mainly directed toward the establishment of a 
national home for the Jews and not to the equal 
benefit of all Palestinians. (1) 
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In 1922 Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, issued 
a statement of policy, The White Paper of 1922, in which his 
1'1ajesty's Government pointed out and defined the limits of 
the Jewish National Home and the functions of the Jewish Agen-
cy, assuring the Arabs that it was not the intention of Great 
Britain to submerge them or their language and culture, or 
saddle them with Jewish nationality. But the Arabs remained 
unreconciled to Zionism. 
In 1924 violence flared again, and again it was quickly 
put down by the British. The Arabs refused to be reassured 
by statements of principle which failed to face the implic-
ations of incessant immigration of Zionist influence. But 
still nothing was done to remove the cause of trouble. 
In August, 1929, Arabs and Jews again clashed. Before 
the British could restore order 135 Jews and 116 Arabs had been 
killed, and 339 Jews and 232 Arabs wounded. 
London at last took notice of the weriousness of the sit-
uation and appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Wal-
ter Shaw to study the situation and the cause of the trouble. 
The commission went to the Holy Land, surveyed conditions 
there, listened to both Arabs and Jews, questioned government 
(1) Memorandom by His Britannic Majesty's Government, The 
Political History of Palestine under British AdministratiOn, 
Palestine: 1947, Presented to the UN Special Committee~on 
Palestine, p. 3. 
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officials, then returned to London. The commission said: 
The fundamental cause of violence and fighting 
is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards 
the Jews, the disappointment of their political and 
national aspiration and fear of their economic future.{2) 
In less than ten years three serious attacks have been 
made by the Arabs on the Jews. Eighty years before the first 
of these attacke there is no recorded instance of any similar 
incidents. The Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigra-
tion not only a menance to their livelihood but a possible 
overlord of the future. 
In October, 1930, the British Government issued a White 
Paper in which they pointed out the following: 
The capacity of the country to absorb new immi-
gration ~ust be judged in relation to Arab as well as 
Jewish unemployment. fhe obligation to facilitate 
Jewish immigration and to encourage close wettlement 
by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of 
the mandate. His Majesty's Government does not con-
template any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immi-
gration in any of its categories.(3) 
In its report to the Council of the League of Nations, 
the mandat.es commiseion criticized the mandatory gover:runent 
for not having concerned itself more actively with the social 
and economic development of the country. The increase in 
Jewish immigration from 1933 was accompanied by an intensification 
(2) 
(3) 
. . 
Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1930, cmd. 3530,p.3. 
~UN World Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947. 
See Britannic l~jesty's Government, op. cit., p. 13. 
Great Britain ~arliamentary Papers, op. cit., pp. 11-14. 
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of Arab political activity. (4) 
In October 1933, the ArGb Executive proclaimed a gen-
eral strike and organized a demonstration outside the go~­
ernment offices in J·erusalem. The demonstrators clashed 
with the police and during the next few weeks other riots 
took place in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa, and again in Jerusalem. 
The disturbance of 1933 differed from those of 1920 and 1929, 
in that they were directed not against the Jews but against 
the mandatory government which was accused of tilting the 
balance against the Arabs in its administration of the man-
date. 
It was hoped that sooner or later the Arabs would be 
reconciled to Zionism, thus the British and Zionists policy 
was based upon that hope. So it ~ms desirable to postpone 
the grant of self-governing institutions until such time as 
the Arab attitude had changed. Its genuine self-government 
was est8,blished immediately while the Arab majority was in-
flexible OPI)osed to Zionism, that would make impossible the 
fulfillment of British obligation to the Zionist. 
In 1936, the Arab national committee ordered a general 
strike to begin April 22, and to continue until Great Brit-
ain altered its policy. Two weeks later the same committee 
called on the Arabs to refuse to pay taxes. Violence flared 
in many parts of Palestine; the pipe lines which carry the 
Iraq oil to Haifa was punctured repeatedly. Hundreds of 
L 
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Arabs were herded into ordinary jails and collective fines 
were levied against villages. The seemingly unsuccessful 
strike, in which the entire Arab population, MOslem as well 
as Christian, participated, continued. 
Military reinforcements began to ar'riv e in May, and by 
\ 
September there were two British divisions in the country. 
The high commissioner was empowered to establish a military 
tribunal. The government refused to listen to the "Arab 
case" or to offer any concession in return for the cessation 
of the strike and the restoration of order. 
A Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, 
was appointed in August 1936, with the task to investigate 
and recommend a way out of the dilemma. It also sent Gener-
al Dill with an additional division of troops to quell the 
disturbance. (4) 
The Royal Commission reported that the underlying causes 
of the disturbance were: 
(1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence. 
(2) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the 
Jewish immigration and the national home.(5) 
(4) The Round Table (A Quarterly Review of the Politics of 
the British Commonwealth): "Palestine the Wider Hope", Vol. 
L{IX, December 1938, pp. 252-277. 
{5) Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., PP• 89, 
97. 
36 
As a solution, the commission offered a complicated 
plan to partition the country into two separate and inde-
pendent states -- one Arab, one Jewish, with a British zone 
between• The Arab State was to be set up in Samaria and 
Judea and the Southern desert. The Jewish Sta.te was to be 
set up in Galilee and on the Philistine Plain. The British 
area was to include Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor 
to Jaffa on the coast. This suggestion was hailed by the 
British Government as an excellent way out of the Palestine 
dilemma. (6} 
On September 14, 1937, the British Foreign Secretary 
requested the council of the League of Nations to approve 
the proposed partition of Palestine. On September 16, the 
League Council adopted the resolution, and asked the manda-
tory to prepare a detailed plan for the partition of Pales-
tine. 
In February 1938, a technical commission was appointed 
under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead. The commission 
arrived in Palestine on the 27th of April and left on the 
3rd of August. In a White Paper issued vii th the report of 
the partition commission, his ~~fu.jesty's Government announced: 
They have reached the conclusion that his further 
examination has shown that the political administrative 
and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to 
(?) For convenient summary of the Peel Report See Great Brit-
a~n~ Palestine Royal Commission, SummaEY of Report (Colonial 
135), London 1937. 
create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Pal-
estine are so great that this solution of the problem 
is impracticable. (7) 
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The British Gove~nment announced a policy which accom-
panied the publication of the Woodhead report, that suggested 
an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews might be possible. 
On February 17, 1938, the London Conference was attended 
on the one side by representatives of the Arabs of Palestine 
and of the Government of Egypt, Iraq, Saudia Arabia, and Ye-
men, and on the other hand the Jewish Agency for Pa.lestine. 
Since the Arabs maintained.their refusal to recognize the Jew-
ish Agency, it was necessary tq organize two separate confer-
ences, an Anglo-Arab and the other Anglo-Jewish. The British 
Delegation presented proposals similar to those which were 
subsequently published in the White Paper (}~y 1939). They 
were rejected by the Jews in principle, and no agreement t·tas 
reached. (8) 
The Arabs were aroused by the partition plan and they 
were driven to des?eration with the policy of the mandatory 
and with the continued influx of the Jews and the passage of 
(7) Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., p. 3. 
See also Round Table: "Palestine A Leaf Turned", ll1'arch 
1939, p. 457. 
See Congressional .Records - House, February 24, 1947. Vol. 
93, Part 1, p. 1392. 
( 8) Memorandum by His lvfaj esty' s Government, op. cit • , p. 26. 
See New York Times, Feb. 3, 1947, pp. 8, 4. 
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land into Jewish hands. They decided to stake everything on 
a final showdown. Bands of men attacked the British in var-
ious parts of Palestine. Considerable numbers of young men 
from the neighboring states crossed the borders to join the 
Arab guerrillas in the hills of the Holy Land. 
The British a.ns'\ltered with a mighty show of force. The 
police and the army timi ts in the country were thrown into 
action, more troops arrived in Palestine, military la'd was 
declared, and curfew imposed. }fure Arab leaders were arrest· 
ed or exiled. 
The guerrilla Arab bands became more organized, and arms 
and money were smuggled across the frontiers into Palestine. 
Rebel courts were established for the trial of Arabs accused 
of disloyalty to the national cause. Travel was forbidden by 
the mandatory without prior authorization. The imposition of 
a collective fine on Arab communities became more frequent. 
Innocent men were shot on the slightest suspicion. Over ltOOO 
homes were destroyed by British troops. The Arabs continued 
to resist by conducting a psychological campaign which proved 
both annoying and embarrassing to the British. In an endeavor 
to win the sympathy of the British tommies, the Arabs told 
them the reason for their :cebellion and assured them that 
their only quarrel with the British was the pro-Zionist policy 
of the Government. This appeal was so successful that sold-
iers were forbidden to associate \~th the Arabs. The Arabs 
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found other ways to present their case to the troops. Little 
boys managed to enter the army camps and sell the soldiers 
fruit ,.,rapped in paper containing a printed statement of the 
Arab case. School children wearing tin pans for helmets and 
using tin kettles for drums mimicked the troops as they went 
through their drill and maneuvers, making them acutely con-
scious of the fact that they (British) were fighting an un-
armed and helpless people. 
In some to\~s, the Arabs conducted funeral services for 
"British Justice" and solemnly escorted the coffin to its 
grave in a fitting procession. 
Thousands of English soldiers disagreed with the gov-
ernment on her policy. They sent many letters back to Eng-
land telling how they were sent there to be killed for the 
cause of Zionism. H. G. 'Nells described British feeling in 
these weirds: 
In England there is a growing irritation at the 
killing and wounding of British soldiers and Arabs in 
pitched battles fought because of this Zionist idea. 
They are beginning to feel that if they are to be his-
tory-ridden to the extent of restoring a Jewish State 
that was extingu1shed nearly two thousand years ago, 
they might just as well go back another thousand years 
and sacrifice their sons to restore the Canaanites and 
Philistines.(9) 
Finally on May 1939, England feared an anti-English move-
ment in the Middle East. His MB.jesty's Government determined 
(9) Liberty, December 24, 1938, p. 67. 
I. 
f. 
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to put an end to the bloodshed in the Holy Land. She de-
cided to impose her own solution on both Arabs and Jews. 
This solution \-ras outlined in the White Pauer. The British 
Government stated that from 1922-38 the population had in-
creased 90 percent. The Jews increased from 55,000 to 316 1 -
018 from 1914 to 1938 •. (The non-Jewish increase was a 55 
percent increase, while the Jewish increase was 47 percent). 
Two tlurds of the Jewish i~~igrants came from Western Europe. 
The ~aite Paper dealt with the cause of the trouble and 
made public the Hcl'1ahon-Hussein letters for the first time+ 
(1) The T#hite Paper zoned the land into three 
categories. 
a. Areas '1.-rhere Jews could buy. 
b. Areas where Jews could buy, but only 
with government sanction. 
c. Areas where J e\is could not buy. 
(2) Immigration: The \Vhite Paper limited the Jewish 
immigration to Jewish population, plus 75,000. 
"No further immigration \vill be permitted unless 
the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce 
it." (1.0) 
In June 1939, the permanent mandate commission of the 
League at their 36th session examined the White Paper of 1939. 
The commission reported: 
The poticy set out in the White Paper was not in accord-
ance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the 
(10) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 28. 
See also Great Britain Pa~1iamentary Papers 1939, Cmd. 
6019• pp. 6-11; UN World, Vol, I, No. 4, May 1947. 
mandatory :power and the council, the commission had 
always placed upon the Palestine Mandate. (ll) 
Three out of seven members were unable to share this 
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opinion, they considered that existing circumstances would 
justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the council 
did not oppose it.(12} 
(11) Ibid.~ p. 29. 
(12) League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, Minutes 
of the Thirty Sixth Session, (Geneva: 1939), p. 275. 
CH.Al?TER IV 
I:MJ?ERI.ALIS1<1 .BEG.li.'TS · TERRIORISM 
The Zionist Revolution 
We shall fight with Great Britain in this war 
as if there were no White Paper and we shall fight 
the White Paper as if there were no war • 
• • • Ben Goruin 
The Arabs first attacked the policy presented in the 
White Pa~er, objecting to the additional 75,000 Jewish im-
migrants. Eventually the Arabs became reconciled to it. 
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Now it was the turn of the Jews to fight the mandatoryt 
by bombing, assassinating and kidnaping against the British. 
The Jewish terrorists were better armed, better organized, 
and possessed greater technical skill than the Arab guerril· 
las of 1936. Government buildingw, trains, railroads, shops, 
and highway bridges have been repeatedly blown up. The Jews 
declared that the solution of the White Paper was unaccept-
able to them. They insisted on unlimited immigration and the 
postponement of democratic government until the Jews had be-
come a majority. Later they specifically demanded the estab-
lishment of a Jewish State. 
In 1942 a small group of Zionist extremists, led by 
. 
Abraham Stern, came into prominence with a series of polit-
ically motivated nrurders.(l) The high commissioner narrowly 
(1) Washington Star, January 2, 1947. and New York Times, 
January 2, 1947, March 3, 1947, pp. 7,8. 
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escaped death in an ambush outside Jerusalem. On November 
6, 1944, the British Minister of State in the Middle East 
(Lord Mayne) was awsassinated in Cairo by two members of the 
Stern group. 
The ijagana (an illegal military formation controlled by 
the Jewish Agency) and the Irgun Zvai Leumi {another illegal 
Jevnsh organization) were responsible for much destruction of 
government property during 1944.(2) The King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem containing the officers of the government, was 
blown up killing 86 public servants. The terrorists kidnapped 
a British Judge and British officers. British civilian and 
military families were evacuated from Palestine. 
Due to the continuation of Jewish terrorism in Pales-
tine, Lieut. General Sir Alan G. Cunningham, the High Commis-
sioner for Palestine, issued a strong statement on June 29, 
194o, denouncing lawlessness in Palestine and expressing fir.m 
determination to restore order. The premises of the Jewish 
Agency in Palestine were occupied and members of the Jewish 
Agency Executive were arrested. This was followed by the 
publication of a British White Paper on July 24, which, on 
the basis of various intercepted messages, claimed to link 
(2) Arthur KOestler, Rise of the Hagana (New York: Mc1lillan 
Book Co., 1947), pp. 66-98. ~New York Times, Nov. 14, 1945. 
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the Jewish Agency to terrorist activity in Palestine. The 
Hagana, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern gang were all 
accused of violence on the basis of the evidence presented.($) 
The Anglo-American Committee of Inqui!Y 
When the ~econd war came to an end, it was not possible 
for the mandatory power to give full effect to ;,the policy set 
out in the White Paper of 1939. The traiic fate of the Jew-
ish people in Europe had created a demand that the Palestine 
problem should be examined again. The demand was strong in 
the United States. In August 1945, President Truman wrote 
to Mr. Attlee suggesting that the concession of 100,000 im-
migra~ion certificates for Palestine would be an important 
contribution to the settlement of displaced European Jews.(4) 
Speaking at Bournemouth, England, on June 12, 1946, Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin said, in regard to Palestine: 
I hope it will not be misunderstood in America 
if I say, with the purest of motives, that that was 
because they did not \>rant too many of them in New 
York. (5) 
The British Government did not adopt this proposal but 
accordingly obtained the agreement of the United States to 
( 3) Text given in Ne\v York Times, July 25, 1946. The above 
quoted frore the Library of Congress, Palestine Problem. 
(4) Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 18, 1945, p. 790. 
{5) New York Times, June 13, 1946, p. 1. 
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the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 
The twelve members of the Anglo-American Committee after 
a work of 120 days recommended a new plan. Under this plan 
the greater part of Palestine would be divided into Arab and 
Jewish provinces. Each province would have an elected legis-
lature and an executive. The one hundred thousand Jews shoUld 
go to their province.(6) Here we see England has won a great 
game of politics by getting America to take part in the deal. 
During those days I was in Damascus and the Syrian Uni ver-
sity's students went to the English delegation to protest 
against the admitting of 100,000 immigrants to Palestine. The 
English Consul told the students "that is Mr. Truman's sugges-
tion. We have nothing to do with it." The result was the 
the American Consulate was burned that day in Syria, Egypt. 
and Iraq. 
The London Conference 
It had been the intention of his Majesty's Government 
to consult the interested parties before reaching a final 
decision on their policy on Palestine. Invitations to a 
conference in London were issued on the 25th of July to the 
governments of the Arab League, to the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, and to the Palestine Arab Higher Executive.(?) 
(6) See map next page. 
(7.) New York Times, January 7, 17: 1, 3. 
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The conference opened on September 9, 1946. The Brit-
ish Delegation put the provincial autonomy plan before the 
conference. The Arab Delegates at once made it clear that 
they were opposed to this plan in principle and could not 
accept it as a basis for disaussion as it would eventually 
lead to partition. The Arab Delegates propounded their so-
lution that Palestine would be a unitary State with a per-. 
manent Ara.b majority and would attain its independence afte:r 
a short period of transition (two or three years) under Brit-
ish mandate. (8) 
The Zionist congress met at Basle and denounced the 
plan of provincial autonomy. The congress announced that 
Palestine be established as a Jewish ~ommonwealth integrated 
in the structure of the Democratic World.(9) 
On February?, 1947, the British Delegation at the 
Anglo-Arab conference submitted ne\v proposals, which \vere 
also communicated to the JewisL Agency. These provided for 
a five-year period of British trusteeship over Palestine. 
with the declared object of preparing the country for inde-
pendence. 
The latest British proposals were rejected both by Arabs 
(8) New York Times, September 12, 1946. 
(9) Washington Star, January 6, 1947 ~ \vashington Post, Dec.-
24, 1946. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1946. The Nation, Jan. 25, 
1947. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 9, 1946. 
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and by the Jews. The situation in Palestine became so 
dangerous, that tl1e British ordered the evacuation of Brit· 
ish women and children. Even the presence of 100,000 Brit~ 
ish troops in the country has failed to end the reign of 
terror wllich Jewish leaders insist is the work of a small 
faction of Palestine Jews.(lO) 
Finally, realizing that England was blamed by both 
Arabs and Jews; and partly because of the pro-Zionist atti· 
tude of the United States go~ernment and the continued prod-
ding by Washington, the British Government, in September 1947 
dramatically told the United Nations A$sembly that it was 
planning to terminate the mandate and to evacuate its troops 
and civil servants from Palestine as soon as possible; there-
upon the mandatory decided to refer the problem to the United 
Nations. (11) 
(10) Congressional Record~,.; House, Vol. 93, Part 1, 'P• 1392. 
See United Nations World, 'Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947. 
New York Times, Feb. 5, i947, 1:24. 
(11) United Nat ions World, Ibid. 1 
New York Times, Feb. 3, 8:4. 
Congressional Record!, Ibid., p. 1392. 
PART II 
"PRESSURE OF POLITICS" 
(The Solution of the Problem) 
CHAPTER I 
THEL UNI.TED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITT:EE ON PALESTINE 
The Fir8t MOve 
It has been said that: 
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The United States Department of State on March 28, 
1947, informed the British Ambassador in Washington, D.C., 
that the United States would support a request by Great 
Britain for the convening of a special eession of the Gen .. 
eral Assembly at its regular session in September 1947.(1) 
His Majesty's Government considered that these proposals 
were consistent with the terms of both the League Mandate, 
and the United Nations Charter. On February 18, 1947, a de-
cision had been announced to the House of Commons by the For-
eign Secretary of State. In the course of his speech he 
said: 
His Majesty's Government have been faced with an 
irreconcilably conflict of principles. There are in 
Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. In 
1914 there were 55,000 Jews in Palestine. For the Jews, 
the essential point of principle is the creation of a 
Sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs the e,~ential 
point of principle is to resist to the last the estab-
lishment of a Jewish Sovereignty in a~ part of Pales-
tine. His l~jeejy's Government have of themselves no 
(l) Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (New York: McCary-
Hill, 1950), p. 75. 
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:p0wer, under the terms of the mandate, to award the 
country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even 
to partition it between them. We shall then·ask the 
United Nations to consider our report, and to reccom-
mend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend 
ourselves to recommend any particular solutions.(2) 
Here we see the significance of the British (tactics) 
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in politics; to save her face,sa.ve her interest in the Near 
East, England handed the problem to the United nations and 
stepped out of the deal leaving a black page of her history 
in the eyes of the Arabs, MOslems, and the Zionists all over 
the world. 
The United Nations was called at a critical moment in 
the history of' Palestine to accept the challenge as a last 
chance for the solving of this problem in a :peaceful and fair 
manner. If' this chance was misned, chaos and disorders might 
result in Palestine more than what happened and what is hap-
pening (as we see later). 
The Battle of the Agenda 
On April 2, 1947, Great Britain requested the United 
Nations to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the 
next regular session of the General Assembly and to call a 
special session as soon as possible for the purpose of appoint-
ing a committee to study the problem. The request was prompt-
ly granted, and the special session opened on April 28, 1947.(3) 
(2) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, Political Historr 
of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 40. United Nations Bulletin, 
April 15, 1948, p. 305; 
(3) New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7. 
L 
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Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Syria, and Yemen re-
quested that a proposal for the termination of the mandate 
over Palestine and the declaration of independence also be 
placed on the agenda. When the American delegate objected 
vigorously the Arab request was rejected.(4) Russian del-
egates asked that the proposed committee be instructed to 
submit a plan for the independence of Palestine. This re-
Quest was also opposed by the Americans and was accordingly 
rejected. (5) 
Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Delegate a~~ounced that 
partition is the best alternate solution for Palestine, and 
here (for the first time) the United States Delegate hailed 
the solution and added such as the inclusion of question of 
displaced European Jews within the scope of the inquiry. The 
Arabs were convinced that the United States, the most influ-
ential member of the United Nations was already committed to 
uphold the demand of the Jewish Agency for the Jevnsh State. 
From the start the Arab Delegates tried to prevent the 
Jewish Agency from getting a hearing. Austin, the United 
States Delegate, argue<! that the "sacred" charta' of the 
United Nations must be upheld an~ the Jewish Agency be per-
mitted to appear before the General Assembly. Poland, the 
(4) United Uations Special Committee on Palestine, Report 
to the General Assembl~, London Office, 1947, p. 1. 
(5) New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7. 
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country which for many a decade has been expelling Jews in 
large mumbers, put considerable pressure on the United Nat-
ions to give careful consideration to the point of view of' 
the Jewish people in the Palestine question. A compromise 
solution was made. Spokesmen of both the Arab Higher Com-
mittee and the Jewish Agency were permitted to appear, not 
before the General Assembly itself but before the Political-
and Security Committee of the General Assembly.(6) 
In the middle of' the general debate ¥~. Gromyko ~ossed 
a diplomatic bombshell into the deliberations of the United 
Nations General Assembly by supporting a plan which all Arab 
spokesmen had repudiated as imperialism. Russia did this be-
cause two thirds of the immigrants that entered Palestine 
were from' the eastern part of' Europe, and also to get a foot-
hold in the }fiddle East. 
Thus the battle of the Agenda was a long one. 
It took four meetings of the General Committee and 
two meetings of the General Assembly until a decision 
on the Agenda was reached to grant a hearing to two non-
governmental agencies before one of its main committees.(?) 
HOwever, the primary purpose of the General Assembly was the 
constitution and instruction of'a special committee on Pales-
tine. In this connection the assembly 'I:Jas faced with three 
different problems. It has to decide to establish a commit-
tee. This involved a debate on the need for a committee. Two 
(6) New York Times, l~y 10, 1947, pp. 4 ff'.,p. 115, 
(7) Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United'Nations, Public 
Affairs Press, 1947, p. 103. Also see New York Times,April 30, 
1947, 1:8. 
r 
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other :problems follo\<red logically, the composition of the 
committee and its terms of reference. Some representatives 
had doubts whether such a committee would be formed. 
Mr. Jamali of Iraq claimed consistently that the :prob-
lem of Palestine could be dealt \·ri th directly by the General 
Assembly without any previous :preparation by a committee. He 
submitted that : 
"If these principoles were to be reccommended by the 
Assembly the issue \>lould be settled." He insisted, fur-
thermore, that he does not believe there is a necessity 
for a committee at all.(8) 
Everybody else stressed the necessity of the committee. 
Even Dr. Malik emphasized the fact that it is not even going 
to be Anglo-American Committee. It is going to be a United 
Nations Committee. Thus it was called a special committee; 
not because it was special in its character but because it 
was the first such inquiry undertaken by the United Nations. 
On ~~Y 15, 194?, the General Assembly adopted by an 
affirmative vote of 46, with the five Arab States, Turkey, 
and Afghanistan in opposition, with the following resolution: 
Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has been called into special session for the purpose of 
constitution and instructing a special committee to pre-
pare for the consideration at the next regular wession 
(8) mr Official Records of the First Special Session of the 
General Assembly. Vol. 1, Plenar:y, }!eatings of the General 
Assembly, Seventy Seven Plinary meetin~; April 28~May 15, 
194?' p. 125. 
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of the Assembly to report on the question of Pales-
tine. The General Assembly resolved that. a special 
committee to be created. (9) 
The Composition of the Committee 
The idea of the Secretary General to have a committee 
of neutrals was endorsed by the United States and found favor 
runong many other states. Others opposed it and a third group 
was in the middle of the road. IV.ir. Erikson, favoring neutral-
ity, )advanced .. the.vi~w that: 
There is indeed a great need for impartial and 
international and authoritive committee. He was suppor~ 
ed by l•.tr. Parodi who observed that the committee should 
be a special impartial comniittee. The idea of impart-
iality was endorsed by the representatives of Peru and 
Honduras.(lO) 
lVIr. Austin maintained that the superior advantages are 
to have a neutral committee. Mr. Austin v'las sui.~ported by Sir 
Alexander Gadogan who expressed the view of his government 
in favor of a neutral committee. The full. meaning of neu-
trality was expressed by Kr. Ponce (Ecuador) as he stated: 
vie do not wish to say that it is possible to 
assure absolute independence and impartiality, but 
we do mean that the countries which are not directly 
interested in the problem, the countries which are 
not under consideration and who do not have interests 
in this matter of a political, economic, strategic, 
or of another similar nature, will more closely 
approach impartiality and independent judgment than 
the others which are defending their rights or attempt-
ing to protect their interests.(ll) 
(9) UN Official Records of the First Sfecial Session of the 
General Assembly; Vol. 11, Meeting 28 doc. A/286, A/293) 
April 29, 1947, p. 11. 
(10) Report to the General Assembly by the UN Special Commit-
tee on Palestine, p. J. 
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Mr. Arce {Argentina) at t.he head of the second grou:p, 
who opposed it, aoubted that countries to which they were 
going to give such a delicate task would make great efforts 
and \vould be capable of showing neutrality in the matter. 
I1r. KOsanovic (Yugoslavia) attacked the idea of neutrality 
more drastically by saying: 
Let us be completely sincere. Is it possible 
to be neutral in this problem? I do not think there 
is any neutrality here. neutrality means no opinion. 
Dante, in the Inferno, puts a neutral opinion in the 
inferno. Those who are neither with God nor with 
the devil are in the inferno.(ll) 
He was supported qy Mr. Belt (Ouba) who maintained that it 
is very difficult to find neutrals in this question. 
Between these two extremes was the view which held that 
it *ould fue better to call a committee consisting of members 
of the United Nations other than the permanent members of 
the Security Council. Mr. Gromyko (Russia) rejected this 
idea. 
I do not think the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council deserve such punishment. They do not 
deserve to be denied the rights possessed by all other 
.countries. 
Asaf Ali stating his vievTs as an ans\'ler to Nr. Gromyko~s 
statement waid: 
So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, by vir-
tue of the fact that the Soviet is in close proximity 
r 
to this particUlar area, and possible also interested 
in what developments are taking place there, ooth in 
the Arab World and in Palestine; it would be much the 
best for Russia to stand away.(l2) 
In regard to France 1-ir. Asaf said, "France was a man-
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datory in Syria -- it may be considered an interested party 
in some way or another." (13) 
Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed his opinion as to the 
involved states to be out of the committee. He went further 
and opposed the inclusion of the Ara.b States on the committee. 
The resu1t was an American proposal, which suggested a com-
mittee made with regard to geographical distribution and ~~. 
Austin named seven members. 
The counter proposals of Argentina favored a membership 
of eleven and was supported by the representative of Austral-
ia. The delegation of Chile added two more governments and 
there were two candidates still missing from the proposed 
quota of eleven. As a result two ballots \vere taken by a 
show of hands, one on the question of who should represent 
the South Pacific group. The choice vras betvreen Australia 
and the Philippines. Australia won. India won, as a rep-
resentative for Asia, against the Siams. 
Thus the General Assembly on May 15, 1947, "resolved 
that the special committee was to be consisted of the rep-
resentatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Netherlands, 
(12} Ibid., p. 146. 
(13) Ibid., p. 146. 
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Peru, Sweden, Uruguay (named by the United States), Guate-
mala, Yugoslavia, (na.medl"by Chile), India, and Australia. (~4) 
Analyzing the special committee,it consisted of two 
representatives of the Britiwh Commonwealth of nations (Aus-
tralia and Canada). Two representatives of Eastern Europe 
who have more knowledge of the Jewish affairs than the other 
members (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). It had three Latin 
American countries: Guatemala, Peru and Paraguay. It also 
contained two Asiatic countries: India and Iran.(l5) 
The General Assembly adopted the passage which ~he rep-
resentative of Venezuela states concerning the qualifications 
~f the committee members. 
The state members of the special committee, should 
appoint persons of high moral character and of recog-
nized competence in international affairs, and that those 
appointed would act impartially and conscientiously in 
accordance with the purpose and principles of the char-
ter of the United Nations.(l6) 
The terms of references adopted, on Hay 15, 1947, are 
wide and in the main general. 'The committee is to prepare, 
not later tlmn September 1st, a report for the next session 
of the Assembly on the question of Palestine, the future gov-
ernment of Palestine, and to make proposals for its solution. 
(14) Report to the General Assembly by the UNSCOP, p. 3. 
~New York Times, }my 14, 1947, 1:1. 
(15) Nev1 York Times, 1-fu..y 4, 1947, 4:3. 
(16) UN Official Records (General Assembly), 57th Meeting, 
op. cit., May 13, 1947, p. 333. 
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1t ryas given the wident p~~ers to ascertain and record 
f~~cts and invAstigate all ~uestion:=; and issues relevant to 
th0 problem o~ Palesti~e.(l7) 
It vras to condnct inve"'ticat:i.on_s in l=lelestine and where-
8ver it 'Tic"l.Y c1.ee::'l u~eful. It was to receiv'3 and BYI1':11:t':1e oral 
an/l written evidences, Y'hichever it :m"l~' consider apnronriate 
in eRch case fron the nnnd~tor:r novrer, from representat:i.ves 
of the population of "?8.lestine, 1.nd fron gove:r>nrrents and such 
or,r:anizrtion-; and incUvidun.ls as it may thin1-:: necessary. 
It vr'.s to gi~re the most 0areful consideratton of the relig-
ions interests in Palestine of Islam, ,Ju0ais·'1, 8.nd Christian-
?a~rr.1ent of exuenses: The General Jlssembl;r arthorized 
~~'le Secretar~· General to: 
"reim_burse t:':"'avel anC!. su'bsistence exne·1ses of a 
represe~tative and an aJtcrnate renrese,tative from 
each sovern1'1ent renresonted on the spec ia1 CO""T.:':"ci ttee, 
on ::ouch basis e.nd in snch f::1r-:n as he inc..,:r determine 
"TT.Ost annronri~_te in the c:i.rcu'nstfmces. "- T!J.e al1owance 
ryp2 fi~ed at twent~ dolJars.(~R) · 
'
7enborshin of t:he Cor1:-v:1ittee and Secret.g_rin.t 
- . 
Australia ~:r. J. D. L. Hood, Delesate. 
T~r. s. L. llt:Teo, f\.l ternate. 
~1stice I. c. Rand, Dele~ate. 
T.lr. Leon ~:s:7ra·...,d, Alternate. 
r. :Carel Lisiclc~:, Delc.[\'lte. 
Dr. Richnrd Pech, Alternate. 
(17) 'Rep:)rt to the Gerer9.l J\ssemol:.r, on. cit., 9· 2. 
(J.O,) )n. cit., tT?T ')f:"ici8.1 Recor(1s, Vol. 1, ?lenar;r 
·~eotipp of tl•.e Second ::~e1:sion, :-r:;. 77, Na:r ~-h, 19L 17, 
-p. 12!•. 
Guatemala 
India 
Iran 
Netherlands 
Peru 
Sweden 
Uruguay 
Yugoslavia 
H. E. Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, Delegp. te 
I•lr. E. L;. Gonzales, Alternate 
Sir Abdur Rarunan, Delegate. 
1-'.lr. Venkata V~svranathan, Alternate. 
br. H. Dayal, Second Alternate. 
H. E. l·~r. Nasrollah Entezam, Delegate. 
Dr. Ali Ardalan,· Alternate. 
Dr. N. S. Blom, Delegate. 
E.r. A. I. S;:its, Alternate. 
H. E. Dr. Alberto Ullca, Delegate. 
H. E. Dr. Arturo Garcia Salazar, Alternate. 
Justice Emil Sandstrom, Delegate. 
Dr. Paul lVlohn, Alternate. 
Professor Enrique Rodriques 
Fabregate, Delegate. 
~lr. ~ecco Ellauri, Alternate. 
~1r. Vladimir Simic, Delegate. 
Dr. Jose Brilej, Alternate.(l9) 
Four of the representatives were jurists with a back-
ground of government representation. Six of the represent-
atives had a background of long-standing diplomatic services 
and government representation. One was a professor with a 
background of government representation. 
Chairmanship and the Working-groups 
On may 26, 1947, the special committee on Palestine held 
its first meeting at Lake Success. This was called to order 
and presided over by the Secretary General.of the United 
Nations who welcomed the committee members and handed them the 
(19) Ibid., p. 123. 
See also Report to the General Assembly, Q£• £11., p. 4. 
first three volumes of the working documents on Palestine 
prepared by the secretariat. 
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At the same meeting the committee.exchanged many points 
of view on its future work. After a long discussion it was 
agreed to create a Preparatory Working Group which should 
produce some suggestions on various organizational matters 
for the consideration of the committee. 
The working group held three meetings at the Em~tre State 
Building. At the second meeting of the special committee, at 
Lake Success, it presented what suggestions she had already 
done. At this meeting they made the following decisions: 
(1) It was agreed to postpone until arrival in Pal-
estine any discussion of communications from dis-
placed persons requesting that the committee visit 
assembly centers of Europe. 
(2) A tentative work plan was adopted, in the sense 
that, upon its arrival in Palestine, the committee 
should first, ask the government of Palestine to 
furnish factual information; second, request the 
Arab and Jewish Lia.ii!JOn officers to prevent obser-
vations on this statement; third, make a brief 
surve,r. of the country, and fourth conduct hear-
ings. (20) 
Work of the Committee in Palestine 
On June 14~and 15, 194?, the committee arrived in Pal-
estine, on the 16th it met in Jerusalem at theY. M. c. A. 
The Jewish Agency requested that permanent liaison officers 
should be attached to the committee. The committee to avoid 
(20) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 5. 
general problems with the Arabs, the mandatory government, 
and the Jewish Agency, informed the said parties that they 
may appoint liaison officers to the committee who shall 
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supply such information or render other assistance as the 
committee may require. The liaison officers may present at 
the discretion of the committee such information as they 
think advisable. 
These liaisons could not and would not sit with the 
committee as a member of the committee. The could not ques-
tion in meetings involving hearings except with permission. 
They could not be entitled to be present at the deliberation 
of the committee or in the private discussions between mem-
bers. 
On the arrival in Palestine the cornrnittee established 
four sub-com~~ttees for consideration of specific problems. 
(1) Sub-committee I was established for the purpose of 
drawing up an itinerar~r for the committee. 
(2) Sub-committee II was established to deal with re-
quests by organizations or individuals for hearing. 
(3) Sub-committee III \~s appointed later, for the pur-
pose of visiting displaced persons camps. 
(4) Sub-committee IV was constituted to study the ques-
tions of religious interests in the Holy Land. 
Internal Procedure 
The special committee decided its own procedure. All 
committee documents were reproduced by the secretariat and 
distributed by the documents office. Verbatim minutes of 
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all the committee hearings were taken and were circulated 
to the members on their request. Summary records were kept 
of the cornraittee meetings. The committee decided that: 
Copies of all documents, other than confidential 
ones, were to be su:p:r:·lied to the three :partiesJ the 
mandatory :power, the Arab Hi~her Committee, and the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine.{21) 
Decisions were taken by a majority vote. Owing to tre 
complexity of the :problem under investigation, appeals to 
the vote were frequent. 
The meetings of the committee were held in :public, un-
less the committee decided otheTivise. ¥~ny times the commit-
tee conducted its meetings in :private to :prevent harmful :pub-
licity, delay, or embarrassment to its members. From I~ 26, 
1944 to August 31, 194?, the United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine held 13 :public and 38 :private meetings. 
The comrni ttee had its own :press officers. They ";ere 
authorized to give the :press verbal briefings of the meetingst 
but not vrithout the previous approval of the chairman. The 
press officers used to obtain the approval of the committee 
at the end of every meeting, before giving.briefings. 
To arrive at an understanding of the issue involved in 
the Palestine :problem the committee adopted a two-fold method 
of operation. First, by conducting a survey of the land, its 
people and their aspirations, the social, economic, and relig-
ious systems. The second method of operation was to investigate 
(21) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 1?. 
the parties and their views on the problem of Palestine. 
This was carried out by means of oral hearings and written 
testimony. The committee had many informal contacts with 
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the heads of the religious men, and of.the man-in-the-street.* 
The committee at Jerusalem heard 33 individuals, repre-
senting 13 political and religious organizations. It heard 
six representatives of the Government of Palestine. As I 
stated before, in Beirut the committee heard representatives 
of the Arab States in ten meetings, eight private and two 
public. 
There were many channels through which the committee 
got the #actual information of the problem; first through 
oral evidence. The practice was that the party gave factual 
information and vras asked factual questions by the members 
of the committee. Second was written testimony. The Govern-
ment of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency submitted a big sup-
ply of evidence which included background documents, factual 
statements, and maps. A large number of written statements 
were also submitted by organizations and individuals who had 
not requested or had not been granted a hearing. 
There was a third group of materials called informal 
evidence. The committee took all possible steps to ovezrcome 
every disability in order to make a successful work. 
* See map on next page. 
. ' 
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It maintained many informal contacts with political 
and religious lec:,ders, vii th the members of the govern-
ment, with members of illegal organizations, and with 
the man-in-the-street.(22) 
(22) Op. cit., Renort to the General Assembl~, p. 22. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CASE Al'ID THE JURY 
Before the case is carried to the'conrt tne·judges 
have to study the case many times before they face it. The 
members of the committee, as well as every one who got ac-
quainted with it, were puzzled by the nature of the problem 
and how it developed. 
The General Assembly had been struck too, by the com-
plexity of the problem. Here are some of their declarations 
and their question-mark statements. ~~. ~ua Tai Chi stated: 
I am afraid that no parliament of man, no state-
ment, no legal formula, no historical equation,. no 
political and economic progr~n can singly or altogether 
by themselves solve the problem.(l) . 
1-'Ir. Gromyko called it "an acute question and :political 
problem. 11 For J:I".Lr. Austin, 11 it is a very grave problem.t' Hr. 
Van Raij en spoke of it as ••painful and unfortunately complica-
ted." 1-ir. Asaf Ali declared: 
Palestine has become the acid test of human con-
science. The United Nations will find that upon their 
de~HsioR will depend the future of humanity, whether 
humanity is going to proceed by peaceful means or 
wheth€r humanity is going to be torh to pieces. If 
a wrong decision flows from this assembly, you may 
take it from me that the world shall be cut in twain 
and there shall be no peace upon earth.(2) 
(1) Op. clt., Re~ort to the General Assemb~, p. 199. 
( 2) lli.Q.. , p. 200 •· 
See also: O;[:.ficiaJ. Records .of the First Special Session 
of the Genera) fisemb!y, Vol. 1, Seventy Nine Plenary l·1eeting, 
l1ay 15, 1947, p. 126. 
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The president, I1r. Aranaha, spoke of it as a subject 
of the most controversial nature. He came to the conclusion 
that~ 
The problem of Palestine is one of the most 
difficult problems with which anybody can be faced. 
The only road left open to us now is to meet this 
challenge, and we have to meet it fully, if \'/e are 
to survive.(3) 
I, The Arab Case Before the Comnittee 
The basic approach of the Arab delegations and States 
to the problem was that the rights of the Arabs are derived 
from actual and long-standing possession (1,300 years) and 
rests upon the strongest human foundation. These are what 
they call "Natural Rights". 
Is a claim based on possession established 2,000 years 
ago a valid one? lifo, said :rvrr • .Jam.a.li. If so Mexico would 
be justified in claiming large areas of the United States. 
Spain could clain Mexico and the Arabs would have a valid 
title to Spain, which they ruled longer than the .Jews ruled 
Palestine, 
The Arab delegates sought strenously to destroy the Jewish 
case. They emphasized that the small land of Palestine is 
a,n integral part of the Arab World. The tradi tiona arrl cul-
ture are of Arab quality and character. Mr. Asaf Ali stated 
(3} Op, eit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 200. 
the same idea by saying, "Palestine undoubtedly is an in-
tegral part of Arabia.(4) 
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Thus the argument based on "historical conneetiontt is 
not only flimsy but dangerous. Ancestral possession in an-
cient times is not a basis for a sound case. 
In addition to those "natural rights 11 ,the Arabs had ac-
quired specific political rights derived from the Sharif Hus-
sein's compact with Great Britain and the help they gave her. 
The thesis that Palestine west of the Jordan \'las excluded 
from the British pledges can no longer be maintained. The 
text now availab:J.e sho\,Ts that Sharif Hussein was given a 
general promise relating to its independence in the l~cl>lahon 
letters of 1915, and a specific·promise securing the p6litical 
and economic freedom of its Arab population.(5) In spite of 
the circulation of these official letters in the Arab land, 
the Mc~~on correspondence had remained hidden from public 
knowledge in England until 1939. As for Hogarty's message 
and the memorial, they lie buried in the White Hall in a sea 
of oblivion. (6) 
Once more the Arab representatives attacked the mandate, 
(4) Ibid. I 
(5) See Appendix I 
( 6) See Appendix in Report to the General Assembly. 
and its validity. J.1r • .Tamali stated: 
The \!Thole issue of Palestine is one of conflict 
principles derived from expediency, power of politics 
and local interest. I believe that the principles on 
v1hich the .Tewish claim is based are invalid as being 
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in contradiction \vith the Charter of the United Nations. 
the Government of the League of Nations and the man-
date. (7) 
As to its contradiction to the United Nations Charter, 
E~ • .Tamali meant that the purpose of that organization is 
to maintain peace, prevent aggression, and develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Why 
should self-determination be granted freely to other peoplee. 
and not the Arabs? Why should the people of Palestine, vrho 
were ninety percent Arabs and ten percent Jews (1914-1918). 
be asked to live ind~finitely in a condition of political 
subjection for the sake of the minority who had not been ask-
ed to coma to the country, and were not wanted? Why should 
Arabs of Palestine be expected to \vait patiently and subser-
viently through the years until the minority had become, by 
force and shedding of blood, the majority? This is slavery 
forever for the Arab. 
I~f.r. 111. Hassan (Egypt) stated before the committee that 
England had no legal right to proclaim the Balfour Declaration 
(7) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the 
~eneral Assembly, Vol. II, April 29-May 7, 1947, Twenty-
,_-,ighth l'leeting, Document A Bur/78, p. 27. 
and give away Palestine over the heads of its inhabitants. 
She gave something she did not own, or possess. At the 
time of the Dedlaration, Palestine was not yet in their 
hands. lvfr. Kal tan demanded that "an inquiry be made into 
the legality, validity and ethics of this document.n(8) 
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Mr. Asaf Ali sought to dismiss the Balfour Declaration 
as a document, which was made under the wtress of the great 
war. He suggested the following: 
That the special committee look into it to see 
whether the terms of the mandate are consistent with 
Article 22 of the eovenant. It is the root of and 
the very reason for all the troubles.(9} 
In contesting the argument that the mandate was sane-
tioned by the League of Nations, I1r. Jamali said: 
The answer to that is that it was one of the mis-
takes of the League, which waw under the control of the 
Allies. The League must have passed it without adequate 
study or perhaps ~nthout anticipation of the consequen-
ces. Even if the members who passed the terms of the 
mandate did so with good intention, experience proved 
that they were wrongt just as the Balfour Declaration 
itself was wrong.(lOJ 
On four different occasions before the committee, Arab 
speakers protested against continued Je\-.rish immigration into 
Palestine. They claimed that the right of Jews to immigrate 
(8) UN Official Records of the General Assemp]X, Vol. III, 
Document A/C (136) Me ting 52, Iviay 9, 1947, p. 193. 
(9) UN General Assembly Special Sessi9n, op. cit., p. 194. 
(10) Ul~ Official Records of the First Snecial Session of the 
General Assembly, Vol II, April 29 - Hay 7, 1947, Twenty-
eight meeting, Document A(B~78, p. 15. 
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into Palestine is denied by the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the resolution of the General Assembly of Decem-
ber, 15, 1945. The Arab spokesmen contend further that there 
is no more room in Palestine for large scale immigration. 
They point to the fact that the density of the country's 
population is now 176 persons to the square mile, as compar-
ed with 46 in the United states, 22 in Russia, 13 in Brazil 
and 3 in Canada. The Palestine question is not a purely 
humanitarian one. It is primarily political. It is hot 
whether homeless Jews should be allowed a refuge in Pales-
tine. It is whether they should rule it; that is the main 
issue. Ur. Khouri made the following statement; 
We do not underste~d why the displaced persons of 
~urope, who are searching to resettle somewhere in the 
world, should go to Palestine. The United Nations in 
the General Assembly had a rewolution as the last ses-
sion in October clearly stated that the non-self gov-
erning territories could not be the place for sending 
new displaced persons without the consent of the pop-
ulation of those countries.(ll) 
}tr. Khouri's view, supported by Mohnond Hassain Pasha, of 
the refugee problem in ~urope as the province exclusively 
of the International Refugee organization and, therefore, 
outside the jurisdiction of the special committee on Pales-
tine. (12} 
(11) Ibid .• , p. 284. 
(12) The United Nations World, Vol. I., No. 9, Oct. 1944. 
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The Arabs presented a case not only against the Jews, 
but also against Great Britain. The British Government has 
never accepted the Arab case. How many lives \•Tere lost as 
a result of the policy of enforcing the rrEndate and how much 
money has been spent on police posts and fortresses as com-
' 
pared with schools and hospitals? David Hopper states: 
Forty percent of the Arab applicants for admis-
sion to schools were turned away for lack of space. The 
special committee on Palestine reported in 1947 that the 
Government System of Public Education covers only 57 percent 
of Arab boys and 23 percent of the girls of school age.(13) 
1~. Khouri, though he had much to say, confined himself 
only to this: 
I am not going to discuss the administration in 
Palestine during the mandate. All the taxation and money 
collected there from the population was spent in establish-
ing or promoting the Jewish National Home; it is as if the 
Arabs of Palestine were asked to help in digging their graves 
vri th their own. hands. (14) 
Religious groups also appeared before the special com-
mittee and defended the Arab case. They declared that their 
religious attachment of Palestine is more extensive and deep-
er than that of the .rews. 
Some Christian supporters of Zionism have approached 
the subject from another angle. They base their stand on the 
(1.3) Frank C. Sakran, Palestine Dilemma, (Washington: Public 
Affairs Press, 1948), p. 120. 
(14) UN Official Records of the first special session of the 
General ASsembly, Vol. I, Plenary Meeting 78, May 14, 1947, 
p. 144. 
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promise to Abraham that his seed shall inherit the land of 
Canaan. Thus it belongs to them and sooner or later they 
have to come back to it. While others stated that,accord-
ing to the Bible, God's promise to Abraham was fulfilled 
3,000 years ago when the Jews occupied and ruled Palestine. 
They later lost it because of their transgression and since 
they rejected Christ as their Messiah, can no longer be con· 
sidered by Christians as the heirs of Abraham. The Bible 
says: 
If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, 
and heirs according to the promise. There is neither 
Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there 
is neither male· nor female, for ye are all one in 
Christ Jesus.(l5) 
MOhammedan supporters of the Arab case also spoke of 
Islam's teachings as similar to those of Christianity. ~-
hammed, their prophet, taught that because of their failure 
to heed the message of the prophets, including those of Jesus 
and of himself, the Jews forfeited any claim to God's favor 
despite their descent from Abraham: 
Verily the men who are the nearest of kin to 
Abraham, are they who follow him; and his prophet, and 
they who believe on him; God is th.e patron of the :faith-
ful.(l6) . 
(15) Ga.lat:ian113 3:28, 29. 
(16) ~he KOran: The family of Imran. 
r ! 
Arab spokesmen have also cited the following princi-
ples of American Policy outlined by President Truman in a 
speech delivered on October 1945. 
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We believe in the eventual return to sovereign 
rights and self-government to all peoples who have 
been deprived of them by force. We shall approve of 
no territorial changes in any frien~ly part of the 
'I.Arorld unless they accord with the freely expressed 
wish~ of the people concerned. ;ve believe that all 
people who are prepared for self-government should be 
penni tted to choose their ovm form of government by 
their own freely expressed choice, without interfer-
ence from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, 
in Asia, in .Africa, as well as in the \vestern Hemis-
phere.(17) 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the vie\'TS express-
ed by Gandhi reflect the attitude of the Asian people and 
voice their feeling most truly ,.,hen he said: 
Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense 
that England belongs to the English or France to the 
French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on 
the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today can't 
be justified by any mor<::1,le code of conduct. Surely it 
would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud 
Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews 
partly or wholly as their national home. The root cause 
would be to insist on a just treatment of Jews wherever 
they are born and bred.(l8) 
Freya Stark, a Britisher, writes: 
I have always held that force is a monstrous thing 
to use against people long settled on its land to in-
duce it to accept immigration. If the arrival are angels 
from heaven, it makes no difference: the inhabitation of 
{17) Na~J Day Speech, President Truman Foreign Policy, Con-
gressional Digest, Background, Dept. of Armed Forces, Am~ 
ican Foreign and Hilitary policies, v/ashington, Oct. 26, 1945, 
p. 294. 
{18) United Asia, International Ymnthly of Asian Affairs, 
1948, :P• 252. 
• 
---
i 
l 
a land for two thousand years gives one a right to 
open or close the door, whether it be Italians in 
Abayssian or Zionists in Palestine. The Jews have 
already admitted close upon half a million Jewish 
immigrants within the last 25 years. The Arabs num-
ber two thirds, and the Je\vS one third. Thus that 
ip proportion of population the Jewish immigration 
would correspond to 45 million in the United States. 
If America had ad~itted 45 million Jews or Gentiles 
or indeed angels s; nll in one lump in less than 30 
years, and it wu . ·proposed still to coerce her to 
keep her door open, it is easy to imagine what her 
reaction would be.(l9) 
II. The Jewish Case before the Committee 
The Jevdsh case as a whole v.ras presented by three 
spokesmen of the Jewish Agency (Dr. Silver, }~. Shertok, 
Hr. Cussion). Na.ny delegates hovrever made statements of 
understanding and sympathy for the Jews but nobody iden-
tified himself with the cause in the manner in \vhich the 
Arab speakers identified themselves with the cause of the 
Palestinian Arabs. 
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The Jewish spokesmen demanded the opening of Palestine 
to unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of 
a Jewish State. The statement, "Palestine belongs to the 
Jews, 11 was based on : 
(ll ~~ The historical connection. Their religious attac~~ent to it. The Balfour Declaration and the mandate. 
Dr. Silver argued: 
The Jewish case is, in the fir.st place a legal 
one, based on the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour 
Declaration which was issued by His 1-T.a.j esty' s Govern-
ment as a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
(19) Frank Sakran, Palestine Dile!fuua, on. cit., p. 212; 
from Arab Island, pp. 69, llOl 
---
PsDi!'ati.)n. :9:ir- ~Iajes+;::rr s Govermr..ent views nith favor 
the estnbl:!.sh"'lent of a nRt:l.o::.al ho:r·1e for the Je,.Yish 
peonle. The :nandate in its prear:1ble, recor,nized the 
historical connection of the Jewish peonle with Pales-
tine o.nd the grounds for reconstittttl:-J.gc their national 
home in tJ:-le country. Generations ar:o t}:e internationaJ. 
CO:tnrl'Uni ty o_f the world, of 1'r'1icb the United l'T'ltions to-
day is the politic-::_ cnc spiri tufll heir' d0creed that 
the Jewish people shaJl be .rj_ve':'l the right long denied 
anc the ormort1.rnJty to reconstitute their national home 
in Palestine. That ne.tional ho:me is still in tr.e mak-
~.ng. It han not vet been full:r established, no inter-
-r.at:!.o-:-lal co:'!LmlJnjt~r har cancelled, or even quer-tioned 
+:hat r:tght.(20) 
Dr. Silver accu8ed the 3nglish Government for failing 
tn fTil~ill he~ pro~ise. He s8.id: 
The ':TI.ancato.,..-r power which was ert;rustecl with the 
oblivatior to rqfe~u~~d ~he op~ortunitv for the con-
tj_nu.ou8 P:ro·wth and develon:nent of the ,Je,Nish Hatinnal rro~e has'~nfortunately in recent vearn crievouslv in-
terfered with n.n cirC1}"'1.Scribed it. That opportunity 
'""lust no;,~· be full:"r restored. ( '21) 
~Tr. Shertol( Cl.eY'1.aDded and arr;ued, ab01..1.t thC' historical 
connectj_o':1 of the Jews in Palestine, .l'tating: 
It ma:",r sound rrnite y>lausible to art_!ue that if 
the right of the Jews to return to Palestine is ad-
'ni tted 0"1 the ground of ancient histor:':r, t1.J.en the 
v7hole man of the vrorlc WO'..lld have to be remade and 
c1.,aos woi1ld ensue. But does th'J. t question really 
arise? Do tbA descende.nts of the Ro!P..c0 .:r>s, for exa"Ylple, 
clai:n. entry into England? Do t~1.ey need Eng'land? 
Does the:Lr future, t:teir ver-.:r existence, depend on 
settlin~ there? (2'2) 
(20) T.JN ')fficial Records of the First Snecial Session of 
+::re General Assenbtv, Vol. III, T1ain Comnittee-s, SOth T~ee.t­
~.ng, (Docume·1t A./Cl)J 16) T'ay e, 10):.7, P• 109-110. 
~-'e'" v·o-(>1' T-"LY"''e'"' (T·:"-..T 1 1 JC1l17 IV 1•.2 ) ...._~vv .. ._ _ .. ,J.u .. ~-c.,.,-·- J- ' • e, 
--~- . 
(21~ Ihid._, n. 110-111. 
(?2) TJJT 0fi'icial Records of t:re First Spec~.8.l Session of 
_the Gener-al J~:::se'""lbl·'T, Vol. -;-li, S"l,_th T~eeti'lf': (Document 11./Cl/1.36) 
'1 ,~ 12, 1°11 7, p. ?. ') 7. 
Then 11r. Shertok applied the same questions to the 
Arab delegates: 
Do the ~abs for that matter press to return to 
Andalusia in Spain? Is it a matter of life or death. 
for them? No ••• the analogy is fallacious and mis-
leading. 
The Jews as a homeless people should have a home 
and their historical connection to Palestine is a 
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great historic phenomenon, a unique and an internat-
ional affair. The great historic phenomenon of the 
Jewish return to Palestine is unique because the po-
sition of the Je1.\rish people as a homeless people, and 
yet attached vdth an unbreakable tenacity to its birth-
place. It is that phenomenon that has made the problem 
·of .Palestine an issue in international affairs, and no 
similiar issue has ever arisen.(23) 
:Mr. Ben Goroun, concerning the Jewish situation in Pal· 
estine, dealt ·with three e.spects: the regeneration of the Jeiv-
ish nation, the achievement of the Je\\fS in Palestine and re-
settlement; using the folloiifing language he said: 
In Palestine you are faced not nerely with a 
large and g11ovring number of 'Jews, but ivith a distinct 
Jewish Nation. In Palestine there is a new and unique 
phenomenon, a Jewish Nation, with all attributes, char-
acteristic resources, and aspirations of nationhood. 
Palestine, was in the course of centuries conquered and 
invaded by many alien peoples, but none of them ever 
identified its national fate with it.(24) 
Speaking about the achievement of the Jews in the work 
of reconstruction he stated: 
The growth of this nation and its work of recon-
struction must not and cannot be arrested, and this 
for two reasons. One is the existence of large numbers 
of homeless Jews, for whom there is no other salvation 
except in their own national home. The second is that 
(23) Ibid., p. 252. 
(24) ~., p. 274. 
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more than two-thirds of the land of Pe.lestine is still 
\vaste and uncultivated. 
We are not like our Arab neighbors, in possession 
of vast underpopulated territories; like Iraq, Arabia, 
and Syria. We must therefore make use of every bit· of 
every free land in our country, even desert land.(25) 
The connection of the Je•,.rish immigration with the Pal-
estine :problem was presented by Hr. Shertok. He emphasized 
the fact that: 
The need for immigration cannot be ignored. To 
treat the issue of Palestine in isolation from the im-
migrc,tion issue would make as much sense as to study 
the beating of a heart in disregard of blood circulation. 
'rhe Jev.rish immigrants appealed to the world to say that, 
they form part of a people which has a national home 
vlill of its own. They want to go to the only country 
where they will feel at home, both individually and co-
llectively. (26) 
Ben Goroun, answering the representative of Poland who 
asked, vras there any cooperation bet\veen the Arab and Jews, 
stated: 
Yes, there has been on both sides. Arabs and Jews 
have cooperated successfully in the \..ride and varied 
fields of municipal, corn..'Tlercial, and labor a.ffai:rs.(27) 
I can affirm that there is nothing inherent in the 
nature of either the native Arab or the immigrant Jew 
which prevents friendly cooperation. On the contrary 
considering the admitted great difference of background, • 
they mix remarkably well. We are going to Palestine 
not to fight the Arab \vorld, but to live at peace with 
it. (2'8) 
The Jewish spokesmen attacked the mandatory government 
and the White Paper, after Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated 
(25) Ibid., p. 274-275. 
(26) Ibid., p. 254-55, 
(27) They did not find encouragement or help from the man-
datory ivho kept them apart. 
(28) Ibid,, p. 257, 
that the British Government tried for years to settle the 
problems of Palestine and had failed and that, therefore, 
it had brought the problem to the United Nations. Hr. Ben 
Goroun retorts to this: 
77 
The mandatory power was charged by the League of 
Nations with the carrying out of a definite settlement. 
The Balfour Declaration was approved by the League of 
Nations and made international law. The settlement was 
the restoration of Palestine to the Jews. England had 
failed to fulfill that settlement. The failure became 
manifest with introduction of a policy set forth in the 
White Paper of 1939, w~~ch ~ olated the most essential 
terms of the mandate and vitiated its entire purpose. 
The ·\mite Paper was condemned by the League, and 
dengunced by the most eminent political leaders of the 
United Kingdom itself. The Jews all over the world were 
disappointed. The White Paper Policy is responsible 
for tr~ misery and deaths of a large number of Jews and 
for the cruel acts of expulsion of Jewish refugees. It 
is responsible for establishing in Palestine a police 
state without parallel in the civilized world. This is 
the real nature of the failure of the mandatory power.(29) 
Dr. Silver went further than that by condemning the maR-
datory and stressed that the mandate was without international 
supervision. 
The administration of Palestine has, since the out-
break of the war, been conducted by the mandatory power 
as if it were vested with the sovereignty of Palestine, 
vrhereas it is assumed to adr.flinister that country-,-c of 
which it was not the sovereign, as a trustee for carry-
ing out the purposes of the mandate which clearly de-
fined its rights and its obligations.(30) 
The whole argument revolved around the fu.lfillment of 
(29) Ibid~, p. 273-274. 
(30) Ibid., p. 108. 
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the declaration :promising a national home for the Jews. 
YJX. Shertok ended the Jewish case with a strong appeal to 
the family of Nations, that: there should be an Israel State 
with free immigration and full independence. "For its attain-
ment "Vre appeal for the assistance of the entire family of 
nat ions." 
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Sumrnary of Jewish and Are,b Arguments 
The summary of arguments gleaned from the debate before 
the committee and supplemented from other sources presented 
here for both the Arab and Zionist sides of the Palestine ~obM 
lem is not intentied: to exhaust all that might be said on be-
half of either faction. It is merely a survey of some of the 
main contentions advanced by either side to justify the stands 
they have taken. 
The arguments of each side, in parallel columns, follow: 
Zionist ~ 
1. Arguing from history, the : 1. Arguing historically, the 
Zionists lay claim to Pales- : Arabs of :Palestine claim to be 
tine on the basis that they : descendants, in part at least, 
occupied Palestine for many : of the original inhabitants of 
9enturies, as witnessed by : P~estine. Partly they are de-
the Old Testament, and there : cendants of the Arab conquerors 
they built. a flourishing He.;. - . : of the 7th century A.D. The 
brew kingdom. After the des- : Hebrews were invaders from the 
truction of Jerusalem in the : outside and for the last 2,000 
first century A.D. and the : years thare has been no Jewish 
subsequent dispersion of the : state in Palestine and no Je,,.-
Jews, some Jews still remained: ish majority. It is not re-
in Palestine. For this reason: asonable to remake the map in 
it is just to reconstitute the: accordance with a situation 
Jewish state in Palestine. : of 2,000 years ago • 
• 
• 2. Palestine 'is a holy land : 2. :Palestine is also a holy 
to the Jews, the home of their: land to thE Christians and is 
sncient prophets and temple, : the second holy land of the 
is closely connected with the : ~fuslems. Jerusalem is Islam's 
symbols and practices of the ::third holiest city. There-
Jevrish religion and has been : ligious nostalgia of the Jews 
the object of their hopes : does not confer political 
throughout the ages. As the : rights. Most Jews now return-
Jew's unique religious home, ::ing to :Palestine are relig-
they have a right to return to: iously inspired but are anim-
l?alestine. : ated by aggressive political 
: nationalism. 
Zionist 
. 
• 
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Arab 
-
3. The Balfour Declaration of: 3. A "national home" in Pal-
1917 promised the Zionists : estine does not mean a Jewish 
a. "national home" in Pales- : state. The official British 
tine. Prominent British : \fuite Papers of 1922 and 1939 
leaders understood that this : confirm this. The Balfour Dec-
meant, in time, a Je,..rish state: laration contradicts the 
approved by the United States: 14:cMahon pledges. Balfour prom-
and the League of Nations. : to give away something that 
: was n~t his to give. The Arabs 
: of Palestine are not claiming 
: their country on pledges made 
: to them, for it belongs to 
: them. Nor are the Arabs claim-
: ing their independence on as-
: surrances; they are entitled 
: to such independence as their 
: natur&.l and inalienable right • 
• 
• 4. The Jews have brought : 4. The prosperity of the Jew-
western civilization to Pal- : ish colonies in Palestine is 
estine. Astounding agricul- : aftifical because it is support-
tural and industrial progress: ed strongly by foreign c~pital. 
has been made. Jewish immi- : At one time the Arabs were the 
gration has raided the low : most cultured people on earth. 
Arab standard of living and : After four centuries of ottoman 
improved health, hospital,and: rule, it was natural their 
other services for the bene- : economy should be depressed. 
fit of Jews and Arabs alike. : The other independent Arab 
The Arab economy is feudal- : states have made remarkable 
istie. ~ means of irrigation: progress on their own init-
etc., Palestine could support: i~tive. It is unfair that prop-
millions of additional people:-erty acquired by the Jewish 
-- both immigrants and : Agency should be made in· 
natives. The White Paper of : alienable and that Arab labor 
~939 unjustly restricts Jew- : should be disbarred from it. 
ish acquisition of property. : 
5. The Jews have suffered : 5. The Arabs pity the sad 
unspeakable ~ersecution in : plight of the Jews but, after 
Europe and all considerations: all, the Arabs were not re-
bf humanitarian justice de- : sponsible for bringing about 
mand that the Jews be permit-: that sad situation. Pales-
ted to go to Palestine, a : tine, a small, arid country, 
land that has been promised : cannot solve the Jewish refu-
them under international law.: gee problem, which must be 
MOst Jewish refugees would : approached on a world scale. 
: 
Zionist Arab 
-
rather go to Palestine than : At the same proportionate 
any other place. Nowhere else: rate of Jewish immigration 
do Jews have the same oppor- : into Palestine, the United 
tunity·to rebuild their lives.: States would have taken in 
Law and justice demand that : over 40 million immigrants. 
the world answer the Zionist : Let the rest of the world 
plea. : assume its share of the 
: refugee burden. 
: 6. As inhabitants of the 
: land for centuries, the 
: Arabs have a right to Pal-
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6. The League of Nations 
mandate recognized "the his-
torical connection of the 
Jewish people with Pales-
tine. 
: estine on the basis of self-
: determination of peoples. 
. 
• 
: 
7. Political Zionism is : 7. I.fany Jews do not support 
supported by an overwhelming : Zionism; many others are in-
majority of Jews, and qy many: terested only in cultural or 
Christian leaders, especially: religious Zionism. The western 
in the United States and Great: democracies have been ignor-
Britain. : nant of the case • 
• • 
: 
B. The Jews require a state : B. The concessions of the 1939 
in Palestine because the : White Paper merely recognized 
British, as the governing : Arab rights in Palestine. The 
authority,. have made conces~ :British promise to stop immi-
sions to the Arabs for stra- : gration after five years has 
tegic, political and other : been broken and now 100,000 
reasons. : nevr ir.arr.igrants are being reo-
: commended. 
: 
• 
• 9. The establishment of a : 9. Establishment of a Jewish 
Jewish state in Palestine : state might lead to war be-
-vrould help solve the Jewish : t"reen .Arabs and Jews. The Je\'lS 
minority problem at the same : are not a nation but citizens 
time. Jews v1ould no longer be: of man~r countries who profes'1 
a perpetual minority group : the same religion. Haey Jewish 
but would have a government : citizens of other countries 
vJ"hich could defend Je\•.rish : are opposed to political Zion-
rights before the internat- : ism because they fear it may 
tional councils of the world.: effect their political status. 
All this 'l.vould not prejudice : 
the rights of Jewish citizens: 
of other countries. 
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Zionist 
10. The Jews must attain a : 10. The Jews have no right to 
majority in Palestine because: obtain control over the Arabs 
only thus can they cast off : in their own country. The 
permanently that minority : Arabs can be trusted to guar-
ghetto status that has pla- : antee Je1'ish rights: a Moslem 
gued them for centuries. An : family, for example, has been 
Arab guarantee of their minor-: entrusted by the Christians 
i ty rights would not be : for many years \'Ti th the keys 
sufficient. : of the Holy Sepulchre • 
• 
• 
: 
11. The Arabs have great 
stretches of territory and 
many millions of people. 
: 11. Most of the Arab world is 
: desert. Would the United States, 
: for example;. be 'wilxing 'to 
: giv~ up one of its small states 
: upon the order of a foreign 
: power? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
12. The United States gov- : 12. The United States govern-
ernment has repeatedly ex- : ment has been influenced by 
pre~sed sympathy for Jewish : American Jewish voters in its 
aspirations in Palestine. : policy towards Palestine. Pres-
President Roosevelt agreed to: ident Roosevelt promised to 
v.rork for a Jewish co:mmon- take no action i11 Palestine 
wealth in Palestine. : hostile to the Arabs • 
. 
• 
• 
• 
13. The Arabs have accented : 
the 600,000 Jews in Palestine: 
as a 11 Fai t accompli 11 ; They : 
\rlould probably accept a Je\v- : 
ish state if England and the : 
United States insisted upon 
it. The Arab League is too : 
weak to wage an effective war: 
against the western democra-:: 
cies. The Arab states need : 
Anglo-American friendship in : 
the Near East b8cause of the : 
threat of Russia. : 
. 
• 
• 
• 
13. A Je\rlsh state in Pales-
tine would meet the o~mbined 
resistance of the Arab League. 
If England and America support 
Zionist aims, oil concessions 
might be vri thdrawn. Some Arabs 
have hinted that Russian sup-
port may be called in if Eng-
land and the United States 
press the Zionist cause too 
far. 
14. Continued Je\dsh immi-
gration into Palestine is 
required if the Zionists 
are to construct the Jewish 
states which they cl.aim has 
been promised to them. 
: 14. Even \vith Jewish immi-
gration limited only by eco-
: nomic capacity, they may 
: never obtain a majority in 
: Palestine because of the 
: rapid natural increase of the 
. 
. 
r 
i : Arab population.(31) 
• 
• 
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The arguments for ea~h side in the Palestine problem 
could be extended indefinitely. Those just listed, however. 
may be accepted as representative of the difficulty involved 
in reaching a workable solution. Since that fateful day in 
191? when }tr. Balfour extended his promise to the Zionists, 
there have been few. 
Proposals Propounded in the Comr.i ttee Hearing for the 
Solution of the Problem 
A. Jewish proposals: 
1. l~st Jewish organizations in Palestine and abroad 
which submitted written or oral statements to the committee 
agreed with the Jewish Agency in demanding Palestine for the 
creation of a Jewish State. The opposition to the creation 
of a Jevlish State is represented by a r.1inority. 
2. Tie Ihu (union) Association and the Hashemer Work-
er's Party were in favor of a bi-national state in which the 
two (Arab and Je\.rs) communities would have equal status and 
political power. 
(31) Charles R. Gellenr, The Palestine Problem, The Library 
of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Pub. Affairs :Bul-
letin, No. 50, Washington D.C., }furch 194?, pp. 1?6-1?9. 
Report to the Gen. Assembly, The UH Special Com..'llittee on 
Palestine, iUs 1itajeety 1s :StG,tionary Office, London,l94?, pp. 4?-66. 
The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central, 
Geneva, 194?, p~ 106. · 
Sa.TUy E'l. I'lida.ny, Int ernF .. t ional Relations (Arabic), (Damas-
cus: Syrian University Press, 1938),p. 2-23. 
3. The Communist Party proposes a democratic Arab-
Jeivish. State, which might be bi-national or federative. 
4. The council for Judaism voiced opposition to 
Zionism, and opposed the establishment of a Jewish State. 
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5. The Jewish Agency: A solution to ensure large 
scale immigration and' settlement and leads \vi thout delay to 
the establishment of the Jewish State. 
B. Arab proposals: 
The representatives of the Arab States put forward 
much the same constitutional proposals for the future of Pal-
estine. 
1. Palestine should be a unitary state, vlith a demo-
cratic constitution and an elected legislative assembly. 
2. Civil rights provided for all citizens. 
3. Protection of religious and cultural rights of 
the Jewish community. 
4. Strict prohibition of Jmvish immigration. 
Here we see two different solutions with no cooperation 
from either side, thus the special committee rejected such 
solutions. 
Palestinian Arabs Boycott of the Comrni ttee During the 
Hearing in Palestine. 
The United Nations Special Corr,mittee on Palestine \>raw 
faced ivi th the non-cooperation of the Palestinian Arabs. 
This in fact effected the entire work of the committee. 
On June 13, 1947, the Arab Higher Committee con-
veyed an official statement of their decision to ab-
stain from collaboration in the work of the United 
1\fations Special Committee on Palestine. (32) 
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Since the success of the United nations Special Commit-
tee on Palestine depended upon the co-operation of the par-
ties (Arabs and Jetvs), the co:rmnittee did her best to overcome 
this disability. 1-fr. Sands tram (chairman) made many appeals 
by radio and local press for the full co-operation of all 
parties. 
On June 23, the committee addressed a letter directly 
to the ~trab Higher Cor.1mittee inviting them for full co-oper-
at ion. In answer the Are,b Higher Committee stated: 
The .Arab Higher Committee found no reason to 
reverse its previous decision.(33) 
To balance the absence of the Arabs, the committee 
took special account of .Arab residential, industrial., ag-
ricultural and religious ~reas. 
The com:dttee adopted another procedure, at a later 
.. 
(32) Report to the General Assembly, United Nations Special 
Committee on Pr:tlestine, England Office, 1947, p. 8. 
United Nations Year Book, 1946-47, Department of Public 
Information, United l~ations, Lake Success, New York, p. 304. 
(33) Report to the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 8. 
t-· 
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stage of its w·ork, to invite the neighboring Arab States 
to express their views on the question of Palestine. Letters 
were addressed to Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
and l're,ns-Jordan. Acceptance followed, with the exception of 
Trans-J"ordan. 
King Abdulah had his own vietvs of wanting the Arab State 
in Palestine to be added to Trans-Jordan. To obtain King Ab-
dulah' s views and attitude, the chc'J-i-.'nan and some: members of 
the committee went to ~~an for a private visit to his majes-
ty's representative. JQl this sLowed the consistent efforts 
of the committee to obtain all Arab view points on the future 
government of Jlalestine. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CO~ThiTTTEE Jur.D THE DECISION 
To prepare the report the chairman, l'Ir. Sandstrom, and 
two members presented suggestions as to a working program of 
the comrnittee for the pre:pa,ration of the committee at Gene'1ta. 
The presentation of this suggestion by the chairman was at 
the 42nd meeting. After an informal consultation, they adopt-
ed a memorandum on the future vlOrk-program of the committee. 
It was approved by the committee. It was also suggested that 
another informal memoranda be submitted by delegates or mem-
bers of the Secretariat. 
After many informal discussions two :proposals had emerg-
ed. The first was Federal State Constitutional plan, favored 
by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia). Seven mem-
bers voted against this. The second plan was partition with 
an economic;union. Three members voted against this. The 
representativ~ of Australia did not vote. 
Finally at the 52nd meeting on August 31, 1947, the 
representatives signed the approved text of the report and 
the covering letter to the Secretary General. The main 
recommendations submitted 'l.ofere as follows: 
I. Reco~~endations Approved Unanimousl~ 
The committee unanimously approved eleven recommend-
ations to the General Assembly: 
1. "Termination of the mandate. Arabs and Jews are 
in full accord with tr~t. 
2. Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the 
earliest possible date as the people of Palestine 
are sufficiently advanced to goverrr.themselves. 
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3. There shall be a transitional period preceding the 
grant of independence, which shall be as short as 
possible. 
4. During the transitional period the authority en-
trusted with the task of administering Palestine 
and preparing it for independence shall be respon-
sible to the United Nations. 
5. The sacred character of the Holy places. 
6. The General Assembly will undertake immediately an 
international arrangement whereby the problem of 
the distressed European Jews will be dealt With. 
7. Full protection for the rights and interests of 
minorities. 
8. It shall be required that the two parties (Arabs 
and Jews) have peaceful relations. 
9. Economic unity. The preservation of a suitable 
measure of economic unity in Palestine, under any 
type of solution, is of utmost importance to the 
future standards of public services, the standards 
of life of its people and the development of the 
country. 
10. States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in 
Palestine the privileges ana immUnities of foreign-
ers will have the right to the re-establishment of 
such privileges and immunities in an independent 
Palestine. 
1~. l~e General Assembly shall call on the peoples of 
Palestine to extend their fullest co•operation to 
the United Nations in settling the problem .. and 
ending the acts of violence which have for too long 
beset that country.(l) 
(1) Ibid., p. 66-70; Ne"' York Times, Dec. 6, 1947; See map. 
11. Recon~endations approved by a substantial majority. 
A. Partition and the Economic Union* 
In the course of the 47th meeting of the co.rnrnittee on 
August 27, 1947, seven members of the committee (Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sv;eden, and 
Uruguay) expressed themselves by recorded vote in favor of 
the plan of partition witL the Economic Union. It consists 
of the following parts: 
1. 11Partit ion with the Economic Union. 
2. Boundaries. 
3. City of Jerusalem. 11 (2) 
Only by means of partition, says the majority group, can 
the conflicting parties find a way to solve the problem. Tha 
reasons they gave fort his are as follows: 
1. 'rhe partition solution provides thot finality ·which 
is a most urgent need in the solution. Every other proposed 
solution would tend to induce the tvm parties to seek modifi-
cation in their favour by means of persistent pressure. The 
grant of independence to both States, hov,rever, would remove 
the basis for such efforts. 
2. Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the 
actual Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Full political 
co-operation would be indispensable to the effective func-
tionine of any single state scheme, such as the federal State 
(2) Ibid., p. 73. 
proposal, exce?t in those cases which frankly envisage an 
Arab or a Jewish dominated State. 
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3. Partition is the only means available by 'tvhich po ... 
litical and economic responsibility can be placed squarely 
on both Arabs and Je"Vrs, with the prospective result that oo n-
fronted with responsibility for bearing fUlly the conse-
quences of their own actions, a new and important element 
of political amelioration "Vnll be introduced. In the pro-
posed federal State solution this factor \orould be lacking. 
4. Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine 
today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out 
the necessary cooperation between the Arab and Jewish commun-
ities in a. single State. The creation:;of a Jewish State un-
der a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this is-
s~ from the area of conflict. 
5. It is recognized that partition has been strongly 
opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition will be 
lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of 
territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limit-
ation on immigration. ~1e fact that the solution carries the 
sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should 
allay Arab fearw of further expansion of the Jewish State. 
6. In view of the limited area and resources of Pales-
tine, it is essential that, to the extent feasible, and con-
sistent with the creation of two independent States, the eco-
nomic unity of the country should be preserved. The partition 
proposal, therefore, is a qualified partition, subject to 
such measures and limitations as are considered essential 
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to the future economic and social well-being of both States. 
Since the economic self-interest of each State would be 
vitally involved, it is believed that the minimum measure of 
economic unity is possible, where that of political unity is 
not. (3) 
"Palestine within its present borders following a tran-
sitional period of two years from Sept. 1, 1947-49 shall 
be constituted into an independent Arab State, an inde-
pendent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem. During 
the transitional period, the present mandatory power 
shall carry on the a~~inistration. During the transit-
ional period a legislative body shall be established in 
each state." (4) 
B. Partition with the Economic Union: 
A treaty shall be entered between the two states, con-
taining the Economic Union of Palestine. The objectives of 
this Union shall be: 
1. "A customs union. 
2. Connnon currency. 
3. Operation in the common interest of railways, pos-
tal and telephone. 
(3) Ibid., P• 73. 
(4) Ibid., p. 75. 
New York Times, December 6, 1947. 
4. Joint economic development especially in respect 
to irrigation." (5) 
Commentary on Partitio~ by the Committee 
1. The primary objectives sought in the foregoing 
92 
scheme are, in short, political division and economic unity: 
to confer upon each group, Arab and Jew, in its own territ-
ory, the power to make its own laws, while preserving to 
both, throughout Palestine, a single integrated economy, ad-
mittedly essential to the well-being of each, and the same 
territorial freedom of movement to individuals as is enjoyed 
today. The former necessitates a territorial partition; the 
latter, the maintenance of unrestricted co~nercial relations 
between the States, together with a common administration of 
functions in which the interests of both are in fact inex-
tricably bound together. 
2. The territorial division with the investment of full 
political pov1er in the State achieves, in turn, the desire of 
each for statehood and at the s~~e time creates a self-oper-
ating control of irr~igration. 
3. The Economic Union is to be administered by a Joint 
Economic Board in the composition of vrhich a pe.rity of inter-
est in the two States is recognized by equal representation 
from them. But in relation to such necessary and convenient 
(5) Ibid. 
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services day-to-day rulings are imperative; and since in 
present circt~stances it cannot be expected that in joint 
matters they would easily agree, the principle of arbitral 
decision is introduced by adding to the Board three indepen-
dent gutside persons to be chosen by the United nations. 
4. BUt in the larger view here are the sole remaining 
representatives of the Semitic race. They are in the land 
in which that race was cradled. There are no funchmental 
incompatibilities between them. The scheme satisfies the 
deepest aspiration of both; independence. There is a con-
siderable body of opinion in both groups which seeks the 
course of cooperation. Despite, then, the dra\vback of the 
Arab minority, the setting is one from which, with goodwill 
and a spirit of cooperation, may arise a rebirth in histor-
ical surroundings of the genius of each people. The massive 
contribution made throughout the centuries by them in relig-
ious and ethical conceptions, in philosophy, and in the en-
tire intellectual sphere, should excite among the leaders a 
mutual respect and a pride in their common origin. 
5. The Jews bring to the land the social dynamism and 
scientific method of the West; the Arabs confront them with 
individualism and intuitive understanding of life. Here then, 
in this close association, through the natural emulation of 
each other, can be evolved a synthesis of the h..ro ci vili-
zations, preserving, at the s~ae time, their fundamental 
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characteristicu. In each State, the native genius will have 
a scope and opportunity to evolve into its highest cultural 
forms and to attain its greatest reaches of mind and spirit.(£) 
c. Boundaries: 
"The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, 
Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the city of Jerusalem. 
The Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon 
?lain, most of the coastal plain and the whole of the Beer-
shaba Sub-district, \'rhich includes the Hegab. The Jewish 
State has 498,000 mews and 407,000 Arabs. The Arab State has 
10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs. The city of Jerusalem has 
100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs.(?) 
D. The City of Jerusalem: 
;r "The city shall be placed under international trustee-
ship system tied to·the United Nations. It shall include 
Abu Dis, the most of Southern Bethlehem, the most of Western 
Ein Kar.m. The city should be included in the Economic Union 
of :Palestine. (8) 
(6) Report m the General Assembly by the United Nations 
Special Committee on ~alestin~1 pp. 86-81. 
(7) Ibid., P• 83. 
(8) Ibid., p. 88. 
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J"ustifica.tion 
"The proposal to place the City of Jerusalem under in-
ternational trusteeship is based on the follo\rlng cDnsider-
ations: 
1. Jerusalem is a Holy City for ~ree faiths. Their 
shrines are side by side; some are sacred to two faiths. 
Hundreds of millions of m1ristians, }fuslems and Jews through-
out the world want peace and especially religious peace to 
reign in Jerusalem, the sacred character of its Holy :Places 
to be preserved, access to them guaranteed to pilgrims from 
abroad. 
. 
2. The history of Jerusalem, during the Ottoman regime 
' as under the mandate, shows that religious peace has been 
maintained in the City because the Government was anxious and 
had the power to prevent controversies involving some relig-
ious interest from developing into bitter strife and disorder. 
The Government was not intimately mixed in local politics and 
could, when necessary, arbitrate conflicts. 
3. Reltgious peace in Jerusalem is necessary for the 
maintenance of peace in the Arab and in the Jewish States. 
Disturbances in the Holy City would have far-reaching conse-
quences, extending perhaps beyond the frontiers of Palestine. 
4. The City of Jerusalem shall be dffinilitarized and its 
neutrality shall be declared and preserved and no para-military 
formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted ·within 
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its borders. 
5. Persons residing in the City of Jerusale~, without 
distinction as to ethnic origin, sex, language or religion, 
shall be ensured protection under its laws \vi th regard to the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of worship, language, speech and publication, educa-
tion, assembly, and association. 
6. Residents of the City of Jerusalem, irrespective of 
nationality, may participate in the local elections of the 
City and they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the City 
in respect of taxation and judicial proceedings. 
7. A Governor of the City of J"erusalem shall be appoint-
ed by the Trusteeship Councll. He shall be neither Arab nor 
Jew nor a citizen of the Palestine States nor, at the time of 
appointment, a resident of the City of Jerusalem. 
8. In addition to the Governor, there shall be such 
other executive, legislative and judicial organs, bodies and 
offices for the government of the City as may be determined 
in the Trusteeship Agreement. 
9. The protection of the Holy Places,religious build-
ings and sites in the City of Jerusalem shall be entrusted 
to a special police force, the members of \-'lhich shall be 
recruited outside of Palestine and shall be neither Arab nor 
Jew. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such bud-
getary provisions as may be necessary for the maintenc~ of 
this special force. 
1.0. The City of .Jerusalerr. should be included in the 
Economic Union of Palestine.(9) 
III. Recommendations Approved bv the Hinority 
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A. Federal State Plan: It is recognized that Pales-
tine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, 
that both these peoples have had an historic association with 
it· and that both play vi tal roles in the economic and cul tur-
al life of the country. 
It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the inter-
national community not to bend every effort .of support for 
the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Na-
tions. This support vrould be an important factor in encour· 
aging cooperation and collaborat'ion bet;.veen the t'lrro Semetic 
people of Palestine. 
Thus the object of a Federal State solution would be to 
give the most feasible recognition to the nationalistic aspir-
ation of both Arabs and Jevrs and to merge them into single 
loyalty and patriotisn ,,,rhich \vould find expression in an in-
dependent Palestine. The Federal State is also in every re-
spect the most democratic solution. It avoids the creation of 
national minority grou:-ps, and affords an opportunity for full 
and effective participation in representative government to 
(9) Ibid., p. 86, 87, 88. 
every citizen of the State. rrhis solution would be most 
in harmony with the basic principles of the charter of the 
United Nations. This independent Federal State of Pales-
tine shall compromise an Arab and a Jewish State. This plan 
was supported by three members (India, Iran, and YugoslaviaK' 
**(10) 
Recorrlil1 endations 
The undersigned representatives of India, Iran, and 
Yugoslavia, not being in agreement vvith the recommendation 
for partition formulated by the other members of the Commit-
tee, and for the reasons, among others stated above, present 
to the General Assembly the following recornm.endations, which 
in their view, constitute the most suitable solution to the 
problem of Palestine. 
lT IS RECOMMENDED THAT 
·1. The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recog-
nition of their right to independence, and an independent 
federal State of Palestine shall be created following a 
transitional period not exceeding three years. 
2. With regard to the transitional period, respon-
sibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for 
independence under the conditions herein prescribed shall 
(10) Ibid., p. 88-97. 
be entrusted to such authority as may be decided upon by 
the General Assembly. 
3. The independent federal State of Palestine shall 
compromise an Arab State and a Jewish State. 
4. In delimiting the boundaries of the Arab and Jew-
ish States, respectively, consideration shall be given to 
anticipated population grovrth. 
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5. During the transitional period a constituent asse~ 
bly shall be elected by the population of Palestine, which 
shall formulate the constitution of the independent federal 
State of Pal est ine. 
6. The govermental structure of the independent fed-
eral State of Palestine shall be federal and shall compromise 
a Federal Government and the Governments of the Arab and Jew-
ish States respectively. 
7. Amcmg the organs of government there shall be a 
Head of State and an executive body, a representative fed-
eral legislative body, a federal court and such other sub-
sidiary bodies as may be deemed necessary. 
8. The federal legislative body shall be composed of 
. t v.ro chambers. 
9. Election to one chamber of the federal legislative 
bo,dy shall be on,:the basis of proportional representation of 
the population as a whole. 
10. Arabic and Hebrevr shall be official languages in 
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both the Federal and State Governments. 
11. Each State shall be entitled to organize a police 
force for the maintenance of law and·order. 
12. The boundaries of the respective Arab and Je\vish 
States in the independent federal State of Palestine shall 
be as indicated on the map attached to this report. 
13. The problem of Jewish innnigration into Palestine 
be dealt 11li th in the follovring manner: 
For a period of three years from the effective 
date of the beginning of the transitional period 
provided for in the solution to be applied to 
Palestine, egen if the transitional period should 
be less, Jewish immigration shall be permitted 
into the borders of the JevTish State in the pro-
posed independent Federal State of Palestine, in 
such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive ca-
pacity of the Jewish State, having due regard for 
the rights of the population then present within 
that State and for their anticipated natural rate 
of increase.(ll) 
(11) Ibid., p. 9C! 
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CHAPTER lV 
VIEhPOINTS, COELEl~jTS AND ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES 
TO 'i'hE DISPUTE BEFO:C~~E THE GENERAL ASSEJ>~BLY 
On September 17, 194 7, v.rhen the regular session of the 
General Assembly met at Lake Success the first item on the 
Agenda to be discussed and debated was the committee's re-
port. The first to speak up was the United Kingdom Delegate • 
1'he United Kingdom's viewpoint 
The representative of the United K:j_ngdom declared that 
his government was in substantial agreement with the twelve 
general recommendations; in particular, the United Kingdom 
Government endorsed and wished to emphasize three of these 
recommendations: The termination of the T•Iandate, Indepen-
dence, the problem of Jewish displaced persons. As to the 
first ones both of which were an exact expression of the guid-
ing principle of British policy. As to the latter the Unitro 
Kingdom Government believed that the entire problem of dis-
placed persons in Europe, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, v.ras 
an international responsibility demanding urgent attention.(l) 
The United Kingdom representative went on to say that the 
attitude of his government remained as then stated. His 
( 1) UN Official Records of the Second Session of the 
General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question; 
Second Meeting, Lake Success, New York, Sept. 26, 1947, p. 1 
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government was ready to cooperate with the assembly to the 
fullest extent possible. He could not easily imagine cir-
cumstances in which the United Klngdom would wish to pre-
vent the application of a settlement recommended b.1 the 
A8sembly. The crucial question for His Majesty's Govern-
ment was, however, the matter of enforcements of such a set-
tlement. His government was ready to assume responsibility 
for implementing any plan on which agreement was reached by 
the Arabs and the Jews. If on the other hand,~the Assembly 
were to r-6-lJ~omm.end a policy which was not acceptable to both 
parties the United Klngdom Government would not feel able to 
implement it, and the Assembly Should therefore provide, in 
such a case, for some alternative authority to implement:(2) 
On September 26, 1947, British Colonial Secretary Ar-
thur Creech Jones told the United Nations that: 
"Britain had decided to terminate its mandate and 
withdraw from Palestine regardless of whether a settle-
ment was reached or not. The 1ate for complete evacu-
ation was given as August, 1948."(3) 
View Point of the Arab Higher Cpmmittee 
The representative of the Arab Higher Committee, Mr. G. 
Hussein, declared that it was the sacred duty of the Arabs 
of Palestine te :-defend their country against all aggressione 
(2) Ibid., p. 3. 
(3) Palestine Termination of the Mandate, His Majesty'e Gov-
ernment Stationary Office, London, 1948, p. 11.-
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including the Zionists. The right and the testimony of 
the Arabs in Palestine, stated El Hussein:, had been the sub-
ject of more than eighteen investigations within twenty-five 
years, and all to no purpose. Com.·;issions of inquiry had 
either reduced the national and legal rights of the Palestine 
Arabs or had glossed them over. The few recomrr.endations 
favorable to the Arabs had been ignored by the Ivhndatory Po·w-
er. For these and for other reasons already communicated to 
the United Nations, it was not surprising that the Arab High-
er Committee should have abstained from the nineteenth inves-
tigation (UNSCOF) and refused to appear before the Special 
Committee. (4) El Hussein· declared thc.:t England is the one 
who created all of their troubles and ~ngland a lone who is 
responsible for the miserable conditions of the Arabs. 
urn education, the Jews had control of their own educa-
tional system \vhile the Arabs were deprived of th.e right.n(5), 
11 In economic fields, discrimination was still more ap-
parent. The Mandatory power and the Jewish Agency had pur-
sued a policy calculated to place obstacles in the way of 
{4) UN Official Records. Ad Hoc Committee, 21?.• cit., Third 
meeting, Sept. 29, 1947, p. 6. 
(5) Ibid., p. 8. 
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Arab agricultural development while assisting Jewish indus-
t~. l1r. Hussein cited instances showing how action by the 
High Commissioner for Palestine during 1920 {who was a Jew 
himself), had compelled the sale of Arab lands by Arab debt-
ora to the Jews and had le'd to the wiping out of many Arab 
villa.ges~n{6) 
"In the financial field the government's policy of dis· 
crimination was common knowledge although the Arabs repre-
sented two-thirds of the population, the Jewish minority re-
ceived one-half of the benefits of the budget, and Jewish 
local authorities had received a far greater proportion or 
government leans and special loans for housing and other pur-
poses. The granting of the Jordan and Dead Sea concessions 
were instances of discrimination in favor of the Zionists in 
the field of economic development.n{7) The representative ot 
the Arab Higher Committee stated that, yielding to Zionist 
pressure, the United Kingdom Government had failed to imple-
ment its own decision, made in 1939, that Jewish immigration 
into Palestine must cease and then Palestine must become an 
independent unitary state within a fixed time. 
No comments upon the UNSCOP, declared El Hussein, be-
cause the Arab Higher Committee considered that it could not 
(6) Ibid., p. 9. 
(7) ~ •• p. 9. 
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be used as a basis for discusssion. Both the majority and 
the minority plans contained in the Report vvere inconsis-
tent with the United Nations Charter and the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. "The Arabs of Palestine 1-vere sol-
idly determined to oppose with all the means at their dis-
posal any scheme which provided for the dissection, segre-
gation or partition of their country or vvhich gave to minor-
ity special and preferential rights and status. 11 ( c3) 
Viewpoints of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 
The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 
praised the special committee for its conscientious labors 
and good faith. On behalf of the Jewish Agency he supported 
ten of the eleven recommendations unanimously adopted by 
UNSCOP. The exception was recommendation:Vl (Jewish Dis-
placed Persons). The Jewish Agency, he said, did not dis-
approve of this recommendation but did wish to call atten-
. tion to the llintense urge" of the overwhelming majority of 
Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine, a fact 
noted by both the Anglo-American Committee and by UNSCOP.(9) 
The solution proposed by the minority of the Special 
Committee was unacceptable to the Jewish Agency. The major-
ity proposal was not really satisfactory to the Jewish peop~, 
(8) Ibid., p. 11. 
{9) Ibid., p. 15. 
.. 
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either, &ccording to the Balfour Declaration the National 
HOme implied to Palestine and Transjordan. Transjordan hadt 
nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had 
subsequently been set up as an Arab State. Now a second 
Arab State was to be carved out of the remainder of Pales-
tine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would 
represent less than one-eighth of the territory originally 
set aside for it. Such a sacrifice, declared Dr. Silver, 
should not be asked of the Jewish people.(lO) 
The representative of the Jewish Agency also criticized 
the UNSCOP majority proposals concerning Jerusalem, saying 
that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem (outside the 
walled city) ehould be included in the Jewieh State,{ll) 
In conclusion he urged that the transitional period 
leading to the establiehment of the Arab and Jewish States 
in Palestine be made as short as possible; at any rate short-
er than the two-year limit proposed by UNSCOP. The repre-
sentative of the Jewish Agency favored an international 
authority to be entrusted under the United Nations auspices, 
with the task of administering Palestine during the trans-
itional period.(l2) 
(10) Ibid, p. 16. 
(11) Ibid,, P• 16. 
(12) Ibid., p. 17-18, 
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.A.ttitu<le o! the Representative of Australia .. (Commonwealthl 
The representative of Australia abstained from voting 
on the plans of partition on the ground that it is out of 
the scope of the Committee. He stated at the forty-sixth 
meeting of the Special Committee that he holds the view 
"that the primary obligation of the Committee in respect of 
the General A8sembly is that of a recording, reporting and 
a !act-finding function. 11 (13) 
Mr. HOod went on to say that even it is true that the 
obligation is also laid on the Committee "to submit propos• 
als as it may deem appropriate for the solution of the Pal-
estine problem," but, since there is neither unanimity on 
any particular solution nor any decisive majority in favor 
of any particular course", the representative suggested that 
,r. 
the whole question ot Palestine should be reviewed and de-
termined by the General Assembly. 
Abdur-Rahman ----~R=e-p=resentative of India (Asiatic views) 
In a special note handed to the General Assembly, the 
representative of India ad~cated that independence is the 
natural birthright of every people of the world. The denial 
of this right is the •erious menace we have in the world 
today and the strained relations between the Arab world and 
the Mandatory today could be easily traced to these same 
lOS 
causes. As to the BalfC'ltr lJecla.ration, it wae made improp-
erly and unjustly: Abdur-Rabman stated that it had no legal 
or moral validity not legal "as the British Government had 
no power to make it at the time when it was made", or even 
subsequently, •as they did net acquire any sovereignty over 
Palestine"; and not moral "as it wae in contravention of the 
promises already made to the Arabs, who had given all the 
assistance required of them in pursuance of such promisee 
and which was admitted b,y the General Assembly to have been 
"invaluable".(l4) Thus it is possible to conceive that Lord 
Balfour either knew nothing about the promises which had al-
ready been made to the Arabs or had altogether forgotten 
them under the pressure of the war when it was passing through 
a critical juncture, and argued on behalf of the government 
to view the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Pal-
estine with favor. Justice M. Abdur-Rahman of India support-
ed his statement by a speech made by Lloyd George in the 
60mmon~ in June 1937.(15) 
"It wa.e one of the darkest periods of the war 
when Mr. Balfour prepared hie Declarations. Let me 
recall the circumstances to the Houee. At the time 
the French Army had mutinied, the Italian army waw 
on the eve of collapse and America bad hardly started 
preparing in earnest. There was nothing left but 
~itain confronting the most powerful military com-
bination the world has everJ'Seen •. It was important 
for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. 
We came to the conclusion, from imformation we re-
ceived from every part of the world, that it was 
(14) IbidL, p. 50. 
(15) Ibid., p. 52. 
vital we sheuld have the sympathies ef the Jewish 
cemmunity. I can assure the Committee that we did 
not come to the conclusion from any predilections 
or prejudices. Certainly we had no prejadices. Cer-
tainly we had no prejudices against the Arabs be-
. ' 
109 
cause at the moment we had hundreds and thousands of 
troops fighting for Arab emancipation from the Turks.(12) 
Thus the Indian representative concluded that the Balfour 
Declaration "has no legal or moral validity 11 so it is il-
legal and ±mmoral. He described the period between 1921-
1947 a.s the 11 reign of terror" during which England had kill· 
ed hundreds and thousands of Arabs and hundreds of houses 
were destroyed. During such a disturbed state of affairs it 
was impossible for the Arabs to d~elep their land and take 
part in peaceful pursuit which goes to develop a nation. 
While the Jews, whc were siding with the government, contin-
ued the Indian Representative, lest no time in trying to con-
solidate their position, and with the h~lp of the world Jew-
ry and particularly those of America. What to say "of sec-
ondary and higher education even the elementary education 
was ignored". "There are no vocational institutions and 
nothing appears to have been done during this time towards 
training persons fer social service. While millions t>f 
pounds have been spent on security measures and on the ar.med 
police. •• The fact, however, remains that the )'Ia.nd.atory :Po~­
""rer cannot be held to have succeeded in preparing the people 
for self-government and thus vielated the article twenty-two 
(16) Ibid., •· 52. 
o! the Covenant ef the Mandate." (17) 
As to the "Displaced Persons" the duty o! finding 
suitable places for these persons, advocate4 the repre-
sentatiye, rests on the whole of the world and not only 
on Palestine,(l8) 
In conclusion, "Independence to be granted to Pal-
estine as a whele, and a federal Palestinian State should 
110 
be formed which should be composed of both Arab andl Jews. (19) 
Views of the Repre§entative o! Yugoslavia (Communist views), 
In a letter sent ~~ the chairman of the Special Commit-
tee on Palestine the Representative of Yugoslavia reminded 
him that when deciding the procedure to be adopted for the 
writing of the Commdttee's report to the General Assembly et 
the United Nations, it was resolved that a single report 
would be prepared and submitted. While on the other band 
two different points of view had taken shape and were sub-
mitted to the General Assembly the Majority plan, favoured 
the partition and the Minority plan, favoured the creation 
of an independent federal state of Palestine. 
(17) Ibid,, p, 61, 
(18) Ibid, p, 75, 
(19) India was a British colony, and the Indians, who were 
striving at that t~e to achieve their independence ~ a 
common feeling witlt::,the Arabs and they well know what does 
it mean to be subjected to another nation. 
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This difference of opinion had arisen from a different 
appraisal of the historical, political, national and econom-
ic, aspects of the problem under consideration. "In aocc.rd-
ance with that decision I have, not being able to agree with 
the majority plan," declared the. representative of Yugoslav-
ia, "reserved the right to submit separately my views on 
the main featur~s of the historical background of the Pales-
tine question, the appraisal and pr~ses for the solution of 
the problem." (20) 
The Palestine problem arose, stated the representative, 
frem two different promisee, one to the Arabs and anether to 
the Jews. Aside from the newly created situation in the Near 
East where Great Britain had become the dominant power. In 
countries which were under her mandate or protectorate, Great 
Britain created a strong base for the realization of her im-
perial, political and ecenomic interests. 
"Great Britain from 1922· did not endeavor to prepare 
Palestine for independence.• "She carried out her policy 
without the agreement of the interested Palestine parties, 
imposing this policy upon both Arabs and Jews.n(21) 
Simio (the Yugoslavi~Representative) advocated that 
' England had failed to bring together the Jews and the Arabs. 
(20) .Annexes! Appendices and Maps to the ;re1,1o;rt by the IJN 
Specia! Commi tee on Palestine to the General Asaembly,(Lond-
on: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947), p. 79. 
(21) Ibid., p. 81. 
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She had kept them separated, just divide and rule. 
"In 1922 the .Arab representatives announced their read-
iness to accept Jewish settlement in Palestine and to coop* 
erate for the progress of the land."(22) 
"In 1930 a society was founded called the Worker's 
Brotherhood with the purpose of erganizing Jewish and Arab 
workers in a common union. The initiative for the founding 
came from the people th~selves. This meant that conscious-
ness of the need for unified.action and close co-operation 
among Arabs and Jews had strengthened. This attempt was doom-
ed to temporary failure. The authorities forbid the organ-
ization to continue its activities and suppressed the publica-
tion of its newspap~r."(23) 
In ~943, 515 Arab and Jewish workers participated to-
gether in strikes. 
In 1944, the number of strikers participating in such 
conm~n strikes grew to 1,250. In 1945 to 2,350; 1946 to 
30,000 and in 1947 to 40,000. These strikes are not merely 
of economic but of political significance as well. Demon-
strations having as their slogan "unity of Arab and Jewish 
workers means victory" accompanied the strikes. 
During the uprising itself, and especially during the 
(22) Ibid,, p. 83. 
(23) Ibid., p. 85. 
I 
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the Second War, new forces came into being within the frame-
work of the Arab National Movement. These new foroee were 
re:presented in the "League of the National Liberation &f Pal-
estine," working against the mandatory auth~rity and for re-
&l)proachment and cooperation with .. the democratic Jewish for .. 
ces. "These new forces", continued S1mic, "formed expression 
also into the creation of a unified 'Arab Front~. The Arab 
Front gathered about itself those Arab politicians who con-
sidered that close cooperation with the Jews was vital for 
a successful etruggle for independence."(24) 
The mandatory kept the Jews and the Arabe apart even 
in schools, the representative declared, "as regards educa-
tion and public health, we could not help but be struck by 
the extremely low percentage of budgetary expenditure under 
the above two items." The representative quoted: "In 1922· 
1923 the :percentage was 4.86 education and 6.2 :public health. 
In 1936-1937 it decreased to 3.99 in education and 3.3 in 
health. In 1943-1944, 3.09 education and 3.3 :public health. 
In 1944-1945, 2.9 education and 2.7 public health.(25) 
In social legislation, the representative stated "we 
are ·obliged to note the absence of progressive social legis-
lation. Such elementary rights of the workers as the right 
(24) Ibid., ~· 86. 
(25) Ibid., P• 88. 
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to for.m trade union, the right of assembly and strike,_ the 
limitation of working hours, minimum wages, compenstaion in 
case of discharge, payment for absence due to sickness and 
annual leave, ar~ not provided for in the labour legislation 
of Palestine.n(26) 
Again Simic accused the mandatory of being a failure. 
"The disparity between the standards of the Jewish and Arab 
workers", he state4, is frequently referred to as one of the 
main causes of friction between Arabs and Jews in genetal." 
"Indicative of the a.bsence of any J.'OSi ti ve policy on the 
part of the government to remove this disparity is the fact 
that it has failed to eliminate it even among its owm em-
pleyers of whom there are some 80,000 and when there is the 
additional glaring disparity between British empleyees on 
the one hand and Arab and Jewish empleyees on the other (of 
the 121 offieals whose salaries amount to more than ene 
thousand pounds a year -$4,000.00 - 113 are British, only 
four are Arab, only three are Jews, while one is listed un-
der the heading "others 9 --- and many similiar instances 
might be quoted).(27) 
Thus in analyzing the various possible proposals regard-
ing the future government of Palestine egery one should bear 
(26) Ibid., P• 89. 
(27) Ibid., p. 89. 
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in mind the fact that Palestine consists of tvm peoples -
the Arabs and the Jews and according to the representative, 
the main object of the committee is to reconcile them. "An 
essential premise on -v;hich our considerations of the proble m 
and solutions should be based is the unquestionable fact that 
Palestine, within its present frontiers, constitutes an 
economic unit.n(2$) 
Mr. Simic ended his letter stating "on the basis of such 
considerations, fundamental principles and premises, bearing 
in mind existing realities in Palestine, and prompted by a 
sincere desire to achieve a just and lasting solution of the 
Arab problem and of correctly settling relations between.Aral:s 
and Jews in a free and independent Palestine, their common 
state."(29) 
The United States Attitude 
On September 17, 194 7, when the r egular session of the 
General Assembly met at Lake Success, United States Secre-
tary of State George C. I1iarshall declared that: 
{28) 
(29) 
(30) 
"The United States gives great weight not only 
to the recommendations which have met with unanimous 
approval of the Special Committee but also to those 
which have been approved by the majority of the 
committee."(30) 
Ibid., p. 102. 
Ibid., P• 102. 
Joseph Dunner, The ReJ2ublic of Israel, .Q.l2.. £ll., p • 78. 
r 
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The Russian Attitude 
The greatest surprise came from Russia; for the first 
time in the United Natious history the U.s.s.R. sided with 
the United States on a major issue by favoring the partition 
plan. After considerable discussion the United States and 
Russia decided on a plan similiar in many respects to the 
majority proposal. A commissien ·of five members was pro-
posed to supervise the transition to independence, but it 
was not provided with either a military force, or the machin .. 
ery of administration. A further reason is suggested by the 
tone of Russian speeches at the United Nations, which seemed 
bent on establishing the "principle" of partition. They 
pleaded the right of a minority to separate itself from the 
majority and from its own state. 
Voting 
The final act in the partition of Palestine was played 
out at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall 
of 1947. 
On Oct~ber 11, the United States delegation declared it-
. . . 
self, with a few reservations, in favor of the plan for par-
tition as submitted by the UN'e Special Committee. Its.,.eu;p-
port-<.was based on two a.eeUliJ:I)tions: That Arab opposition 
would be negligible, and That the proposed Jewish State could 
be made a "going concern" -- despite the consensus of expert 
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opinion that neither aee~tion was eound.(31) After its 
decision was made, the United States delegation proceeded 
on the principle that other countries shQuld be allewed to 
ma.ke up their own minds. This principle was modified. how• 
ever, when it became apparent that if it were followed the 
partition plan would be defeated. A straw vote taken in the 
united Nations on Saturday, November 22, showed 24 States 
supporting the partition, 16 opposed, and the rest abstain-
ing or undecided. The American Delegation was told at that 
point that the United States was committed to partition and 
that it must go threugh. (32) 
By Wednesday, November 26, when the vote wa.e taken in 
the Committee, the result was 25 to 13 -- one vote gained 
for the partition, three lost to ite opponents, and the ab-
stention increased by two. That was still not enough for 
the two-thirds majority needed fer passage. 
Here the Zionists took the fight into their bands. 
Ral~ing a group of influential Americans and selecting 
their targets with care, they exerted all possible influ• 
ence, floods of telegrams and letters, and politics and eco-
• 
nomic pressure. Six countries which had indicated their 
(31) Victor H. Berne:tein - Spee·ch - Coqgressio~l Records, 
Senate, Vol. 93, part 9, P• 10985-6. 
(32) Kermit Roosevelt, The·Fartition of Palestine, The Mid-
dle East Journal, Jan. 1948, p. 13. 
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intention of voting against partition were the chosen tar-
gets: Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, China, Ethiopia and 
Greece, All except Greece were either won to the voting f0r 
partition or persuaded to abstain, 
These countries had many sound reasons for voting against 
partition, .Aside from moral scruples about "self-determin• 
ation" and the possible injustice of impesimg partition en 
a country against the will of a majority of its inhabitants, 
Haiti has a sizeable number of Syrian citizens. Liberia, 
China, and the Philippines have 1arge numbers of Mesleme 
among their population. Ethiopia and Greece wish te be on 
good relatione w1 tk.: their Moslem neighbors, who strongly 
oppose partition.(33) 
The del.egates of" thoa.e .. six nations, and their home gov-
ernments as well, were swamped with telegrams, phone calls, 
letters, and visitation, Many of the telegrams, particular-
ly, were from Congressmen, and others as well invoked the 
name and prestige of the United States Government. .An ex-
Geverner, a prominent Democrat with White House and other 
connections, ~ersonally telephoned Haiti urging that its dele-
gation be instructed to change its vote,(34) He spoke 
(33) Ibid,, p, 14, 
(34) ·Congressional Record~(, Vol. 93, Part 11, Nov. 28, 1947 1 
P• 11656, 
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firmly and might be ~resumed to speak with auth&rity. A 
well-known economist also clese to the White House, and act-
ing in a liaison capacity for the Zionist erganization, ex-
erted his powers ef persuasion upon the Liberian delegate. 
Both states reversed themselves and voted for partition. 
After a good deal of "pressure politics" the final vote was 
cast with thirty-three for the partition plan and thtrteen 
against it. Ten abstained from voting.(35) 
A significant feature of the United Nations decision is 
that votes fer partition were cast entirely by Christian na-
tions, while those against it, with the exception of Cuba and 
Greece, came from non-Christian states. 
When the final vote for partition was announced, the 
Zionists became delirious with joy. Street dances and mass 
meetings were held in Tel Aviv. 
The Arabs were disappointed. The regular armies of the 
various Arab States encamped along P~lestine's frontiers, and 
the .Arab League is reported to have .:~treeo.zmnended that they 
will occupy the country when the British leave it. 
On March 15, Great Britain signed a new twenty-year 
treaty of mutual defense and friendship with Trans-Jordan 
and that Brigadier Glubb Pasha and his staff would remain in 
(35) For mare detail see: UN Bulletin, March 15, 1948. 
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command of the Legion. After the bnglish troops left Pal-
estine, the Arab State Armies moved to capture Tel Aviv. 
Three vleeks later, Glubb and his army (Trans-Jordan army) 
were five miles east of 'l'el Aviv. The Iraq Army was VJ ight 
miles north of Tel Aviv. The Syrian Army and the Egyptian 
Annies were on the north and south. England gave the signal 
to Glubb to retreat and stop fighting. 'l'he Iraq Army which 
is under English control was told to stop fighting. 
After three months, more than 40,000 volunteers entered 
Palestine. Hundreds of airplanes from the United States, 
Yugoslavis, and the U.S.S.R. were sent in. 
The Zionist, seeing the armies of Iraq and Trans-Jordan 
retreating, attacked the Egyptian and drove them out of many 
cities. They drove on to the north-east until they reached 
the boundries of their state which were drawn by the United 
Nations Commission. 
Another reason for the retreat of the Ira~ and frans-
Jordan armies is the hatred between Abdulah and Elmufti (the 
president of' the Arab Higher Col;!).mittee of Palestine). Each 
wanted to rule the Arab State of Palestine. Egypt and Syria 
sided with Blmufti and were left to fight alone. 
vvhen the second truce started more than $50,000 Arabs 
fled to the neighboring states as refugees. Thus Jewish 
refugees stepped into Palestine while, $50,000 Arabs stepped 
r 
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out to be refugees, 50,000 of whom died for lack of food 
and clothing.(36) 
Another victim of the Partition Plan was the 
As~assination of Bernadette. Count Folk Bernadotte of 
8weden, official United Nations mediator proposed modi-
fication to the committee on Palestine in his final 
report to the United Nations. Three days after he was 
assassinated by a Jewish Terrorist. Under this plan all 
the Negeb would go to the Arabs and all of Galilee to 
Israel. 
A final settlement of Israels frontiers has not yet 
been agreed upon, but after intermittent fighting in 
late 1948 and early 1949, Israel and its two chief 
antagonists, Egypt and Jordan, signed armistice agree-
ment on February 24, and April 3, 1949, respectively. 
These were accomplished through the high efforts of 
Dr. Ralph .6unche of the United States, the successor of 
Bernadette. 
(3b) Interim Report to the .Fifth Session of the General 
Assembly, by the Director of the United Nations Relief 
and vvork Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 
Fifth Session Agenda, Item 20 (B) October 19, 1950, p. 10-lL 
CHAPTER V 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
.ABOUT THE COML•D:TTEE' S DECISION OF PARTITION 
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Kere in Washin~Jton - and in the temples of the United 
Nations Brotherhood on New York's Eaet forty-second street •• 
stated Lehrman in the c~entary of December, 1953 - It ba8 
become a diplomatic maxim that like oil and water, the Arab$ 
and the Israelis do not and ca.met mix. (1) Mr. L.ehrma.n has 
uncovered, after admittedly dogged search, knowlegeable ob-
servers who believe that Frenchmen and Tunisian may yet lie 
down teaether or Italians with Yugoslavs, or Pakistanis with 
Hindustans or even Soviet Russians with Americans, each araed 
to the teeth but willing to leave bad enough alone, short-
term or ~be, lenger. But. Israel and the Arab States -never! 
The Palestine Conciliation Commission, Lehrm8llccontinued, 
has made no real progress whatever in four years toward liq-
uidating the existing state of war. The reason it has made 
no progress is that the most serious residue of that war has 
not been treated urgently and separately as the urgent and 
separate problem it is - namely the plight of the 880,000 
Arab refugees. The refugee camps are hotbeds, net enly of 
anti-western emotions that will take years to subside, but 
(1) Hal Lehrman, "The Arabs, Israel and Near East Defense," 
C.mmentaty, December, 1953, p. 563. 
• f active Communist propaganda as well. And until it is 
solved, other Middle Eastern political quarrels can't be 
resolved. They can only be quelled, as the British are 
now quelling ene in Egypt. 
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Another view as to the outcome ef the Partition Plan 
is that of Mr. Geerge McGhee, Assistant· Secretary of the 
State Department for the Middle East. "Let me speak very 
frankly on this question," said McGhee .))efore the committee 
on Foreign Affairs, "The Political less of the Near East to 
the Soviet Uhion would be a major disaster comparable to its 
loss during war. The Middle East may be ori tical to our na-
tional interests in time of war, but it is vital to us in 
time of peace.•{2) 
To the Assistant Secretary the Middle East is one of 
the most dangerous spots teday. He pointed out that the 
main reason for the unrest is the refugees' problem. Seeing 
the danger, tor this unsolved problem he analized the situ-
at.ien as: 
1. Js long as the refugee problem remains unresolved, 
t.ha"delioate equilibriUm effected by the armistices 
is endangered. 
2. AIJ long as this problem. remains unsolved, attainment 
of a political settlement in Palestine is delayed 
and a major source of friction between Israel and 
{2) McGhee, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 8lst Congress - 20th Session; u.s. 
Printing Office, Washington, 1950, p. 9. 
124 
the Arab etates is perpetuated to the detriment of 
peace in the entire Near East. 
3. As long as this problem remains unresolved the 
refugees themselves will continue to serve as a 
natural fecal point for exploitation by Communist 
and disruptive elements which neither we nor the 
Near Eastern Governments can afford to ignore.(3) 
The Middle East's political disorder, according to 
MCGhee, is the presence of three quarters of a million idle• 
destitute people - a number greater than the combined strength 
of all the standing ar.mies of the Near East - whose discon-
tent increases with the passage of time. Straight relief 
without a~ bQpe of solution is merely perpetuating and ag-
gravating a bad condition. The morale of the people is con-
tinuously lowered and speaking frankly, the Assistant Secre-
tary says that there is no means provided whereby the prob-
lem can be ultimately liquidated.(4} 
To the present writer it is a stalemate and the American 
policy-makers are privately confessing their failure while 
they do not quite know what to try next. The same helpless-
ness has filtered through the mess and to well informed and 
concerned public opinion, including that of American Jews. 
Students of history, culture, and religion are watching 
with the greatest of interest and concern the outcome of the 
Partition Plan. The presence of Israel is a unique phenomenon 
(3) Ibid,, p. 9, 
(4) Ibid,, P• 15. 
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in the history of mankind. I de not know of a single ether 
instance in the world where there is such radical existent-
ial dtacontinuity acroee national frontiers for it must not 
be forgotten that Israel is not as yet at peace with her im-
mediate world. Her Arab and Meslem environment has not yet 
recognized her. She has no dealings whatsoever with her sur• 
roundings. Besides this radical political and economic es-
trangement- there is profound intellectual and spiritual 
chasm between Israel and the rest of the Near East. Twe en-
tirely different economies, two entirely diffeJtent religions. 
two entirely different languages, two entirely different men-
talitie•, two entirely different cultures, two entirely dif-
ferent civilizations, face each other across this chasm. 
Thus Israel is only geographically part of the Near East, and 
thus her fundamental problem is not how to establish herself 
but to integrate herself, economically, politically, and 
spiritually in the life and nature of the Middle East. Self-
•stablisbment by force is fairly easy - at least it is pos-
sible; but self-perpetuation by force is, in the nature of 
this case, absolutely impossible. Another inquiry is whether 
the concentration in one state of the factors at onee ef 
language, race, religion is not a challenge to the modern 
concep~ion of the state, which is free of the necessary de-
termination of a~ of these factors, and certainly of the 
three of·them taken together. There is no ether state in 
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the world today - nor has there been for centuries - which 
is nationally characterized by a race, a language, ~nd a 
religion none of which nationally characterizes any other 
state. Israel alone is Jewish, Israel alone is Judaic. No 
state is alone Moslem or Christian or protestant or cathoiic. 
No state alone is Syrian or I•:ongolian or Negro. And no state 
(except Israel and perhaps Ethiopia) has a national language 
of its own unconnected (in the sense of interaction) with any 
living language. 'l'his unique concentration of the three 
factors of race, language and religion is thus a challenge 
to the modern conception of the state. ( 5) 
The world is viewing and ·wondering ho·w a completely 
alien s"cate that is suddenly thrust upon by the Partition 
Plan and that is not vmnted by its immediate environment 
can survive, expecially if this state has created for others 
the very problems - Arab refugees - it meant to solve for 
its own people. To these there has recently been added a 
more tangible and perhaps more serious factor of disunity in 
the physical e:xistence of Israel on the only land bridge 
which connects the north-eastern and the "~:~estern parts of 
the Arab world. 
I think the Zionist idea, reinforced by an organization 
(5) See My Mission In Israel, by James G. McDonald (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1951) and the .F'orrestal Diaries edited 'Qv 
I!Jalter I11iLiis (New York: Viking, 1951) - they are of special 
interest to the student of this subject. 
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and sharpened by the suffering of the Jews in recent years, 
has won a world-wide sympathy and su:pport. Whether the Zion-
ism in the next crucial :phase of its development is resource-
ful to create genuine, internal relations of confidence and 
cooperation between itself and the Arab Nationalists or the 
Moslem Arab World in the midst of which it ha.s chose:n to 
plant itself is altogether beyond my ken to prophesy. Some 
writers, whatever their motive, have hailed the Partition 
Plan and have depicted Israel as destined to reconcile East 
and West. But how can one reconcile two things by being out-
side of them? The West is unthinkable apart from Christ-
ianity and the East apart from Islam. Israel is grounded 
neither in the one oor the other. Lebanon - little and frag-
ile as she is - is the only country, not only in existence 
today but perhaps throughout history, where East and West 
meet and mingle with each other on a footing of equality. 
The vigorous Moslem citizens of Lebanon bring:·in the intesral 
contribution of the East, while the Christian citizens are in 
deepest spiritual and historical communion with the West. If 
this situation can endure there is a wonderful possibility of 
creative confrontation. 
The political Zionists had from the beginning a program 
of strong nationalism, a program with grave implications for 
those of the Jewish faith living in other countries. They 
hoped that a Jewish State in Palestine would become the center 
12S 
of ~ewieh activities, claiming the loyalty and support of 
all ~ews. The activity of the political Zionists has pene-
trated western political, social, and religious life more 
deeply and effectively than many of us realize. Parties in-
serted planks in their platfor.ms supporting Zionism and the 
Partition Plan. Well known church leaders endorsed it, many 
of them not realizing all its implications. Many Christians 
~ave given generous financial support to the cause, hoping 
thereby to alleviate the intense suffering of Jews in Europe 
and hoping, also, that this would prove to be an effective 
way of combating anti-Semitism. Many sincere and earnest 
Christians have their support and -te ·:Zionism and the Plan ef 
Partition because they believe that the return of the Jews 
to Palestine is the fulfillment of prophecy. Other well 
meaning, sincere Christiane have felt they could not support 
political Zionism. 
After years of growing tensions between Arab Nationalism 
and Zionism with some tragic mistakes on the part of Great 
Britain, with no;_ stable foreign policy on the part of the Uni-
ted States in the Near East, with bitterness being engendered 
as political Zionism increased in power, with the Jews in 
European concentration camps, dying, desperate, finding all 
other doors closed to them, clamoring to go to Palestine -
finally on November 29, 1947, the United Nations by a vote of 
33 to 13 partitioned Palestine. 
r 
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Zionist nationalism has succeeded in establishing the 
State of Israel, which was recognized immediately by the 
United States. Jewish immigrants began at once to pour into 
the tiny state. What can we say of its future? The Jews 
are hard workers, astute businessmen, clever financiers, 
good organizers. ~ne new state has shown signs of great 
vigor. But the population is heterogeneous and generally 
secular and materialistic. There are many political par-
ties, some of them reactionary or radical, others liberal, 
sane, steady. The influx of great numbers of imnigrants 
has crested grave economic problems. At the present rate 
of immigration it is estimated that by 1953 only one person 
in four will have been residents in the area prior to 1948.(6) 
Thus Zionism, one of the most subtle and persistent of 
nationalisms, has, with the assistance of the United Nations 
succeeded in creating a political Jewish State. But the 
flight of some 850,000 refugees has created new economic, 
social and political problems for the Arabs around Israel. 
It has brought division in Arab groups, has caus&4 frustration 
and bewilder.ment among Christians and has aroused feeling of 
bitterness and animosity among Arabs. The presence of one 
million refugees is a disgrace and a great reminder of their 
(6) Glora M. wysner, Near East Panorama,(New York: Friend-
ship Press, 1950), p. 91. 
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defeat and weakness. The assasination of King Abdulah, 
three revolutions in Syria, a military government in Leb-
anon and Egypt - all of these happened as a result of the 
Partition Plan and the flight of the refugees. England an• 
ticpated all of these crisis and troubles and is expecting 
many more to come. Let it not be forgotten that His Maj-
esty's Government, who carried on the Zionization of Pales-
tine, rejected the partition plan recommended by the UNSCOP 
and again played her game of politics with the United States 
"Pull me, push you" knowing that the Partiti•n Plan was a 
going concern in the United Nations and that the United States 
~ad completely pledged herself to the Partition Plan, His 
Majesty's Government rejected the plan on the grounds that it 
was contrary to their mandate policy and to the promises 
given to the Arabs in the past. Two main reasons of the re-
jedtion of the partition were given by His Majesty's Govern-
ment: First, political: "Palestine is the center of communi-
cations of the Arab world and it has common frontiers with 
four Arab States. There is no doubt that the forcible creation 
of a Jewish State in the heart of the Arab world introduces 
a new, highly disturbing threat to peace and security in the 
Middle East. tt (7) 
(7) UN Official Records of the 2nd Session of the General 
Assemblz. Ad Hoc Committee, Anea, Document A/AC 14/ :32 and 
Addition 1, November 11, 1947, p. 29. 
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The second: "Partition is no solution for minority 
problem.lf His Majesty's Government cannot justify the 
partition on the ground of a."minority status". 11The ex-
istence of a Jewish minority does not invalidate the estab-
lishment of a unitary state in Palestine. There have been 
and there still are, minorities in many countries. Some 
minorities existed originally as part of the indigenous 
populations while other minorities were created by immi-
gration. The United Nations cannot subscribe to the prin-
ciple that a racial or religious minority, whether arising 
from natural development or created as a result of immigra-
tion, can exist upon the breaking up of a ho~eland or 
shatter the political, geographical ~nd economic unity of 
a country without the consent and against the wishes of 
the majority.n If it is adopted, declared His lVlajesty's 
Government, 11it \'lill constitute a 'dangerous principle' 
and thu£ become a source of 'internal conflict and inter-
national disorder'. 11 Beside; that nv;e have to respect human 
rights and fundamental freedomstt such scheme is "undemo-
cratic and untenable."($)* 
($) Ibid., p. 294-295 
*(The writer would like to invite the attention of the reader 
to the fact that His lVIajesty' s Gov' t. is accusing the UN of 
over-stepping the primary principles and fundamentals of hunan 
rights by imposing the partition plan "without the consent and 
against the wishes of the majorityrr. 1'his is to His Majesty's 
Gov't. "undemocratic and untenable!!. Y.lhile it is an international 
crime to the UNSCOP and the UN to ignore the self-determination 
right, it is not so to His I<Iajesty's Gov't., 1,",~hen she announced 
the Balfour Declaration, promising to give a land with people 
to people without a land. It is not so, not to consult, but to 
impose by bloodshed and terror the rules of immigration on a 
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To the Arabs and the Middle East this defeat and those 
refugees are not a new phenomenon. It is another ring added 
to that long chain of the East-West conflict: 
Greek vevsus Persia 
Rome versus Carthage 
.'Persia versus Rome 
Crusaders versus Saracen 
Ottomans versus Eurppe. 
While on the field now we view the face-to-face clashes and 
conflict of extreme Zionism versus fantastic Arab-Nationalism. 
I'iusa Alami, an Arab refugee and a member of the Arabs-
Palestinian Higher Conu11ittee in Egypt, is preparing the Arabs 
for a second round. \'Jriting in the Ivliddle East Journal he. 
declared that "Palestine and self-respect of the Arabs must 
be recovered. Without Palestine there is no life for them. 
This is the first phase of a long war."(9) 
With the establishment of a Jewish foothold and base in 
the I:Iiddle East the Arabs are faced with a new danger. 
The ambitions of the Jews are not limited as in the Partition 
Plan or Palestine alone, but embrace other parts of the Arab 
world. In a message to his people last year, lvlr. Ben-Gurion. 
stated: "Prepare to achieve our final g:Jal in the construction 
of the Jewish State, the gathering-in of the Jews of the 
majority to see 45,000 Je\'fS in 1915 ~ ,~)00,000 Jews in 1939. A 
small vmnder, someone might ask hi~ Haj. Gov't. if the right of 
self-determination is respected in Africa and Asia? And if it 
is not undemocratic and untenable? 
( 9) Ivlussa Alami, "'The Lesson of Palestine, 11 J>i~iddle East 
Journal, October, 1949, p. 386. 
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world, and the fulfillment of scriptural promises.n(lO) 
The Zionist program dates back to the days of Herzl, and 
it is based on the colonization of Palestine and the 
revival of the Jewish Kingdom as it was in its golden age. 
Palestine then will become, then , the base for exploiting 
all the Arab Middle East and extending the economic inter-
ests of the Jews. In their definition, Palestine included 
present day State of Israel, Jordan, and a large portion of 
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt ••• The dream of a greater Jewish 
State between the ~ile and the Euphrates. This program which 
they are implementin,?.; step by step will have as its next step, 
says the Arabs, to take all of Palestine, and then they will 
proceed according to circtunstances which they themselves 
will create. To this they will b ring all their pm,rer, 
influence, wealth and abilities at home as well as in London 
and Washington. This is the danger 'l;,rhich faces the Arabs, 
and which obliges them to change their way - the way of 
China - if it is necessary to protect their country to bring 
back the lost sheep. The'Arabs, to meet this challenge, 
needs unity and modernization and here again they meet op-
position, open or hidden, from two sides. These t1vo sides, 
accordinr~ to Alami, are the British and the Je11S. 
(10) Ibid., p. 387. 
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As for the Jews, they have their ambitions, they fear 
. . 
the Arabs, and they want to preserve the opportunity to im· 
ple.ment the remaining parts of their program. It is very 
important to the Jews that no Arab force, capable of recover-
ing Palestine or constituting a danger to their state, be 
created in neighboring territories. They are afraid that 
this force will be created through unity and modernization, 
and here the Arabs have to watch closely to the fifth column 
in their countries (the Jews). 
As for the British, it was they who divided the Arab 
countries. They are satisfied with this and with the fact 
that the Arabs $hgUld be distracted from true unity. Par-
tition, backwardness and rivalry further their interests 
and aims. The British are those who plunged the Arabs into 
this disaster. They are trying, and will try, to delay their 
progress toward unity and modernization. The English are 
strengthening the existing regimes with their regionalism, 
partition and bad governments, and to distract the Arabs from 
thinking ab6ut their crimes against them by waving in front 
of tltem loa.J,UJ and welfare :projects. 
The Arabs believe that Israel is a stranger among them 
and was forced on them to prevent their unity and it is a 
thorn in their side. 
"The disaster has shaken us," concluded E'l-Alamy, 
profoundly and wounded us deeply and opened the door to a 
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great danger. If the shock wakes us up, brings us to-
gether, and impels us to a new life from which we can de-
rive strength, the wound will heal, the danger will be 
averted, and Palestine will be covered. Then the misfor-
tunes will be a blessing. But if not, woe to the out-
come. 11 ("11) 
(11) Ibid,, P• 405. 
.-
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CHAJ?TER VI 
THE COMMITTEE•S DECISION! 
THE "ARAB EAST" AND THE COLD WAR 
In Power Relationships: 
The only groups among the Arabs and the Jews that favor-
ed fartition and reconciliation, are the Communists. While 
the weakness of Communist appeal among both Arabs and Jews 
in the past suggests that neither group finds itself attract-
ed to the ideologies and practices of modern communism, the 
current strategy and tacties of world communism have supplied 
the elasticity for an expansion of communist influence. ~ 
throwing its anti-religious e"gans overboard, communist 
labor leaders in Arab countries have been able to find fol-
lowers muc;h more readily then in the past. Kurds, Armen-
ians, Jews and other nan-Arab minorities have been made the 
targets of spedial propaganda drives. It is within this 
framework that comm~nist efforts in Palestine must be viewed. 
Jewish communists, are among also, the most vociferous 
advocates of cooperation with the Arabs. They are opposed 
to Jewish ''national production" which would discriminate 
against Arab workers. In this t}!ey follow the line of other 
left-wing groups, notably Hashomer-Hatzair. They are also 
opposed to the advocacy of a Jewish State or commonwealth 
over all of Palestine, the so-called "Biltmore Program." 
They are thus able to retain and bridge to the Arab minority 
inside Israel, and in many respects are not at least out-
vlardly a moderating influence.~' 
The entire area is characterized by paralyzing fears 
and by racial, political, and. social tensions. Russia on 
the north has caused Turkey and Iran to be gripped by fear 
of being engulfed, vJhile communist ideology is knmvn to be 
penetrating many areas, although it has always met with 
strong resistance among orthodox Iv1oslems. The thousands of 
Palestinian refugees have created added political unrest, 
insecurity, and economic chaos; on the other hand, the 
establishment of the State of Israel as recommended by the 
Ul·iSCOP and voted by the United Nations, has hot lessened 
instability, or has it decreased the problem of the area, 
The new state has many internal problems with ~;v-hich to v-1res-
tle, while at the same time it tries to develop a foreign 
policy that will~in for it confidence, cooperation, finan-
cial and moral support. ·It is surrounded by hostile and 
bitter neighbors. The whole area - once knovm as Palestine -
seethes with political and religious conflicts that involve 
all the world, and their solution ·is essential to "':orld 
peace. But 11the United States u declared Dr. ~1/ysner, "is 
more deeply involved economically and politically in the 
~~The Arabs in Israel have four communist representatives 
in Parliament. · 
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Near East than in the Far East or even in Europe,"(l2) 
The people •~ this area today are receiving wave after 
wave of propaganda :from East and West. They are told by the 
West that they are backward, under-developed and in need of 
European tutelage and protection. They are told by the East 
that they are exploited, enslaved and despise~, and should 
revolt against Western domination. In fact, they are receiv-
ing no genuine friendship or sympathy or understanding from 
either side. 
In spite of these strong currents, they still stand ad-
amantly for their faith and heritage. It is true that they 
are more inclined towards Western thoughts, but they refuee 
to be the vassals of the West. Although opposed to the ma-
terial creed of the East, they fedl impressed by its support 
of their human dignity and national aspiration. 
"I have complete :faith in the wisdom of our people," 
said .Ahmed Azam, the Secretary of the Arab League, "but I 
fear that they may, under that dual pressure, become in-
different and disinterested. 11 (13) The consequences of such 
a state of mind in the Middle East, as an eternal center ef 
spiritual ideas, will have tremendous repercussions in Asia 
(12) ~sner, op. cit., p. 77, 
(13) Ahmad Azam, "The Middle East and the Cold War," The 
Uhited Nations World, (New York: United World Corporation, 
March, 1951), Vol. 5. No. 3, p. 44. 
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and Africa. While the East, said Azam, under able l ea.d-
ership that combines ideological with material energies, is 
penetrating deeply into Asia and Africa, and the West, With 
no real moral leadership while attempting to harness old 
concepts of imperialism to new concepts of nationalism, is 
but confusing the peoples of the ~fiddle East. The West is 
trying dangerously to harmonize nineteenth-century tutelage 
with the twentieth century's ideas o·f sovereign rights and 
the principles of self-determination. While maintaining a 
masterly attitude of superiority over these ~fiddle Eastern 
peoples, curiously enough the West is paradoxically attempt-
ing to secure the voluntary cooperation of those long-sub-
jected peopl.es. 
This confused approach cannot appeal to the hearts and 
minds of the Arabs and Moslem peoples. .The only resistance 
to commbnism that is being shown at present by the masses of 
the peopl.e in the }fiddle East stems from their religious 
faith. It is high time for England, France and particularly 
America to reconsider their attitude towards the nations of 
the }fiddle East and to try some note which will find response 
in the hearts and minds of 70,ooo,ooo Arabs and 300,000,000 
MOslems, extending from China to MOrocco. Failing this, the 
West will lose the support of these peoples in the ideolog-
ical contest; and the East, th~Qugh a persuasive, strong 
and well directed mental penetration may ultimately gain 
the upper hand, 
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Abed El-Ra.h.man Aza.m Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab 
League, stated lately: "All the imperialistic powers have 
lost their chance to assume the moral leadership of the 
Asiatic and African peoplee.•tl4) 
"The only country in the Western camp '"hich can still 
have a chance of an appeal to the hearts and the minds of 
the oriental masses in this country~ia the United Sta.tes."(l5) 
"Its past history and relations with the oriental world 
ie an example of fa.ir-mindedness and human good relations. 
They have known the United States through the last fifty 
years as good businessmen, teachers, doctors, and missionar-
ies. They recognized America as a nation which stands for 
.freed.nm•and fair-play, and in spite of r~cent blunders, the 
I'fiddle East has not lost faith in .American good will.n(l6) 
Ben Horin, who ~ent sixteen years in the 11iddle Eaat, 
stated in his book, The Middle East: 
"The future of the Middle East ma.y now depend on the 
United States more than any other World power. Unlike 
(14) United Nation World, United Nation World Incorporation, 
fP I oi t I J p e 45 I 
(15) Ibid,, p, 45, 
(16) Ibid,, p. 55, 
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Britain, America never displayed selfish desires for 
the exploitation of colonies. But the United States 
doesn't have a real policy in the Middle East. She 
is just a follower and endorsee anything England 
wants. (1.7) 
When Ben-Horin came back from the Middle East he oar-
ried with him a message: 
"It is a message from the Middle East to the greatest 
democracy on earth. It is a message from peoples who 
once shaped faith and civilization for humanity at · 
large, and who are today in a state of misery and war.{lB) 
If the Un~ed States wants to make sure that peace and free-
dom will rule the world, it must CD me nearer to the scene of 
the trouble. It must not look at the world and its involved 
problems through the glasses of any other nation, but through 
its own spectacles. 
Thus America is in a good position to exercise consid-
erable influence on both sides (Arabs and Jews) to accept 
any kind of settlement; and acceptance may grow into per.man-
ent peace. 
I belteve it is up to Israel, and to her advantage, to 
take the initiative. The Jews, not withstanding their ancient 
connections with the land, are now the newcomers. MOreover 
(17) Ben-Horin, The Middle East. (New York: The World Pub-
lishing Company, 1949), p. 87. 
(18) Ibid., P• 89. 
the Arabs can get along better without them then they can 
get along vdthout the """rabs. Though both could gain in-
calculably from friendly cooperation, provided Israel will 
make the effort. 
Walter Zander v\'arning his people, stated: 
"If military success encourages Zionists to con-
tinue to ignore the Arabs, the end result can only be 
disaster. :i>iilitary success vlill bring only te.mporary 
respite; and until we succeed to secure the good will 
of the Arabs, a dark and portentous shadmv remains over 
the national home." ( 19) 
All friends of Zionism should unite in urging that 
truth upon the new state. As Count Bernadette wrote shortly 
before his assassination: 
11Above all the Jewish State needs peace. A new 
organism of limited resources, its hope for develop-
ment must very lar,gely depend in the lon~T run on the 
cultivation_·of :peaceful and mut.l,lally::trust±ng relations 
vvith the neighboring Arab States v.rhose overwhelming 
numbersdwarf into insignificance any population total 
to which the Jewish State may aspire. 11 (20) 
I believe, myself, that integration must be the solution 
for c{ewish and other minority problems. But the Jews cannot 
do the job alone. And for the tragedy of Palestine, it 
should not be forgotten that the United Nations bears the 
heaviest responsibility. 
(19) Kermit ~\oosevelt, Q.Q• cit., p. 188. 
( 20) Ibid. 
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APPENDIX 
r 1~ 
APPENDIX 1 
DOCUMENTS: BRITISH PROMISES TO THE ARABS 
I. EXTRACTS FROH THE CORRESPOliDENCE BETWEEN SIR HENRY 
HCMAHON, H.M. HIGH COMMISSIOlmR IN CAIRO, AND THE SHERIF 
HUSSEIN OF MECCA. Cmd. 5957. 
No. 1. FROM THE SHERIF OF lfECCA TO SIR HENRY }ICMAHON, HIS 
MAJESTY'S HIGH CO}rniTSSIONER IN CAIRO. 
July 14, 1915. 
Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any ex~ 
ception have decided in these last years to live, and to 
accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their ad-
ministration both in theory and practice; and whereas they 
have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain to support t~em and aid them to 
the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions •• ~ And 
whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also te prefer 
the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in con-
sideration of their geographical position and economic in-
terests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned 
Government, which is known to both nations and therefore 
need not be emphasised; 
For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit 
themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of 
Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, 
through her deputy or representative, of the following 
... 
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fundamental propositions, leaving out all things consider-
ed secondary in comparison with these, so that it may pre-
pare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, 
until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual 
negotiations: 
Firstly: England to acknowledge the independence of 
the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Ad-
ana up to the 370 of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, 
Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the 
border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to 
the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the 
exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the 
west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. 
England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate 
of Islam •••• 
No. 2. FROM SIR H. MCJ.'fAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA. 
August 30, 1915. 
We have the honour to thank you for your frank express-
ions of the eincerity of your feeling towards England. We 
rejoice, moreover, that your Highness and your people are of 
one opinion-- that Arab interests are English interests and 
English Arab •••• With regard to the questions of limits and 
boundaries, it would appea.r to be premature to consume our 
time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, 
in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective 
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occupation •••• 
No. 3. FR0}1 THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCY..AHON. 
September 9, 1915 • 
••• As the limite and boundaries demanded are not those 
of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should 
discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen 
that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by 
these limite and their word is united on this: 
Therefore, they have found it necessary first to dis-
cuss this point with the Fower in whom they now have their 
confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustri-
ous British Empire •••• 
lro. 4. FR011 SIR H. MCMAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA. 
October 24, 1915 • 
••• I have realised, however, from your last letter that 
you regard this question as one of vital and urgent import-
ance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and 
it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their 
behalf the following statement·, which I am confident you will 
receive with satisfaction:--
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and por-
tions of S,yria lying to the west of the districts of Damas-
cus, Home, Ha.ma. and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, 
and should be excluded from the limits demanded. 
With the above modification, and without prejudice to 
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our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those 
limits. 
As for those regions lying within those frontiers 
wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to 
the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the 
name of the Government of Great Britain to give the follow-
ing assurances and made the following reply to your letter: 
(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Brit-
ain is prepared to recognise and support the independence 
of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded 
by the Sherif of Mecca. 
(2) Great Britain will guarantee the HOly Places 
against all external aggression and will recognise their 
inviolability. 
(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give 
to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish 
what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government 
in those various territories. 
(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs 
have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain 
only, and that such European advisers and officials as may 
be required for the formation of a sound form of administra-
tion will be British. 
{5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, 
the Arabs will recongise that the established position and 
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interests of Great Britain necessitate special adminis• 
trative arrangements in order to secure these territories 
from foreign aggression, to :promote the welfare of the loM 
cal :populations and to safeguard our mutual economic in-
t erests •••• 
Ifo. 5. FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCMAHON. 
November 5, 1915. 
I. In order to facilitate an agreement ••• we renounce 
our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayete of Mersina. 
and Adana. in the Arab Kingdom. But· the two vila.yete of 
Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab !!!· 
ayets, and there is no difference between a MOslem and a 
Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather ••• 
No. 6. FROM SIR H. MCIWiON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA. 
December 14, 1915. 
' 
I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclus-
ion of the districts of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of 
the Arab territories •••• With regard to the vilayeis of Al-
eppo and Beirut, the Goverrunent of Great :Britain have fully 
understood and taken careful note of your observations, but, 
as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them 
both, the question will require careful consideration and a. 
further communication on the subject will be addressed to you 
in due course. 
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No. 7. FROM THE SHERIF OF l'IECCA TO SIR H. MCJ.WION. 
January 1, 1916. 
As-regards the northern parts and their coasts, we 
have already stated in our previous letter what were the 
utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done 
so to fUlfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired 
by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this 
same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may 
possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and 
the agreement made between them during the present wars and 
calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent mini$• 
ter should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this 
war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our e,yes 
from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and 
its coasts •••• It is impossible to allow any derogationstha.t 
gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those 
regions. 
II. EXTRACT FRQlv1 THE REPORT ( DATED !-!ARCH 16, 1939) OF A 
CO)llfiTTR .SEI' UP TO CONSIDER THE ABOVE CORRESPONDElrGE. Cmd. 
5974. 
Both the Arab and the United Kingdom representatives 
have tried (as they hope with success) to understand the 
point of view of the other party, but they have ~een unable 
to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the Correspond-
ence, and they._:fe~l obliged. to l,"epqrt to the conference 
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accordingly. 
The United Kingdom representatives have, however, in-
formed the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions. 
as explained to the committee, regarding the interpretation 
of the Correspondence, and especially their contentions re-
lating to the meaning of the phrase "portions of S,yria lying 
to the west of the districtw of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and 
Aleppo", have greater force than has appeared hitherto. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom representatives have in-
formed the Arab representatives that they agree that Pa.le!-
tine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca 
in his letter of the 14th .Tuly, 1915-, and that unless Pales-
tine was e~rd4ed from that area later in the Correspondence 
it must be regarded as having been included in the area in 
which Great Britain was to recognise and support the inde-
pendence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a proper con-
struction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact tx• 
cluded. But they agree that the language in which i te' 'ex-
clusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable 
as it was thought to be at the time •••• (The report here 
~efers to certain other statements made to Arab leaders dur-
ing aifd after the war.) In the opinion of the Connnittee it 
is, however, evident from these statements that His Majes-
ty's Government were not/free to dispose of Palestine with-
out regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants 
of Pa.lestine, and that these statements must all be taken 
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into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilit!es 
which -- upon any interpretation of the Correspondence--His 
Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants 
as a result of the correspondence. 
III. THE HOGARTH :MESSAGE 
The following are the terms of the message which Comman-
der Hogarth was instructed to deliver to King Hussein when he 
visited Jedda in Janu~ry 1918: 
"(1) The Entente Powers are d~tar.mined that the Arab 
race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a 
nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs 
themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pur-
sue a policy with this ultimate unity in view. 
"(2) SO far as Palestine is concerned we are determined 
that no people shall be subject to another, but 
(a) inview of the fact that there are in Pales-
tine shrines, Wakfs and Holy Placee, sacred in some cases to 
MOslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in 
other to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are 
of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and 
Arabia. there must be a speeiai regime to deal with these 
places approved of by the world. 
(b) As regards the MOsque of Omar it shall be 
considered as a MOslem concern alone and shall not be sub-
jected directly or indirectly to any non-~slem authority. 
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"(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in 
favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as 
this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further 
as His Majesty's Government view with favour the reali-
zation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are 
determined that in so far as is compatible with the free-
dom.;of the existing population both economic and political, 
no o·bstacle should be put in the way of the realization of 
this ideal. 
"In this connexion the friendship of world Jewry to the 
Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews 
have a political influence. The leaders of the mGWement are 
determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friend-
ship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is 
not to be lightly thrown aside." 
IV. THE DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN ARAB LEADERS (June 1918) • 
His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of 
the seven with the greatest care •••• 
The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four 
categories: 
1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent 
before the outbreak of war; 
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the 
action of the Arabs themselves during the present war; 
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied 
r 
by the Allied forces during the present war; 
4. Areas still under Turkish control. 
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In regard to the first two categories, His Majestyts 
Government recognize the complete and sovereign independ-
ence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas,and support them. 
in their struggle for freedom. 
In regard to the areas occupied b,y Allied forces •••• 
it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that 
the future government of these regions should be based upon 
the principle of the consent of the governed and this policy 
has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's 
Government. 
In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth cate-
gory, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government 
that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their 
freedom and independence and towards the achievement of this 
object Bis Majesty's Government continue to labour •••• 
V. THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF NOVElffiER 7, 1918. 
The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in 
prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition 
of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of 
the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the estab-
lishment of n~tional governments and administrations de-
riving their authority from t~e initiative and free choice 
of the indigenous populations. 
In order to carry out these intentions France and Great 
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Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the es-
tablishment of indigenous governments and administrations 
in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and 
in the territories the liberation of which they are engag-
ed in securing and recognizing these as soon as they are 
actually established. 
Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these 
regions any particular institutions they are only concerned 
to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the 
regular working of governments and administrations freely 
chosen by the pepu+ations themselves. To secure impartial 
and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic de-
velopment of the country by inspiring and encouraging local 
initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an 
end to dissensions that have too lo~~ been taken advantage 
of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Al-
lied Governments uphold in the liberated territories. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE TEJ:U.fS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE* 
Article l. The Mandatory shall have full powers of 
legislation and of administration, eave as they may be 
limited by the terms of this mandate. 
Article 2. The Iw!a.ndatory shall be responsible for_ 
placing the country under such political, administrative 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of 
the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and 
the development of self-gover~ng institutions, and also for 
safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the in~ 
habitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. 
Article 3. The !-1'andatory shall, so far as cireumetan-
ces,per.mit, encourage local autonomy. 
Article 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be rec-
ognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-
operating with the administration of Palestine in such eco-
nomic, social and other matters as may affect the establish-
ment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the 
Jewish population in· Palestine, and, subject always to the 
. 
control of the administration, to assist and take part in 
the development of the country. 
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization 
and consti tU:tJ._on are in the opinion of the l.fandatory 
* See Annexes, appendices and maps to the Report by the UN; 
Official Documents. 
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appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall 
take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's 
Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are 
willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish nation-
al home. 
Article 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for see-
ing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, 
or in any way placed under the control of, the government of 
any foreign Power. 
Article 6. The administration of Palestine, wnile en-
suring that the rights and p6sition of other sections of the 
population are not prejudices, shall facilitate Jewish immi-
gration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in 
co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 
4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including state 
lands and waste lands not required for public purposes. 
Article 7, The administration of Palestine shall be 
responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be 
included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate 
the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take 
up their permanent residence in Palestine. 
Article 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, 
including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protect-
ion as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ot-
toman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine. 
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Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-
mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall 
have previously renounced the right to their re-establish-
ment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a 
specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at 
the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established 
in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been 
agreed upon between the Powers concerned. 
Article 9. The };Iandatory shall be responsible for see-
ing that the judicial system establiehed in Palestine shall 
assure to foreigners, as \<1ell as to natives, a complete gu&l!· 
antee of their rights. 
Respect for the personal statue of the varioue peoples 
and communities and for their religious interests ehall be 
fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and adminis-
tration of Wakfe ehall be exercised in accordance with re-
ligious law and the dispositions of the foundere. 
Article 10. Pending the making of special extradition 
agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties 
in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall 
apply to Palestine. 
Article 11. The administration of Palestine shall take 
all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the co-
mmunity in connection with the development of the country, 
and, eubject to any international ~bligations accepted by 
the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public 
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shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the 
ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be 
excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious 
belief. 
The right of each community to maintain its own schools 
for the education of its own members in its own language, 
while conforming to such educational requirements of a gen-
eral nature as the administration may impose, shall not be 
denied or impaired. 
Article 16. The ~~ndatory shall be responsible for ex-
ercisi~g such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bod-
f.et(crf'' all faiths in J:lalestine as may be required for the 
maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to 
such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to 
obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies o~ 
to discriminate against any representative or member of them 
on the ground of his religion or nationality. 
Article 1?. The administration of Palestine may organ-
ize on a voluntary basis the fo~ees necessar,y for the preeer-
vat ion of peace and order, and also for the defense of the 
country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Manda-
tory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those 
above specified save with the consent of the MandatoXY. Ex-
cept for such purposes, no military, naval or air foroes 
shall be raised or maintained by the administration of Pal-
estine. 
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NOthing in this article shall preclude the administra-
tion of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the main~ 
tenance of the forces of the l~ndatory in Palestine. 
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use 
the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement 
of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and s~plies. 
Article 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no 
discrimination in Palestine against the national of any state 
member of the League of Nations (including companies incor-
porated under its laws) as compared with those of the l~nda­
tory or of any foreign state in matters concerning taxiation• 
commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or pro-
fessions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil 
aircraft. Similiarly, there shall be no discrimination in 
Palestine against goods orginating in or destined for any of 
the said states, and there shall be freedom of transit un-
derequitable conditions across the mandated area. 
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of 
this mandate~ the administration of Palestine may, on the 
advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs 
duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as 
it may think best to promote the development of the natural 
resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of 
the population. It may also, on the advice. of. the Mandatory, 
conclude·a·specfal customs agreement with any state the 
r 
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territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic 
Turkey or Arabia. 
Article 19. The lt:f.a.ndatory shall adhere on behalf of 
the administration of Palestine to any general internation-
al conventions already existing, or which may be concluded 
hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, re-
specting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammu-
nition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial 
equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navi• 
gation and postal, telegraphic and wireless oommunication or 
literary, artistic or industrial property. 
Article 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on be~lf 
of the administration of Palestine, so far as religious, 
social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of 
any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for pre-
venting and combating disease, including diseases of plants 
and animals. 
Article 21. The I>1a.ndatory shall secure th'e enactment 
within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure t~e 
execution of a law of antiquities based on the following 
rules. This law shall ensure:.equali ty o.f' treatment in the 
matter of excavations and archaetlogical research to the 
national of all states members of the League of Nations. 
(l) ".Antiquity" means any construction or any product 
of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D. 
(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall 
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(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided be-
tween the excavator and the competent department in a pro-
portion fixed by that department. If division seems pos-
sible for wcientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a 
fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find. 
4rticle 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the 
official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscript-
ion in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be re-
p~ated in Hebrew and any statement or inecription in Hebrew 
shall be repeated in Arabic. 
Article 23. The administration of Palestine shall re-
cognize the holy days of the respective communities in Pales-
tin~aa legal days of rest for the members:. of such communi t-
ies. 
Article 24. The ~fundatory shall n~ke to the Council of 
the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction 
of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to 
carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws 
and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall 
be communicated with the report. 
Article 25. In the territories lying between the Jor-
dan and the eastern ?oundary of Palestin~as ultimately deter-
mined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of 
the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application 
of euch provisions of this mandate as he may consider in-
applicable to the existing local oonditions, and to make 
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such provision for the administration of the territories 
as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided 
that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18. 
Article 26. The Y~ndatory agrees, if any dispute what-
ever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of 
the League of Nations relating to the interpretations or the 
application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, 
if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted 
to the Per.manent Court of International Justice provid~d for 
by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Article 27. The consent of the Council of the League 
of Nations is required for anw modification of the terms of 
this mandate. 
Article 28. In the event of the termination of the 
mandate hereby conferred upon the }~ndatory, the Council of 
the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may 
be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under 
guarantee of the League, the right secured by Articles 13 
and 14, and shall use its infulence for securing, under the 
guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine 
will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately, 
incurred by the administration of Palestine during the per-
iod of the mandate, including the rights of public servants 
to pensions or gratuities. 
The present instrument shall be deposited in orginal in 
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APPEliDIX 3 
I. The following letter from the United Kingdom Delega-
tion to the United Nations had been received by the Acting 
Secretary-General of the United Nations: 
United Kingdom Delega-
tion to·the United 
Natione, New York. 
2nd April, 1947. 
I have received the fo~lowing message from my government: 
"Hie Majesty's Govermnent in the United Kingdom re-
quest the Secretary-Gen.era.l of the United Nations to place 
the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the General As-
sembly •t its next regular Annual Session. They will submit 
to the Assembly an account of their administration of the 
League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make 
recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning 
the future government of Palestine. 
In making this request, His Majesty's Government draw 
the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of 
an early settlem~nt in Palestine and to the risk that the 
General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recom-
m-ndations at its next regular Annual Session unless some 
preliminary study of the question had previously been made 
under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore re-
quest the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as p~ssible, 
a. special Session of the General Assembly for t.he-::~,:purpose of 
constituti~g and instructing a Special Committee to prepare 
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of the General Assembly. 
The following letter has been received by the Secre• 
tary-General of the United Nations: 
Embassy of Iraq, 
Washington, D.C~ 
21st April, 194?. 
I have the honour to inform you that I have been in-
structed b.y my Government to request you, in accordance with 
Rule 18 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General 
Assembly, to include the following as an additional ite~ in 
the Agenda of the Special Session of the General Assembly 
convening on April 28, 194?: 
The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine 
and the Declaration of its Indapendence. 
(Signed) Ali Jawdat, 
.Ambassador. 
IV. Request from the Syrian Government for the Inclusion 
of an Additional item in the Agenda of the First Special 
Session of the General Assembly. 
The following telegram has been received by the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations: 
Washington,D.C.,22nd April,l947 
I HAVE THE HONOUR TO I1""FORM YOU THAT I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED 
BY MY GOVERl~M:ENT TO REQ.UEST YOU t IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 18 
OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AS ADDITIONAL ITEH IN THE AGENDA OF 
THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENING APRIL 
28, 194?: THE TERHINATION OF THE 11A:NDATE OVER PALESTINE .AND 
THE DECLARATION OF ITS IliDEJ?ENDENCE. PLEASE ACCEPT EXCELL<io. 
ANCY THE RENEWED ASSURAlJCES OF Iff HIGHEST CONSIDERATION•-
COSTI K. ZURAYK, MINISTER OF SYRIA. 
v. Request from the Lebanese Government for the Inclusion 
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of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special 
Session of the General Assembly. 
The following telegram has been received by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations: 
Washington,D.C. 
22nd April, 1947. 
EXCELLENCY I HAVE THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT I AM INSTRUCTED 
BY MY GOVERNMENT TO ~UEST IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE EIGHT-
EEN OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE PROCEDURE 
OF THE GEl\fERAL ASSEN:BLY THE INCLUSION OF THE FOLLO\viNG .ADD-
ITIONAL ITEr~ Il'! THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCO£.ITNG SPECIAL SES-
SION OF Tlill GEUERAL ASSElwffiLY SCHEDul.ED TO OPEN ON APRIL 28, 
1947 "THE TERMINATION OF THE :I-1ANDATE ON AND THE GRANTING OF 
INDEPENDENCE TO PALESTINE" ACCEPT EXCELLENCY THE RENEWED 
ASSURANCES OF 11¥ HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. CHARLES 1-1.ALIK, 
MINISTER OF LEBANOl{ IN THE UNITED STATES. 
VI. Request by the Saudi Arabian Government for the In-
,clusion of an Ad.di tional Item in the Agenda of the First 
,, 
Special Session of the General Assembly 
The following letter has been received from the Secretary-
general of the United Nations: 
Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia, 
Washington, D.C. 
22nd April, 1947. 
I have been instructed by my Government to request, in 
accordance with Rule 18 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the 
General Assembly, that the following item be put on the Agenda 
of the Special Session which convenes on April 28th, 1947: 
"The termination of the mandate over 
Palestine and the declaration of its 
independence." 
(Signed) ASAD AL-FAQIH, 
Minister. 
r. 
.APl?ENDIX 4 
PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OR 
THE SPECIAL COI~ft•IITTEE ON P.ALESTnm 
I. CHAIRMAN, VICE- CHAIRNAN, AND RAPPORTEUR 
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Rule 1. The special Committee shall elect its own 
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, or Rapporteurs. 
Rule 2. If the Chairman is unable to perform his 
function, a new Chairman shall be elected for the unexpired 
term. 
Rule 3. The Vice-Chairman acting as Chairman shall 
have the same powers and duties as the Chairman. 
Rule 4. In addition to exercising the powers which are 
conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the Chairman 
shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, shall 
direct the discussions, ensure observance of these Rules, 
accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and 
announce the decisions. He shall rule on points of order, 
and subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of 
the pr,eceedings a.t any meeting. 
II • LANGUAGES 
Rule 5. The Committee will conduct its work in both 
English and French except when it may agree that the inter-
pretation may be dispensed with. 
Rule 6. Witnesses who are unable to employ any of the 
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official languages of the United Nations shall as a rule 
provide their ovm interpreters. If a witness who appears 
at the instance of the Committee is unable to employ any 
of t~e official languages and to provide his own inter-
, 
preter, the Secretariat shall arrange for the same. 
III. RECORDS 
Rule 7. As a general rule only summary records of 
its public and private meetings shall be drawn up unless 
the necessity for verbatim records in respect of a speci:f'icc 
meeting or part of a meeting is recognized by the Committee. 
Rule 8. Verbatim records will be taken of all hearing 
and made available to the members of the Committee. The 
Committee will decide in each case whether the testimony 
and discussion will be circulated verbatim or in summary 
form for the whole or part of the meeting. 
IV. PIJID.,ICITY OF l.fEETINGS, JilRESS COMl.flJNIQ,UES AND VERBAL 
BRIEFINGS 
Rule 9. The meetings of the Committee shall be held 
in public unless the Committee decides otherwise. 
Rule 10. Meetings of sub-committees shall be held in 
public unless the sub-co~nittee concerned decides otherwise. 
Rule 11. Official press communiques shall be previGus-
ly approved by the Chairman of the Committee. Press re-
leases and verbal briefings may be issued by the press 
officer unless instructions to the contrary are given by the 
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Committee. 
V. Conduct of Business 
Rule 12. A majority of the I~'lernbers of the Special 
Co~nittee shall constitute a quorum. 
Rule 13. No representative may address the Special 
Committee without having previously obtained the permission 
of the Chairman. The Chairman shall call upon speakers in 
the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The 
Chairman may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not 
relevant to the subject under discussion. 
Rule 14. The chairman and the Rapporteur of the sub-
committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of ex-
plaining the conclusion a:~rived at by their sub-committee. 
Rule 15. During the discussion of any matter, a rep-
resentative may rise to a point of order and the point of 
order shall be immediately decided by the chairman in accord-
ance with the Rules of Procedure. A representative may ap-
peal against the ruling of the Chairman. The appeal shall 
immediately be put to the vote, and the Chairman's ruling 
shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members 
present and voting. 
Rule 16. During the discussion of any matter, a rep-
resentative may move the adjournment of the clebacce. Any 
such motion shall have priority in the debate. In addition 
to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak 
1S7 
in favour of, and two against, the motion. 
Ru1e 17. The Special Committee may limit the allowed 
to each speaker. 
Rule 18. A representative may at any time move the 
closure of the debate whether or not any other represent-
ative has signified his wish to speak. If application is 
made for per.mission to speak against the closure it may be 
accorded to not more than two speakers. 
Rule 19. The Chair.man shall take the sense of the 
Special Committee on a motion for closure. If the Special 
Committee is in favour of the closure the Chairman shall de-
clare the closure of the debate. 
Rule 20. Resolutions, amendments, and substantive 
motions shall be introduced in writing and handed to the 
Principal Secretary who shall circulate copies to the rep-
resentatives. As a general rule, no proposal shall be dis-
cussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the Special Com-
mittee unless copies of it have been circulated to all rep-
resentatives not later than the day preceding consideration 
of amendments. or of motions as to procedure, without previous 
circulation of copies. 
Rule 21. Parts of a proposal may be voted on separ-
ately if a representative requests that the proposal be divi-
ed. 
Rule 22. If two or more amendments are moved to a 
r 
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proposal, the Special Committee shall first vote on the 
amendment f'urtherE'!st removed,in ·substance from the orig ... 
inal proposal and then on the amendment next furtherest 
removed, and so on, until all the amendments have been put 
to the vote. 
Rule 23. When an amendment revised, adds to or deletes 
from a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first, and 
if it is adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted 
on. 
VI. VOTING 
Rule 24. Each Member of the Special Committee shall 
have one vote. 
Rule 25. Decisions of the Special Committee shall be 
taken b.Y a majority of the members present and voting. Ab-
stentions shall not be counted as votes. 
Rule 26. The Special Committee shall normally vote by 
show of hands, but any representative may request a roll-
call which shall then be taken in the English alphabetical 
order of the names of the 11embers. 
Rule 27. The vote of each Member participating in any 
roll-call shall be inserted in the record. 
Rule 28. If a vote is equally divided on matters other 
than elections, a second vote shall be taken at the next 
meeting; this meeting shall be held within forty-eight hours 
of the first vote, and it shall be expressly mentioned in·: the 
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agenda that a second vote will be taken on the matter in 
question. If this vote also results in equality, the pro-
posal shall be regarded as rejected. 
VII. SUB-COMNITTEES AND SECRETARIAT 
Rule 29. The Special Committee may set up sub-
committees. 
Rule 30. The Secretary-General or a member of the Sec-
retariat designated by him may make to the Special Committee 
or any sub-commdttee any oral or written statement which the 
Secretar,y-General considers desirable. 
VIII. LIAISON OFFICERS 
Rule 31. The Mandatory Po'\..rer, the Arab Higher Commit .. 
tee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine may appoint liaison 
officers to the Committee who shall supply such information 
or render such other assistance as the Committee may require, 
The liaison officers may, suo motu, present at the direction 
of the Committee such information as they may think advis-
able. 
IX. ORAL A1ID vlRITTEJJ TESTI~1'0NY 
Rule 32. The Committee may, at its descretion, invite 
representatives of Governments or organizations, or private 
individuals, to submit oral or written testimony on any rel-
evant matter. 
Rule 33. Requests for oral hearing shall contain an 
indication of the subject or subjects on which the witness 
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desires to testify. 
Rule 34. The Committee may refer to a sub-committee 
for •xamination and recommendation such requests to present 
oral testimony as it deems advisable. 
Rule 35. The Committee shall in each case decide the 
time and p~ace of the hearing of any Witness from whom it 
may decide to receive oral testimony, The Committee may 
decide to advise any to submit his testimony in writing. 
Rule 36. The Committee, on the basis of the time 
avai~able to it, may limit either the number of witnesses 
or the time to be allowed to any witness. 
Rule 37. The Committee may refer to a sub-committee 
for study and report such written testimony as it may deem 
advisable. 
X. AMENDMENTS AND SUSPENSIONS 
Rule 38. These rules of procedure may be amended or 
suspended by a decision of the Special Committee taken by 
a majority of the members present and voting. 
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APPENDIX 5 
I. GROWI'H OF POPULATION IN P.ALESTil'ffi. (1) 
Moslems Jews Christiane Others Total 
1919 515,000 ~,ooo 63,000 5,000 648,000 
1922 589,177 83,790 71,464 7,617 752,048 
1931 761,922 175,138 89,134 10,145 1,036,339 
1935 836,688 355,157 105,236 11,031 1,308,l:l2 
].939 927,133 445,457 116,958 12,150 1,501,698 
].941 973,104 474,102 125,413 12,881 1,585,500 
1942 995,292 484,408 127,184 13,121 1,620,005 
1943 1,028,715 502,912 131,281 13,663 1,676,571 
1944 1,064.000 525,000 136,000 14,000 1,739,000 
1946 1,076, 783 608,225 145,063 15,488 1,845,559 
II. RECORDED IIDUGRATION. (2) 
X~ Total Jews Non-Jews 
1920 5,716 5,514 202 
1921 9,339 9,149 190 
1922 8,128 7,844 284 
1923 7,991 7,421 570 ].924 13,553 12,856 697 
1925 34,641 33,801 840 
1926 13,910 13,081 829 
1927 3,595 2,713 882 
1928 3,086 2,178 908 
1929 6,566 5,249 1,317 
1930 6,433 4,944 1,489 
1931 5,533 4,075 1,458 
1932 11,289 9,553 1,736 
1933 31,977 30,327 1,650 
1934 44,143 42,359 1,784 
1935 64,174 61,854 2,293 
1936 31,671 29,727 1,944 
19:37 1'2,475 10,536 1,939 
1.938 15,263 12;868 2;395 
1939 18;433 16;405 2;028 
1940 5,611 4;547 1,664 
1941 4,2'70 3,647 623 
1.942 3,052 2,1.94 858 
Statistical Abstract, 1943; pp. 2·a.nd iii. 
Sta.ti§t ical Abetra.ct, 1943, p. 12. 
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III. BETWEEN 1919 AND TRE END OF 1937 THERE WERE 313 030 
JEWISH IMMIGRANrS, OF THE FOLLOWilJG NATIONALITIES: (3~ 
NationalitY: 
Poland 
Germany 
u.s.s.R. 
Rumania 
Lithuania 
Yemen 
u.s.A. 
Othere 
Ntunber 
131,249 
35,346 
30,718 
15,528 
9,642 
9,181 
7,909 
73,457 
313,030 
Percent 
42 
11 
10 
'5 
5 
3 
3 
23 
10'0 
IV. THE RATE OF NAT URAL INCREASE PER 1, 000 PEHSOl'fS IN PAL-
ESTINE IS SHOWN OlT THE FOLLOWING TABLE. (4) 
Years Moslems 
1922-25 23.27 
1926-30 25~19 
1.931-35 24.97 
1.936-40 27,68 
1941-44 30.71 
Jewe 
20.44 
22~70 
20~91 
17;75 
17.83 
Christiane 
20~16 
20~60 
20.85 
20.77 
18.89 
V. A COI-rtiARISON OF THE PALESTINIAN RATE OF NATURAL INCREaSE 
PER 1,000 WITH OTHER COUNTRIES FOR SELECT YEARS FOLLOWS: (5) 
1921-25 
1935-39 
Palestine 
22.6 
25.4 
10.7 
6.1 
South Africa 
17.4 
14.9 
India 
6~'7 
11.4 
VI. COtnWRIES OF RECEPTION FOR Jh~SH REFUGEES (1933-43).(6) 
Countr;y 
.All eountri es ••••••••••••••••••• 
United States ••••••••••••••••••• 
No. Admitted (in thouea.nds) 
811 
190 
Percent 
100.0 
23.5 
(3) Royal Institute of International Affaire, Great Britain 
and Palestine, 1915-1945 1• London, 1946, p.66. (4} Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report, Washington, 
1946,p. 24. 
(5) Robert R. Nathan; et. al~, Palestine: Problem and Prom-
ise, Washington, 1946, p. 132. 
(6) The Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, Wash-
ington, D.C., March 1, 1947. p. 98. 
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Country Number l?ercent 
Palestine. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • 
. . 120 14.8 
England. • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • . . •• •• • • • • • • • • 65 8.1 
France •••••••• • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • ••• 55 6.8 Belgium ••••• • • •••• • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • •• • • • 30 3.7 Holland ••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
. . •• • • • • • 35 4.3 
Switzerland. ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 1.9 Spain.~ ••••• • • • • • • . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • •• 12 1.4 
other European Countries •• • • • • • • • • • ••• 70 8.8 
Argentina •• • • • • • • •• • • • • • ••• . . . • •• • • • •• 50 6.2 
Brazil ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • "* • • • • • • • • • 25 3.1 Uruguay •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• ••• • • • • • 7 0.8 
Bo1i via. •• • • • • • • • • •• J •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 1.r&, 
Cllile • •.••..•..•..... . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 1.7 Other Latin .American countries •• • • • • •• 20 2.4 China •••••••• • • • • • •• • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 25 3.1 South .Africa. • • • • . . ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 8 1.0 Australia. •••• •• • • • • ••• • • • • • • • •• • • •• • •• 9 1.1 Canada •••••••• • • • • • • • • • • .. • • •• • • • • • • •• 8 1.0 Other countries •••• • • • • • •••••• • • • • • • • • 40 4.9 
r 
' 
APPENDIX 6 
SECRET TRJ:ATY 
PARTITIONING ASIATIC TURKEY 
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,c. 
[This Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, was disclosed 
l>.y memoranda published in 191? by the Bolsheviets, who re-
pudiated i1t. :rt represented a eompromiee of intereste be-
tween the British support of the Arab nationalist movement 
and French imperialist ~bitions in S,yria~ 
Mfmprandum dated March 6, 191?. 
A.a a reeult of negotiations which took place in London 
and Petrograd in the Spring of 1916, the Allied British, 
French and Russian Governments came to an agreement as re-
gards. the future delimitation of their reepeotive zones &f 
influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as 
well as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State, 
or a federation of Arab States. The general principles of 
the agreement are as follows: 
1. Russia. obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, 
Van, B1tlis, as well as territory in the southern part of 
KUrdistan, along the line MUsh-Sert-Ibn-Omar-Amadjie-Persian 
frontier. The l.imit of Russian acquisitions on the mack Sea 
coast will be fixed later on at a point lying west of Tre-
bizon4. 
2. France obtains the coastal strip of S,yria, the vil-
ayet of Adana, and a territory bounded on the south by a line 
I 
I ! . 
I 
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Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the 
north by' a l.ine Ala.-Dagh-ZS.ra.-Egin-Eharput. 
3. Great ~itain obtains the southern part of Meso~ 
pot.amia with Bagdad, a:pd stipulates for herself in Syria 
the ports of Haifa and Akka. 
4. ~· agreement between France and England, the zone 
between the French and the British territories forms a con-
federation of Arab States, or one' independent Arab State, 
~he zones of influence in which are determined at the same 
t.ime. 
5. .AJ.exandretta is proclaimed a free port. 
~th a view to securing the religious interests of the 
Entente Powers, Palestine, with the HOly places, is separ-
ated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special re-
gime to be determined qy agreement between Russia, France 
and England. 
As a general ~ule the contracting Powers undertake 
mutually to recognise the concessions and privileges exiet-
ing in the territories now acquired by them which have ex-
isted before the war. 
They agree to aesume such portions of the Ottoman Debt 
h *I( sue as correspond to their respective acquisitions. 
-------·-·--
See-v. Henry Cooke & Edith P. Stickney, Readire in 
Euro ·ean International Relations Since 18 • (ew York ) 
Harpers & Brot ers, 1931 P. 27. Taken from the 
Manchester Guardian, Jan. 19, 1981 
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